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Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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9 APRIL 1987

WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC COMMENTARY SAYS REAGAN TRYING TO LEGITIMIZE SDI

OW030444 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 28 Feb 87

["International Affairs" program; Hung Bo commentary: "Reagan Is Pushing the Implementation of SDI"]

[Text] Lately, news from Washington bears witness to the fact that Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] program research is going ahead rapidly. The 1993-1995 period might witness the deployment of the its first stages.

The accelerated U.S. propagation of SDI will inevitably lead to the violation of provisions of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty which was signed in 1972. In connection with this, a new interpretation of this treaty is being put forward in the United States. In today's "International Affairs" program we will broadcast the views of our radio commentator, Hung Bo, under the title "Reagan Is Pushing the Implementation of SDI."

According to the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, the testing, development, and deployment of sea, air, or space-based antimissile systems, mobile land-based antimissile system, and their spare parts is proscribed for both parties.

In the 1970's the Soviet Union spoke out in favor of a broad interpretation of this treaty which would have meant that the treaty merely banned the deployment but not the testing or development of defensive weapons with new technology. The United States, for its part, spoke out in favor of a narrow interpretation of the treaty which envisaged a ban on testing, development, and deployment of all other defense systems, other than permanent ground-based defense systems.

During the 1980's as a result of the U.S. proposing the SDI program, the situation was reversed. Recently, there has been a tendency for opinions to be expressed in the Pentagon that suggest that SDI research has achieved great success. Now testing is being planned for a certain missile, a key component of the program, which will later be deployed in space. These tests can only be conducted if the ABM Treaty is interpreted broadly. Otherwise, the U.S. tests will be viewed by the Soviet Union as violation of the treaty.

The intention of the Reagan government to make changes in the interpretation of the treaty is being dictated precisely by a desire to legitimize SDI research.

In October 1986 at the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik, the Soviet leader demanded that the United States adhere to the ABM Treaty and limit, for the next decade, SDI research to laboratories. Reagan categorically rejected this Soviet demand, which led to an unpleasant end to the summit.

Reagan has finally decided to intensify implementation of his SDI program. Therefore, after the meeting he began to adopt a threatening pose. In November last year, the United States deployed its 131st strategic bomber, thus violating a provision of the SALT II agreement. On 3 February of this year the United States carried out its 25th nuclear test since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. In retaliation, the Soviet Union announced the resumption of nuclear tests which it had not conducted during a 17-month period.

Following this, Reagan, during the first 10 days of February, twice called a meeting of his senior advisors to discuss the question of early deployment of the SDI program and the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. These actions by the Reagan administration have caused, once again, concern among the West European allies as well as criticism by the international community. This, despite the fact that no final decision was made at the meetings and an expression of willingness was made to conduct consultations with the U.S. Congress and the U.S. allies, followed by further talks.

Mrs Thatcher, prime minister of the UK, and Craxi, prime minister of Italy, who was in London at the time, called on the United States to conduct more frequent consultations with its allies on the SDI program.

Van den Broek, the Netherlands foreign affairs minister, told correspondents that the Netherlands is concerned that the United States will reinterpret the ABM Treaty in order to deploy its SDI program early.

Prior to this, when the U.S. intention to deploy the SDI program early leaked from the same side of the Atlantic Ocean, Western countries had already expressed their concern. Kohl, prime minister of the FRG, sent a letter to President Reagan demanding adherence to the ABM Treaty. Similar letters were sent by Carrington, NATO secretary-general, to Weinberger and Shultz.

The above-mentioned actions of the Reagan administration were also met by protests within the United States. Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Commission, in his letter to President Reagan, warned that the Senate, in ratifying the treaty at that time did so from the point of view of a narrow interpretation. If the Reagan administration decided to implement a broad interpretation of this treaty without consulting Congress, this would lead to a deep constitutional crisis.

TASS, in its review, commenting on the meeting at the White House to discuss early SDI deployment, condemned the U.S. Government for inconsistency between its word and deeds. The Star Wars militarists, TASS emphasized, are stubbornly attempting to stop all possibilities to lower international tension, to place unsurmountable barriers at the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva, to ensure Washington's rejection of the Reykjavik agreement adherence to the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years, to torpedo this treaty, and to open new channels for an unchecked arms race.

All this clearly shows that in order to accelerate realization of the SDI program, the Reagan government will never retract its intentions to give a new interpretation to the ABM Treaty. If the United States is to act in this way, then it will invariably be reflected at the present Soviet-U.S. arms control talks, will ruin the ABM Treaty, will put an end to the hopes of reaching new Soviet-U.S. agreements on disarmament, will lead to a new spiral of the arms race between the superpowers, and will contaminate the new atmosphere of normalization of relations between the East and West.

The people of China and the people of the whole world do not wish to see this happen, particularly the people of the various European countries. The whole world is watching with deep concern the future actions of the United States and the Soviet Union.

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U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC PARTY JOURNAL ASSESSES REYKJAVIK OUTCOME

HK050441 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese No 1, 13 Jan 87 pp 17-20

[Article by Shi Jinkun (4258 6930 0981) and Cao Ye (2580 0396): "A New Stage in U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Talks as Viewed From the Iceland Summit"]

[Text] Abstract: The Iceland meeting not only reflected the latest developments and differences in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks but also further revealed the features and trends in the disarmament talks at the new stage. The Iceland meeting ended on an unhappy note, but the United States and Soviet Union will still maintain the momentum of the disarmament talks. Agreement by both sides on individual problems of less importance seems not far away. No matter what the development of the disarmament talks, the United States and Soviet Union will not give up the strategic attempt to seek hegemony on the basis of strength. The situation of combining talks with a contest will last. [end abstract]

The U.S.-Soviet Iceland meeting with arms control as its main topic of discussion was held from 11 to 12 October 1986. Given that the United States and Soviet Union are obviously getting increasingly close in their disarmament stands and given the time for agreement being still not ripe, no agreement was reached. The sides were divided on the problem of space weapons. This was another major move with the heads of both countries personally involved in a trial of strength since the United States and Soviet Union again started the Geneva talks in March 1985 with the bilateral struggle for disarmament entering a new stage focused on space arms. The meeting not only reflected the latest developments and differences in U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks but also further revealed the features and trends in the disarmament talks at the new stage.

1. Setback and Deadlocks in the Midst of Progress [subhead]

That the Iceland meeting ended on an unhappy note was not unexpected. Chief U.S. delegate to the Geneva talks Kampelman said before the Iceland meeting: "Much work remains to be done" between the United States and Soviet Union. "The Iceland meeting is unlikely to reach any arms control agreement." The Soviet Union took the initiative to suggest that a preparatory summit be held before the convening of an official meeting. Obviously, he had planned on the preparatory summit taking the place of the official meeting scheduled for the end of the year in case of failure to reach an agreement. Thus, Gorbachev could avoid losing face and also keep the road to dialogue between heads of state from being blocked. A retreat seemed to have already been prepared for. The meeting reached a deadlock over space weapons, but both sides, especially the Soviet Union, had made a very big retreat from the original asking price. The area of agreement between the United States and Soviet Union had obviously widened compared with before the meeting. After the meeting, both sides, while taking each other to task, admitted to progress having been achieved at the meeting. Reagan

said: The meeting "took a big stride forward in resolving most of the differences." Gorbachev also affirmed that "this is a hopeful meeting." Bessmertnykh, Soviet vice minister of foreign affairs, admitted that the meeting "was not a failure. It represented an important stage in the history of the development of Soviet-U.S. relations." "People can feel a certain sense of satisfaction that we have been so close for the first time in history in our viewpoints on solving the problem of strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons."

Confrontation over the problem of space weapons is the main cause of agreement not having been reached in a round of U.S.-Soviet talks. But even over this problem, there has also been a relaxation of tension. Concerning the time limit for testing and deployment, the Soviet Union suggested 15 to 20 years last June and the United States called for 7 and 1/2 years last August. Both sides have now settled for 10 years. The area of disagreement has changed from the original call for development or prohibition of outer space weapons to what kind of restrictions to be put on trial production. The Soviet Union insisted that the 1972 ABM treaty be strengthened, with research and manufacture forbidden in outer space. The United States, for its part, stressed that outer space testing should not be prohibited.

Concerning the problem of strategic weapons, the Soviet side gave up the stand about taking into consideration all U.S. nuclear weapons capable of striking at Soviet territory. The United States also no longer insisted on the demand for separate quotas chiefly aimed at weakening Soviet heavy-duty land-based strategic missiles. Both sides agreed to a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons as three in one (land-based nuclear weapons, submarine-launched strategic missiles, and bombers) in the coming 5 years, with delivery vehicles slashed to 1,600 and warheads to 6,000. By 1996, both sides were to cut down strategic nuclear weapons (later interpreted by the United States as various kinds of ballistic missiles) to zero. But the Soviet Union still treated restrictions on the U.S. SDI as a prerequisite. In a confrontation, the United States took the development of SDI as a guarantee for a reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

Regarding the problem of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union promised not to take account of British and French nuclear forces and to substantially reduce SS-20 missiles in Asia. The United States dropped the "middle program" for preserving some of the medium-range missiles in Europe upon which it had insisted. Both sides agreed to cut their medium-range missiles in Europe to zero. The Soviet Union would maintain in Asia, and the United States in its own territory, 100 medium-range missile warheads and freeze and negotiate a reduction in short-range missiles. But to force concessions from the United States, the Soviet Union changed its original stand that an agreement for medium-range missiles could be reached separately. It again stressed that it must be linked with other negotiations, kicking the ball over to the United States.

As to the prohibition of nuclear tests, Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union would no longer insist on U.S. commitment to a moratorium on nuclear tests. Reagan also declared that he would ask Congress to consider approving the 1974 and 1976 nuclear test limitation treaties. Both sides agreed to hold negotiations on the number of nuclear tests, equivalent weight, and other problems.

The Iceland meeting shows that the United States and Soviet Union are still unable to sidestep a sharp confrontation over the SDI problem. The conditions and the time for reaching agreement are still not ripe. But it also reflects quite some progress made by both sides in negotiations. Having understood both sides of the problem, we are not likely to erroneously make a too pessimistic or too optimistic assessment of U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks. A new deadlock is a setback in progress. This is

unlikely to lead to an interruption of dialogue. Just as Gorbachev said, this is "a failure encountered" by both sides "in getting close to an agreement" and "it is still possible to reach an agreement."

2. The Iceland Meeting Further Gives Expression to the Main Features of the U.S.-Soviet Disarmament Negotiations at the Present Stage (subhead)

1. The United States and Soviet Union both want to concentrate forces in a bid for "heights" of technical development and in a comprehensive national resources contest. The need to reduce existing nuclear arsenals has become more urgent than before.

There is, at present, not much room left for technological improvement in U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons. Before the end of the century, it will be difficult to tilt, for that matter, the general balance in military strength between the United States and Soviet Union. Therefore, both sides have directed attention to a contest in the new technological area, with a spending of up to U.S. \$1 trillion represented by SDI; the two are prepared to assert their roles in the early part of the next century. In addition, given the smaller possibility of a major war and the relative stability of the general situation, the United States and Soviet Union will concentrate on competition in the field of national resources. Since the 27th Congress of the CPSU called for "stepping up strategic development," the Soviet Union's attempt to free itself to concentrate on economic development has become more obvious. The U.S. Administration's huge budget and trade deficit also put great pressure on its armament policy. It has become necessary for both sides to formulate new contest rules, to reduce some hackneyed nuclear weapons to ensure economic development, and to apply financial and material resources where they are most needed.

2. The number of nuclear weapons has greatly exceeded strategic needs. A balanced reduction has become possible.

The United States and Soviet Union have, in their huge arsenals, a combined total of 50,000 nuclear missile warheads with a total equivalent weight of more than 10 billion tons, which, theoretically speaking, can annihilate mankind several times over. In a large-scale nuclear conflict, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could guarantee its own survival. Therefore, the possibility of an actual war involving nuclear weapons is at present relatively slim. The Reagan administration has stressed many times that the possibility of a large-scale nuclear war facing the United States is not great. Gorbachev has also affirmed that in the nuclear era, an overall war can no longer be described as an extension of politics. In terms of military strategy, both the United States and Soviet Union before the 21st century basically have no effective strategic defense means. An appropriate nuclear offensive and counter attack capacity could guarantee the sufficient effect of a deterrent. Excess capacity for destruction is not necessary and is also an extra military burden. Therefore, in the latter part of the 1960's, there was basically no change in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons. In recent years, the quantity of Soviet nuclear equipment has also stopped increasing. Meanwhile, both sides have been keen on improving quality and eliminating some outdated nuclear weapons. The establishment of future new strategic defense systems can possibly raise the hopes for the survival of nuclear defense capabilities and nuclear forces with which both the United States and the Soviet Union are well equipped. Under these circumstances, the time for a balanced reduction in a given number of offensive nuclear weapons has become ripe for both the United States and Soviet Union. This is one of the reasons the United States and Soviet Union have expressed agreement to substantially reduce strategic nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles.

3. The restraining effect of allies and other forces of peace on U.S.-Soviet negotiations that exists objectively has become increasingly obvious.

The U.S. and Soviet disarmament policies are chiefly subordinate to their bid for superiority. But given the continuous development of the world political situation in the direction of multipolarization and the strong desire for peace on the part of world opinion, including the people of both the United States and Soviet Union, with its keen demand for a U.S.-Soviet disarmament agreement, to win more support and improve their own strategic position, the United States and Soviet Union are compelled to give more consideration to the demands and pressures of allies and other forces of peace. The further affirmation by both sides at the Iceland meeting of the principle about a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, has, to a certain degree, catered to the demand of medium-sized and small countries for U.S. and Soviet leadership in first reducing nuclear weapons on a large scale. On the matter of medium-range missiles, the U.S. program demanding the preservation of some of the medium-range missiles in Europe has also taken into consideration the worries of West European countries about the absence of a strategic linkup between the United States and Europe. The U.S. demand for Soviet reduction of medium-range missiles in Asia takes into account Japan and other Asian countries' concern over the safe situation in the Asia-Pacific region. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has resorted to both hard and soft tactics. It has given up taking British and French nuclear forces into consideration and has agreed to reduce medium-range missiles in Asia. It has also recently again stressed the ties between a medium-range missile agreement and space weapons negotiations. There is also an attempt to win the sympathy of Western Europe and Japan and drive a wedge between the United States and Europe.

4. Confrontation over crucial areas is still the main aspect of U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks.

Generally speaking, the United States is relatively strong in its economic and technical position. It wants to take advantage of the Soviet plight and win military superiority in an arms race, while pinning down the Soviet Union economically. Therefore, it takes a relatively strong attitude in negotiations. Baset with more difficulties, the Soviet Union especially hopes to hold up through disarmament talks U.S. arms expansion, especially the U.S. SDI, and maintain the current military balance. It has therefore made more concessions. But the United States and the Soviet Union will not give up the strategic attempt to seek hegemony based on strength. They have taken restrictions imposed on the other and self-development as the fundamental aim of negotiations. Concessions by both sides will be limited. In addition, the influence of allies and domestic politics in the Soviet Union and United States will also add to the complexity of negotiations. The progress of negotiations has accelerated. But as far as such a crucial problem as space weapons negotiation and the talks as a whole are concerned, there are still difficulties ahead and a long process is involved.

3. It Seems Not Far Away for the United States and the Soviet Union To First Reach Agreement on Individual Problems of Less Importance [subhead]

The Iceland meeting deadlock has cast a shadow over the relations between the two countries. There will be continuous ups and downs, twists and turns, in future disarmament talks. The recent U.S. exposure of secret U.S. arms sales to Iran has put the Reagan administration in a plight, as it is kept busy coping with things. Its ability to decide on matters of arms control will inevitably be affected. But as far as mutual hopes for maintenance of dialogue and for formulation of a new set of arms race rules and their overall attempt to win over international opinion are concerned,

the United States and Soviet Union will always want to find a new way out. Just as a Chinese saying goes, "where the mountains and the rivers end, a new path suddenly starts, or in the midst of dense willow trees and bright flowers, a new village bursts on the scene." The U.S.-Soviet Geneva disarmament talks were adjourned last November. But early last December the representatives of both sides again held an unofficial meeting. Their state of mind in their hope for progress could be seen. Generally speaking, the less the area influenced by the U.S.-Soviet competition for technological superiority, the greater the possibility of concluding transactions.

If there is a breakthrough in space weapons negotiations, this will of course have a decisive stimulating effect on the whole situation, with things falling into place. But such a possibility is extremely slim. SDI is an important factor in the U.S. bid for superiority over the Soviet Union and also a trump card in forcing concessions from the Soviet Union in negotiations. The Reagan administration will never make any substantive concession. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, no agreement is better than an agreement incapable of restricting the United States, and the maintenance of continued pressure on the United States is more favorable. There has been quite little room for bargaining between both sides. A substantive agreement on space weapons reached in the not distant future seems almost impossible. But given something done for the sake of appearances by the United States and Soviet Union in the sense of limiting tests, the possibility of both sides concluding limited transactions exists.

Given tough going for space arms negotiations, the possibility of both sides seeking partial compromises in less important areas, such as medium-range missiles, nuclear tests, a partial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and so forth, while continuing marathon-like overall talks, is the greatest. On medium-range missile talks in themselves, both sides have actually had no great difference of opinion. At the end of the 1970's, the Soviet Union originally wanted to offset British and French nuclear forces with SS-20 missiles and sour the relations between the United States and Europe. But contrary to its expectations, the medium-range missiles deployed by the United States and Soviet Union in the early 1980's have actually produced results unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Militarily, the medium-range missiles deployed by the United States have constituted a serious threat to the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union's medium-range missiles pose no threat to the United States. Politically, U.S.-European strategic relations in their common fight against the Soviet Union have also been strengthened because of the deployment of medium-range missiles. Elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe can end the threat of U.S. medium-range missiles and also provide new opportunities for restoring relaxed relations between the Soviet Union and Europe. For the Soviet Union, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. It is estimated that the Soviet Union will not stick to its stand too long on linking a medium-range missile agreement with talks on other matters. West European countries are worried about the absence of a strategic linkup between the United States and Europe, the superiority of Soviet conventional forces, and the threat of short-range missiles, and hope for the U.S. preservation of some of the missiles. But because medium-range missiles are not a problem concerning the interests of the United States itself, and the U.S. strategic nuclear forces stationed in Europe and British and French nuclear forces can still allow a nuclear forces balance in Europe, the United States is unlikely to make too much of a retreat from the existing program just because of some West European countries' opposition. After the Iceland meeting, the heads of the FRG and Britain successively visited the United States. In meeting with President Reagan, both sides reached an understanding. The United States said that it would respect West Europe's interests and would, in medium-range negotiations, ask the Soviet Union to resolve the problem of an existing

imbalance between ballistic missiles within a range of 1,000 km in Europe and conventional units.

The FRG and Britain said that they agreed to the U.S. program for total withdrawal of medium-range missiles in Europe. The United States and Europe have got increasingly close in their stands. Given no unforeseen circumstances, an agreement is expected to be first reached in medium-range missile talks. Nuclear tests still represent an indispensable means in developing new weapons. There is no real possibility of an overall prohibition of nuclear tests by the United States and Soviet Union. But U.S. and Soviet nuclear test technologies, such as reduction of equivalent weights and so forth, have been quite advanced. A further restriction on nuclear tests will have no great effect on them. Therefore, there is still the possibility of both sides reaching agreement on further restrictions on equivalent weights, the number of tests, the locations, time intervals, and so forth.

The situation is relatively complicated as far as strategic nuclear weapons talks are concerned. The United States and Soviet Union still take nuclear weapons as a symbol of a power's status and an important part of national defence forces. In addition, the strategic defense system technology will be still premature in the next century. The most that can be done is to establish a small number of scattered defense points. There will be basically no change in the United States and Soviet Union relying on offensive nuclear weapons to maintain their deterrent forces. The proposal for so-called complete destruction of strategic nuclear weapons or all ballistic missiles in 10 years is sheer propaganda that cannot be realized. At present, reducing strategic nuclear weapons is an important pawn with which to force U.S. concessions in space weapons negotiations. The Soviet Union would not freely give it up. In negotiations, the United States still wants to seek restrictions on Soviet ground-based missiles, and the Soviet Union will count on placing restrictions upon U.S. bombers and sea-launched missiles. The solution of these thorny problems is no easy matter. It was reported that last November, the United States again proposed quotas for separate items demanding that the quota for ground-based ballistic missiles be allowed to stand at 3,300 and that for SS-18 and SS-24 heavy-duty missile warheads at 1,650. This was actually a retreat from its stand at the Iceland meeting about an agreed 50 percent reduction in various types of strategic nuclear weapons and a reversion to the original stand aimed at chiefly weakening Soviet heavy-duty ground-based strategic missiles. On 25 November, the United States again decided to exceed the ceiling set by the SALT-II Treaty, deploying the 131st B-52 bomber loaded with long-range cruise missiles. It is estimated that in strategic weapons reduction negotiations, the United States and Soviet Union cannot possibly conclude a treaty in the coming few years. But the possibility of reaching an agreement in principle to gradually achieve a 50 percent reduction entirely exists.

Summing up the above, we can see that the future possibility of both sides reaching agreement on medium-range missiles and nuclear tests exists. Agreement on letters of intent to reduce strategic nuclear weapons is also not impossible. On this basis, an official summit of the United States and Soviet Union is likely to be held. Regardless of the development of disarmament talks, there is no reversing the trend toward a new round of arms contests focusing on space weapons. The situation of the United States and Soviet Union combining talks with a contest will last.

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CSO: 5200/4062

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON U.S., WORLD RESPONSE TO INF PROPOSAL

Positive U.S. Reactions

PH040953 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 87 First Edition pp 1, 5

[Own correspondent V. Can dispatch under general headline "Important New Soviet Initiative, International Reactions to M. S. Gorbachev's Statement"]

[Text] A Wise and Promising Step

Washington, 1 Mar--In America it was half-way through Saturday when the news came from Moscow about the statement by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the important proposals contained in it.

The White House switchboard operator said: "Just a minute, I am trying to connect you." and literally within a minute I was speaking to Albert Bradsher, the press department duty officer.

"We have acquainted ourselves with interest with the Statement of General Secretary Gorbachev," Bradsher said. "According to our preliminary assessment, it is a positive development. We are now consulting our allies and have completed this work in the main...."

While Bradsher was still speaking I already got the impression that the administration's reaction to the new Soviet proposal was encouragingly positive. It could hardly be otherwise, I thought, after all the Soviet Union had again indicated a real way out of the impasse of the fruitless disarmament debate. This is so obvious that should the White House reject this proposal from Moscow it would definitively brand itself as an opponent of arms control accords.

This conclusion is further corroborated by the unusual interest with which the new Soviet initiative has met here.

As soon as the statement of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary was made public in Moscow, a "news explosion" occurred in the U.S. mass media. Literally within minutes of the publication of the statement, the CNN television network channels carried the gist of it. With the speed of lightning the news appeared on the teleprinters of all U.S. news agencies. As I was able to hear for myself, Washington radio stations carried reports about the

statement literally every 10-15 minutes, invariably introducing them with the following sentence: "The Soviet Union is displaying new flexibility in its approach to arms control talks with the United States."

I called at THE WASHINGTON POST editorial office. I asked the foreign news duty editor: "Have you received anything from your Moscow correspondent?" "Of course," he replies. "Celestine Bohlen has sent a report on M. S. Gorbachev's statement. We are front-paging it." Late that night, when the first edition of THE WASHINGTON POST appeared, I was able to verify that Bohlen's article was indeed carried on the front page, which is traditionally reserved for the most important, "key" materials. "Soviet leader M. S. Gorbachev," she writes, "declared today that the Soviet Union is ready to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe.... Gorbachev's statement is a challenge to the Reagan administration to back up its statements that a separate agreement on medium-range missiles could be achieved relatively easily with action. The CBS television network noted: "With an unexpected statement declaring that a separate agreement on medium-range missiles is possible, the USSR has paved the way to a major arms control agreement." Introducing its report with a sequence from the "Vremya" newscast, the ABC television network announced: "Mikhail Gorbachev has submitted a new proposal which makes it possible soon to conclude an agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles in Europe without linkage to other questions. This is a major step. Gorbachev has challenged the United States."

"This is a very positive development and, in my view, we can achieve much progress," S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview to the CBS television network. "Substantial progress has already achieved in Reykjavik. I believe that the USSR very much wants an agreement. We can now considerably reduce the missiles in Europe and help ourselves by strengthening our own security. In my view, the president now has a historic opportunity in the sphere of arms control, not just as regards medium-range missiles but also strategic arms. All the prerequisites are there, even if difficult negotiations lie ahead."

In turn, the ABC television network turned to M. Kampelman, leader of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, who said frankly: "We welcome this because it will enable us to come to an agreement without the need to negotiate the whole package. I expect that the talks on medium-range missiles will be continued with the aim of achieving a speedy agreement on this issue." Commenting on this statement, the ABC network noted that "if an agreement is concluded it could mark a major achievement of the Reagan administration." This is probably quite true, especially if you take into account that in recent decades the Reagan administration is the only one whose "service record" does not feature a single arms control agreement with the USSR. It is true also because--as many sober-minded Americans have immediately grasped--the Soviet Union is again giving the White House a real chance to achieve something constructive in the international arena.

"This is very good news because it means that the two powers are very close to signing an agreement on a very important issue. I have always believed that medium-range missiles are a field in which positive changes could be achieved

prior to Reagan's departure. The Soviet proposal is a way out of the impasse at the talks and therefore I assess it as very positive, S (Gotlib), the prominent disarmament expert, has said.

Lee Feinstein, who has for many years carried out research in the field of tactical nuclear weapons and NATO strategy, said: "This is a very wise step on the part of the Soviet Union. Every public opinion poll shows that the American people want an arms control agreement. As everyone knows, the present administration is the first one which has not concluded a single agreement with the USSR. Therefore, in my view, it has now been offered a magnificent chance to restore confidence in itself. Both sides stand to gain from a reduction of missiles in Europe."

Rear Admiral G. Larocque (retired), head of the prestigious Washington Center for Defense Information, told me: "The Soviet Union is again sincerely demonstrating its readiness to achieve arms control agreements with the West. It is obvious that the proposal to conclude a separate agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles will be received positively by both West Europeans and many Americans. If President Reagan could bring himself right now to pay sufficient attention to the problem of arms control, the best advice which one could give him is to join the USSR and take the first important step to reduce arms in Europe. The USSR's sensible approach to this problem shows that Moscow does not want to exploit the administration's present difficulties. I see the Soviet proposal as a ray of hope. This initiative of the Soviet Union can only be welcomed. It is quite capable of becoming the catalyst in the political process leading to arms control agreements. We should always remember the wise saying: In order to travel a thousand miles it is invariably necessary to take the first step. This is precisely what the Soviet Union has done. I find the Soviet proposal which is aimed at overcoming the impasse at the Geneva talks truly inspiring."

'Ball Now in Washington's Court'

PH041625 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[L. Koryavin, Washington dispatch: "How Will Washington Respond?"]

[Text] As soon as the first reports appeared here on the statement by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, it immediately became the subject of broadcasts by leading U.S. radio stations and television channels.

The statement by the Soviet leader has appeared on the front pages of American newspapers, accompanied by banner headlines. The U.S. mass information media are clearly displaying heightened interest in the new Soviet peace initiative. There are not only information reports on the statement. Commentaries and analytical articles by observers are being devoted to it.

The first commentary I heard on the statement was broadcast by CBS. It pointed to the fact that the administration is evading a solution to the main

problem of today--nuclear disarmament--and is the only administration in recent years that has failed to conclude any arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The point being made in the CBS commentary was that the White House must not miss this historic opportunity but must reach an accord with the Soviet Union.

A WASHINGTON POST commentary stresses that the Soviet leader's proposal to conclude a separate agreement on medium-range missiles opens the door to serious Soviet-American talks. THE NEW YORK TIMES also sees positive prospects opening up in the task of seeking ways to disarmament in connection with the Soviet leader's statement. The initial reaction by White House spokesmen has also appeared. Albeit cautiously, they are pointing to a "positive development of events" and the possibility of making progress at the negotiating table.

On the whole, Washington's initial reaction shows heightened interest in the Soviet proposals. Commentaries on the proposals reveal a sense of optimism and glimmers of hope that a way can be found out of the impasse into which the disarmament problem has been driven through the fault of the United States. Comments by Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicate the positive nature of the Soviet step, which opens up extensive opportunities for talks. Senators Steven and Lugar have also spoken optimistically on the subject. There are already signs that the Soviet proposal is meeting with a response among Democrats and Republicans alike.

It is important to point out that the logic and consistency of the Soviet peace proposals, including the latest proposal on medium-range missiles, has broken down the barriers which some would like to raise in the United States by cutting off the American public from the truth about the Soviet Union. I have read through dozens of newspaper columns and listened to commentaries on the majority of television channels and can attest that there is no longer the stereotyped approach whereby every step taken by the USSR on the road to peace is dismissed as 'propaganda.'

It is American propaganda that now has nothing with which to counter the serious arguments contained in the package of Soviet proposals. It cannot deny that the USSR is persistently looking for points of contact for the sake of achieving the historic aims of disarmament or that it is proposing successive versions of mutual accords.

Even THE WASHINGTON POST is now making this point. It quotes M. S. Gorbachev as saying: "We have been repeatedly assured that if the USSR were to isolate the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package, reaching an agreement on eliminating these missiles in Europe would not be difficult. This is now a good opportunity to prove this in practice."

At the same time, it is noticeable how the weight of the past still brings pressure to bear. WASHINGTON POST observer Jeffrey Smith spoke positively on the Soviet proposal on the whole, but his optimistic tone was mixed with doubts, as he drew particular attention to key differences. It is also noticeable how the forces of the military-industrial complex and their

propaganda apparatus have become agitated--generally opposed as they are to any accords--laying all their stakes on further shipping up the arms race, particularly in space.

Naturally, the way to eliminating arms is not easy. But it is being made easier by the Soviet peace proposals, including the latest proposal on medium-range missiles. How will official Washington react and what practical steps will it take in response to the Soviet Union's new constructive initiative? The ball is now in Washington's court.

'No Real Obstacles' to Agreement

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 4 Mar 87 pp 1-3

[A, Mozgovoy article: "Soviet Proposals Open Up Way to a Nuclear-Free Europe"]

[Text] The overwhelming majority of foreign political analysts and leaders say they highly value the new Soviet peace moves. Indeed, the Soviet Union's decision to take the medium-range missile issue out of the package of disarmament proposals discussed in Reykjavik testifies to this country's determination constantly to work towards mutually acceptable agreements and equal security. And the latest Soviet initiative is a new major step in this direction.

It would be appropriate to recall here that in Iceland the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to dismantle all American and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe within the next five years (the objective of the American "zero option" plan proposed several years ago), leaving 100 warheads on such missiles each in the Asian part of the USSR and on the national territory of the United States. In Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev also said that the Soviet Union was prepared to freeze the number of its missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometres and immediately to begin negotiations on their future. However, the U.S. administration's unwillingness to strengthen the regime of the ABM Treaty and give up "Star Wars" plans blocked the conclusion of an agreement.

What happened after the Reykjavik meeting? At first attempts were made to accuse the Soviet Union of deliberately linking its proposal on medium-range missiles to the issue of strategic and space weapons in order to dodge the solution to this problem. This is a malicious distortion of the Soviet position. In Reykjavik the Soviet side made a major concession by agreeing not to demand reduction of the French and British nuclear potentials and also the U.S. forward-based forces in Europe. That was the reason why the proposals on medium-range missiles were made part of a package.

Since the U.S. administration feels extremely uncomfortable about rejecting its own "zero option" plan, it organised attacks on an agreement on medium-range missiles by high-ranking NATO officers. American General Bernard Rogers, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander [in] Europe, said that "zero option" was "senseless." His West German colleague, General Wolfgang Altenburg, said

that the American medium-range missiles were part and parcel of the NATO defences and that without them NATO's strategy would collapse.

To back up those statements they raised the problem of longer-range missiles, that is missile systems with a range of less than 1,000 km, and alleged that the Soviet Union had superiority in this area. In actuality, there is no Soviet superiority. The NATO leaders simply "forget" to mention their Pershing-1, Lance, Pluton and Honest John missiles deployed in Western Europe.

Though we still believe that tackling the problems of nuclear disarmament in a package is the best way to achieve agreement in Geneva, Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal makes it possible to break the deadlock at the talks and refutes all propaganda allegations made by the West after Reykjavik. That is why the Soviet Union proposes tackling the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe separately from the other disarmament issues and concluding an agreement on them as soon as possible. As soon as the Soviet Union and the United States sign an agreement to dismantle their medium-range missiles in Europe, the USSR will withdraw from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, after consultations with their governments, its longer-range tactical missiles. As regards the other missiles in this class, we are prepared to immediately start negotiations with a view to reducing and eliminating them entirely. In short, there is a realistic opportunity to rid our European home of a large part of its nuclear burden. The Soviet proposals are on the negotiating table in Geneva.

There are no real obstacles to an agreement on medium-range missiles. And Washington has now been given an opportunity to back up its declarations of commitment to the cause of disarmament by practical actions.

(SOVETSKAYA ROSSIA, March 4, Abridged.)

NATO 'Wintex' Criticized

PH100929 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Mar 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS observer V. Vavilov: "Provocative Games"]

[Text] On 4-17 March, the North Atlantic Alliance is going to be conducting major command-staff exercises under the code name "Wintex-87."

The participants in the exercises will be rehearsing their operations in international crisis conditions over an extensive range of territory from Washington to Ankara and throughout Western Europe, including areas in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union and socialist community countries.

This rehearsal envisages taking "key decisions" in conditions, according to an official communication from the Bonn government's press information department, "as close as possible to those experienced in a crisis." The range of "key decisions" includes those relating to the organization of interaction between the bloc's various military and civilian organs for combat operations against the Warsaw Pact countries. Orders are to be issued for calling up reservists, industry is to be geared to meet military

needs, the government of each country is to be invested with "emergency powers," and "committees for the transition to wartime conditions" are being formed.

We do not as yet have full information on these exercises, but even the information provided by one country alone — the FRG — reveals their large scale. In the FRG alone, the exercises will involve 850 staffs of American, British, Belgian, Canadian, and West German troops. The West German "emergency government" headed by State Secretary W. Schreckenberger will run the country or, to be more precise, "run the war" from a government underground bunker near Bonn equipped with antinuclear and antiradiation defense.

How can these rehearsals for preparing for a nuclear missile attack in Europe be congruent with the real interests of the European peoples, who want to protect their home against nuclear catastrophe? Every intelligent person well knows that such a war would inevitably lead to the death of all living beings in Europe and throughout the rest of the world. The NATO strategists in their reinforced concrete bunkers seem to be totally devoid of common sense; they are unfamiliar with the new political thinking which leads to the only right conclusion, namely that the planet's safety and mankind's survival can only be guaranteed today by the joint efforts of all states and peoples, by political means rather than arms.

The new Soviet proposal to free Europe of medium-range missiles and of a considerable proportion of its nuclear burden in a short space of time offers the European peoples an historic chance to resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament and free Europe of nuclear arms.

'Positive' White House Reaction

OW050646 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0430 GMT 5 Mar 87

[From the "Novosti" newscast; Yuriy Rostov commentary]

[Text] The Soviet proposals for the reduction of medium-range missiles are being widely discussed abroad.

[Rostov] President Reagan made a special announcement. He emphasized that he welcomes the Soviet proposals and that even today the U.S. delegation will be introducing in Geneva a draft agreement on the reduction of nuclear missiles in Europe.

Obviously, from the time of first approving the Soviet initiative and introducing the draft agreement to the time that the appropriate document is signed, the road could very well be a long one. It could happen, as on many occasions in the history of Soviet-U.S. talks, that it will lead to a dead end. Nevertheless, in comparison to White House reaction to other Soviet proposals, this reaction was not only one of the quickest but, to the present day, one of the most positive.

What then is the reason for this? First, because the White House would certainly have found it difficult to react in a negative way to an initiative which in fact fully coincides with the official U.S. position. Secondly, both

inside the country and among U.S. allies, the pressure on the White House has now increased sharply. The anti-war government has recovered from its slump and is showing increasingly greater influence on U.S. political life. This can be seen from an analysis of the balance of power in the Congress, where after the fall elections the number of active supporters of disarmament has increased. This is also being demonstrated by the U.S. mass media. It is significant that the press, television, and radio are openly charging President Reagan with being the only president in the last decade who has failed to sign a single arms control agreement.

The position of the U.S. allies is also changing, especially in Western Europe. Certainly this process, when speaking about the governmental process, is a slow one. But the direction that it is taking is clearly demonstrated by the positive reaction of the U.S. allies--except for France--to the Soviet initiative.

It is impossible now to give an accurate prognosis to the prospects of realistic reduction of nuclear medium-range missiles. But it is obvious that the preconditions for this do exist.

World Reaction Favorable

LD070013 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 6 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The world public is continuing to comment on the Soviet Union's proposal for the scrapping of medium-range missiles in Europe. Over to Stanislav Kondrashov, IZVESTIYA political observer.

[Kondrashov] Hello comrades. Almost a week has passed since the Soviet Union, in Comrade Gorbachev's statement, proposed that medium-range missiles in Europe be singled out from the range of issues discussed at Reykjavik and that a separate agreement be concluded on them immediately. Of the foreign comments on this step, in my view the most significant is the positive attitude in the official circles of the West. Indeed such a friendly, positive attitude has not been displayed before to any Soviet initiative. The reason is simple: the Soviet Union has never before gone so far in accommodating the stance of the other side. London, Bonn, Rome, The Hague, Brussels, Copenhagen; everywhere officials have been talking about an important shift, and a reassuring proposal.

President Reagan, greeting Comrade Gorbachev's statement said: This removes the serious obstacles to reducing intermediate-range nuclear forces. In Geneva the Americans have put down on the negotiating table a 40-page draft treaty on the scrapping of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. Only an initial negative reaction from Paris struck a dissonant note, but President Mitterrand hurried to correct even that.

We all know how much hope has arisen in recent years for cutting nuclear arms: no fewer hopes collapsed, placid optimists disappeared. And now a difficult

round on questions of verification and also of short and reduced medium-range missiles lies ahead. Nonetheless, realists are saying these days that the most realistic and best chance of all has appeared for concluding the first Soviet-U.S. agreement for the past 8 years, the first since the signing of the SALT treaty in 1979.

The WALL STREET JOURNAL formulated the situation thus: Mikhail Gorbachev has put forward a proposal that the United States of America and its allies evidently will not be able to refuse. Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, gave a kind of answer to the paper: Why should we reject the proposal, if the Russians are just doing what we were calling for. We did not want linkage, and now they have said yes. We are very glad about this. We shall not argue with Kampelman about who said and did what, we shall not if the cause of peace and nuclear disarmament will gain the interests of all, the main thing is that this cause should not be hampered either in Geneva or in Washington.

By the way, Washington is also scrutinizing and sizing up the Soviet initiative from the point of view of the political situation within the United States. It is no secret that the Reagan administration has been greatly weakened by the development of the Iran-Congras scandal. According to logic of Washington sceptics, Moscow must play on these difficulties.

Meanwhile Moscow is throwing President Reagan a lifebelt, as one U.S. observer put it, in proposing cooperation in a cause which of course both the people and the Congress of the United States will appreciate. How is this to be understood, the sceptics inquire? Understand it, if you can, simply, sensibly and straight forwardly, in the spirit of the new thinking, as evidence of the constructiveness and broadness of the Soviet approach. Whatever the circumstances within the United States may be, in Moscow there is no wish to waste either time or chances for an accord in the cause of nuclear disarmament.

Austrian Foreign Minister Interviewed

LD081831 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1530 GMT 8 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; unidentified correspondent's interview with A. Mock, Austrian vice chancellor and foreign minister; date and place not specified, Mock, identified by caption, speaking in German with superimposed Russian translation; video shows interview taking place in a room — recorded]

[Text] [Mock] I think General Secretary Gorbachev's proposal makes a positive contribution toward reaching a disarmament agreement in general, precisely because it speaks of separating the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of general disarmament issues. This will facilitate the talks. I consider that every step toward disarmament, whether in the sphere of nuclear or nonnuclear weapons, should be implemented on the principle of reciprocity, and it should be obligatory that every step leads to a reduction of the level of military confrontation. There are two reasons for this: Only equality will give security to big and small countries, just as only equality and reciprocity will make it possible to use the liberated financial resources for the development of the civilian economy.

[Correspondent] What will Austria's policy be in regard to elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe?

[Mock] We will support disarmament proposals within the context of the Helsinki process and outside it, if they lead to positive results.

TASS Notes NATO Talks

LD092330 Moscow TASS in English 2312 GMT 9 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 9 TASS — Representatives of the United States and the Western European NATO countries on whose territory U.S. medium-range missiles are stationed are holding talks in Washington today, U.S. State Department spokesman Charles Redman said. He said that the representatives of five NATO countries met in the U.S. capital to discuss verification and inspection provisions of the American draft treaty on medium-range nuclear forces.

The U.S. delegation to the talks is led by Allen Holmes, U.S. assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs.

Foreign Ministry Briefing

LD101520 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 10 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 10 TASS — "It is with satisfaction that we note certain optimism over the developments in the West after the Soviet Union had made a proposal on medium-range missiles," spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry Gennadiy Gerasimov said.

Noting that U.S. allies today gathered in Washington to discuss this problem, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said that principled opponents of the arrangement on the matter are also rearing their heads in the West. Allegations are made that a wedge is being driven between the United States and Western Europe, that there is a delinkage between Western Europe and the United States in the sphere of defences, that the USSR will not agree to verification, and so on.

"But at the given moment we believe that the events connected with the Soviet initiative on medium-range missiles are developing quite well," the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said.

'Increasing Numbers of Doubting Voices'

OW120435 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1200 GMT 11 Mar 87

[From "The World Today" program, presented by Igor Kudrin]

[Text] Hello comrades, More than 10 days have elapsed since Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement on the liquidation of Soviet-U.S.

medium-range missiles in Europe was made public, but reactions to the new Soviet initiative continue. Politicians keep expressing their views. The Western press continues a lively discussion on our proposals.

Let me remind you that an overwhelming number of influential government figures and serious mass information media have reacted positively, assessing the Soviet leader's statement as a chance to solve the nuclear disarmament problem.

U.S. President Reagan not only reacted positively to the proposals, but also immediately recalled the head of the U.S. delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. Strauss, the Minister President of Bavaria, called it a winner of hearts. Such candor from him is surprising.

But days pass, and increasing numbers of doubting voices are heard from the sceptics and opponents of disarmament. It appears that, initially, the Soviet proposal simply shocked them and threw them into disarray by its boldness, suddenness, and willingness to reach a compromise. Now, they are regaining their composure and are thinking up arguments on how to avoid making the important decision. They cite difficulties on matters of control and verification; they speak of the imaginary huge advantage of Warsaw Pact countries in conventional arms; they demand new concessions from the Soviet Union.

Some statements are simply bewildering. Erickson, the leading U.S. Kremlinologist, called the Soviet proposals a great strategic trap. Lord Carrington, general secretary of NATO, is also wary of traps and deceptions. General Rogers considers Euro-missile agreement sheer madness. One of the leaders of the French right wing Rally for the Republic Party reached the conclusion that the best answer to the Soviet peace initiative would be for France to produce neutron weapons. Whereas the VOA commentator expresses, in his own manner, the love for nuclear weapons, typical of the inherent hypocrisy of this station--nuclear weapons are attractive to the West because of their cheapness, since the West has become accustomed to spending its excess funds on welfare.

As you can see, at times it is difficult to reason with some politicians and journalists. It is difficult to assert new political thought in international affairs. Yet, it is only this which is capable of erecting a barrier in the path to a nuclear war.

'Turning Point in Nuclear Disarmament'

PH111041 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Mar 87 pp 9, 14

[Fedor Burlatskiy "Observer's Opinion": "New Thinking--New Policy"]

[Text] The statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe is becoming a turning point in nuclear disarmament and in ending the race in all types of weapons. This conclusion follows not only from the very nature of this

major Soviet step but also from the reaction which ensued from the leaders of the United States, Britain, the FRG, and the overwhelming majority of other countries and, essentially, the entire international public.

Readers will already know about the position of the White House, Downing Street, and other Western capitals from our television and newspaper reports. Their reaction has been positive on the whole, although accompanied by certain provisos. Central television and press organs in New York, Washington, London, Bonn, Rome, Madrid, Brussels, and Tokyo have been optimistic about the prospects for the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles in Europe. Readers will of course be aware of the initial reaction from the French Foreign Ministry. However, President F. Mitterrand for all intents and purposes disavowed its position and stated that he had familiarized himself "with genuine interest" with M.S. Gorbachev's proposals and believes the prospect of removing or reducing Soviet and U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe is "in line with the interests of France and the world."

Everyone was waiting for a statement from President R. Reagan. The President made a special statement on the question, in which he welcomed M.S. Gorbachev's proposal and reported that U.S. representatives would shortly submit at Geneva their own draft text of a treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces.

An analysis of the response to the Soviet initiative makes it possible to highlight several questions that merit our attention. The first question is: What has prompted the present Soviet proposal, which separates the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from other arms reduction questions? All the official and unofficial commentators agree this represents an important Soviet concession, but they do not all interpret the motives, tasks, and goals of the Soviet leadership's new step as being aimed at ensuring a nuclear-free world.

Some see in it a desire to exploit the U.S. Administration's difficulties over "Irangate." Others perceive a goal of "outflanking" White House leaders and influencing Congress and U.S. public opinion to reject the administration's demand for increased appropriations for the SDI program. Others even claim the Soviet Union is attempting to neutralize the "propaganda damage caused by its resumption of nuclear tests." All these conjectures are extremely far from the truth.

The truth — as clear as day — is that new thinking requires new policies. The Soviet Union is pursuing a principled course — it tirelessly seeks ways leading to real results, mutually acceptable accords, and practical achievements in the disarmament sphere.

It is not hard to realize why it is the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe that has been separated from all the other disarmament problems. First and foremost because it is not linked with the U.S. "Star Wars" program as closely as, for instance, the question of a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms. Missiles in Europe mainly concern European security, whereas strategic arms and SDI mainly relate to the sphere of Soviet and U.S. security. Furthermore, on no other question has there been such a rapprochement of positions as on medium-range missiles in Europe. It is well known that the first such proposal was voiced by European socialist and social democratic parties. During the Geneva and Reykjavik summits it was on this point that the sides' positions seemed most hopeful. So the way was cleared for agreement. The present Soviet proposal completes the huge range of talks that have been held at various levels recently.

President R. Reagan has provided his own interpretation of the new Soviet initiative. On the one hand he noted that the initiative is in line with the accord he reached with

M.S. Gorbachev at the 1985 Geneva summit. On the other hand he laid particular stress on the fact that the Soviet proposal is the result of the firmness shown by the United States and its allies on the issue. He repeated the word "firmness" several times in his short statement, concluding it with the following sentence: "There is nothing more important for the cause of peace than our firm adherence to the NATO alliance and our other allies." Is it worth, though, scoring petty propaganda points in the face of a unique opportunity to conclude an historic agreement?

R. Reagan's statement sidesteps the main thing: the good will and capacity for sensible compromise shown by the Soviet leadership. Politics is the art of the possible. This diplomatic principle, which was laid down back in ancient times, is more important now than ever. The confrontation between the nuclear giants, the division of the world into military blocs, the emergence of new centers of power, and the need to take account of the numerous interests of various regions and countries all make the utilization of the "all or nothing" formula senseless and unrealistic. We need a policy that is firm about its ultimate goals and flexible in its methods of implementing them. We need practical steps toward a nuclear-free world. We need a start — and an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe is undoubtedly the best of all possible starts.

The second question is whether an agreement on this problem is feasible in the near future. In answering this question we must be sober and, to a certain extent, circumspect. The first official Western reaction was itself of considerable value. However, words are not as important as deeds. Nobody yet knows what form the draft treaty to be submitted by the United States at Geneva will take. Already many speeches by Western representatives are making various provisos, conditions, and allusions liable to complicate and delay successful progress toward agreement. This is despite the fact that the Soviet statement already contains necessary explanations on disputed points.

The question of operational-tactical missiles is being put forward once again. The statement says clearly that, first, as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR will withdraw its enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles from the GDR and the CSSR in agreement with the governments of those countries.

It is again claimed that the USSR has a "major advantage" in so-called battlefield nuclear weapons — short-range missiles. Without going into a discussion of the question of who has an advantage, we would note that the statement also contains a firm assurance on this score. Our country is prepared to embark immediately on talks aimed at reducing and totally eliminating other operational-tactical missiles. The Soviet position on equal [paritetnyy] reductions in its medium-range missiles in Asia is also clearly set out. In his speeches at Reykjavik and subsequently M.S. Gorbachev has left not a shadow of doubt about our readiness to implement comprehensive verification [kontrol] on a reciprocal basis to effectively monitor [proverka] agreements in the disarmament sphere.

Thus, technical questions and verification [verifikatsiya] problems are not an obstacle to an agreement, which could be rapidly adopted.

What can we expect from the U.S. President now that the Democratic Party has a majority in Congress, the fierce battle over "Irangate" is continuing, the game of musical chairs played by leading White House and other U.S. department staffers is not over, and the President himself needs a major personal success in connection with the sharp fall in his standing? Finally — and this is probably the main thing — what can we expect now that R. Reagan is bound by the clear commitments he made at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits?

Of course, these questions are easier to ask than to answer. Experience shows that the promptings of the U.S. President's heart and mind are hard to predict. Yet it is possible, without any great risk of making a fool of oneself, to make the following assumption: We are now closer to agreement than ever before. President R. Reagan has already demonstrated his capacity for certain compromises. The accords reached jointly during the Geneva and Reykjavik talks are an example of that. One can imagine the difficulty with which the President accepted the impermissibility of nuclear war, stated his abandonment of the quest for military superiority, and associated himself with the Soviet idea of the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century. His agreement to the zero option in Europe for medium-range missiles and to a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms is no less important.

Of course, he now faces a much harder problem -- it is necessary to switch from words to deeds. Will the President grasp this historic chance? We hope so.

In all the circumstances M.S. Gorbachev's statement represents the new thinking and the new policy in action. The future belongs to just such an approach.

IZVESTIYA on 'Spring Hope'

PM151435 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar 87 Morning Edition pp 4, 5

[Stanislav Kondrashov article: "Spring Hope" carried under "Political Observer's Opinion" rubric]

[Text] In that extraordinarily important and insufficiently stable sphere of international life called USSR-U.S. relations a new hope has been born: for the elaboration and signing of an agreement on the elimination of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe. Because it has coincided with the approach of spring, I shall call it a spring hope. The hope has sprung not from the intoxicating March air and sun which is climbing ever higher in the sky, but from political changes. It has at least two components.

First: M.S. Gorbachev's proposal voiced on 28 February that medium-range missiles be singled out from among the bloc of issues which were discussed at Reykjavik and that a separate agreement on them be concluded without delay. The Soviet Union opened up the Reykjavik package and went as far as possible to meet the U.S. position halfway by adopting the "zero option" put forward by President Reagan back in 1981, and agreeing to implement it separately, unconnected with the problem of strategic nuclear arms and space arms.

The second component: Reagan's administration, bogged down in the mire of the "Iran-contras" scandal and having lost a great deal of the American people's trust and also a great deal of its West European partners' trust, is seemingly beginning to drag itself out of this mire and it is not averse to making use of success in the arms control sphere as a towrope to pull it out. This is a sure means of increasing its popularity among Americans and also to restrict and weaken the stream of criticism on Capitol Hill.

This is how it looks to the authors of an article in the U.S. weekly, BUSINESS WEEK: "Now that the President is trying to clear the hurdle of the Iran scandal, Gorbachev has agreed to a compromise.... In a single move, the Soviet leader has resuscitated the fading arms control process, boosted his international prestige, and thrown a life preserver to the drowning President."

This expression -- a life preserver -- figures time and again on the pages of the Western press. It is inaccurate. It is not a question of rescuing or, on the

contrary, drowning the Reagan administration. Indeed this is not within the capacity of another power whose attempt to influence the processes of U.S. domestic life could have the opposite effect to the one expected. It is a question not of biding one's time, but acting. Biding one's time would mean a waste of time (until the end of Reagan's presidential term) and ahead lies the unknown -- who will take the place of the current President in the White House, what will be his political complexion and program, and how much time will go by while he is shaping his own policy in the sphere of arms control? Meanwhile the arms race would continue along all avenues.

Of course, in America the heirs of those who, in the McCarthy years used to look for communists under every bed, have not disappeared but have multiplied. Evans and Novak, the bywords for journalistic hawkishness, perceive a trap even in the life preserver insofar as by clutching at it, the weakened President would, out of a sort of gratitude fixation, make unnecessary concessions to the Russian rescuers. This is the latest primitive rubbish passed off as the fruit of sophisticated reflection. We will not succeed in reeducating Evans and Novak. I would like to advise their readers, nevertheless, to take a direct look at the subject. Proceeding from the interdependence of the world which objectively exists in the nuclear age, and also from the commonality of destiny, Soviet foreign policy rises above considerations of sympathies and antipathies. Like it or not, we have no possibility to separate ourselves from each other. We are destined to have each other as partners who are called upon to solve the common problems of the survival of our own peoples and of all mankind. We must shoulder this responsibility and, as M.S. Gorbachev's statement says, "tirelessly seek denouements which open up the way to mutually acceptable accords."

One such denouement has been proposed by Moscow. A partial one, on medium-range missiles. Because the other side is not prepared for a comprehensive and radical solution, it is refusing to accept the entire Reykjavik package.

Moscow does not want to keep the problem of disarmament in the latest state of deadlock, to do nothing, and wait for fine weather at the seashore -- the shore of the sea of U.S. politics which has been tossed by the biggest scandal of the current Presidency, by the failing activeness of the 76-year-old White House incumbent, and by the rivalry of the weakening Republicans and ever stronger Democrats, a rivalry broadening in the runup to the 1988 elections.

"Why should we turn down the proposal if the Russians are doing precisely what we were urging?" This was the question posed by Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation in Geneva. Americans a rank higher have also expressed themselves in the same spirit -- the President himself, Secretary of State Shultz, and even Defense Secretary Weinberger who automatically says "no" to everything emanating from Moscow. If you don't turn something down, does this mean that you accept it? The next few months will answer this question. In Geneva, where the seventh round of USSR-U.S. negotiations ended last week, the groups concerned with medium-range missiles have not dispersed but are continuing to work. Mr Shultz will visit Moscow from 13 through 16 April for meetings with his Soviet colleague, E.A. Shevardnadze and, obviously with M.S. Gorbachev. To judge by all accounts, the whole range of issues concerning the relations of the two powers will be discussed with understandable emphasis on the prospects for an agreement in Euromissiles. Inevitably suppositions have arisen concerning the possibility of a new summit meeting, just suppositions. It would be premature to talk about such a meeting on a concrete plane, but the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles would obviously provide a worthwhile foundation for holding it.

Such is the spring hope that has appeared over the half year since the autumnal achievements and disappointments of Reykjavik. It proves once again how difficult it is to forecast the development of a situation even for those who have studied the United States and our relations with the United States for many years -- for instance, the author of these notes. Two weeks ago it seemed to me that Reagan's administration

would hardly surface from the spinning whirlpool of "Irangate." The President has succeeded in avoiding accusations of covering up facts and in heaping the greater part of the blame not upon deliberate intent, but on a weak memory and also on National Security Council staffers of which the White House hastened to rid itself. Donald Regan, who became the odious protagonist of the scandal found himself overboard. A former senator, Howard Baker, was appointed as his replacement as White House chief of staff. He enjoys the respect of Washington's political circles and is capable of strengthening the administration's reputation on Capitol Hill and of preventing the exacerbation of the scandal surrounding the delivery of arms to Iran.

Without lurching to the other extreme, I would make the reservation that it is impossible to guess the twists and turns of the immediate future. The destructive potential of "Irangate" is not yet exhausted. At the present stage, the Reagan administration is looking more capable in the foreign policy sphere and the Soviet proposal which has come just at the right time provides the administration with the opportunity to display this capability. The President merely has to take his own branchchild — "the zero option" — seriously and ensure the kind of coordination of stances within his administration which is essential for drawing up an important agreement and which, alas, has so far been lacking for the most diverse reasons.

In a certain respect, the spring hope can be called a 3-percent hope. According to the calculations of the aforementioned BUSINESS WEEK, we are talking about approximately 3 percent of nuclear arsenals. To cite precise figures: 380 American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles, and 355 Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 missiles (with 841 warheads). After such a reduction it is still an extremely long way to a nuclear-free earth and an unarmed space, to the ultimate goal set by the Soviet Union's Reykjavik package. Something is better than nothing. It is better now rather than at some unspecified time. The goal of nuclear disarmament still stands. On the long and difficult path to this goal real and not declarative steps are needed, albeit just the first steps. Instead of the monstrous inertia of the nuclear arms race, it is necessary to create another kind of inertia — movement in the opposite direction. In pursuit of the ideal, great calculations of precisely this kind are riding upon the fragile spring hope.

Shift 'Encouraging'

LD151833 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Mar 87

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Stanislav Kondrashov]

[Text] If we take international life in its more traditional sense, with interstate diplomacy and not personal dramas, then the main trend of commentaries, just as in the preceding week, revolves around the shift in the situation brought about by Comrade Gorbachev's statement of 28 February. The possibility has become real and close, as never before, of concluding an agreement on the total elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. A positive attitude has been shown, as you know, both on the part of the United States and on the part of Western Europe, primarily those countries on whose territory American missiles are deployed.

Of course, by no means has everything yet been solved, but the shift that has taken place is really encouraging. It concerns the elimination of 380 American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles and 355 Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 missiles. The American weekly BUSINESS WEEK has estimated that this is approximately 3 percent of the existing

nuclear arsenals. It's not a great deal, not a lot, but all the same it's a first step in the direction of real nuclear disarmament.

The statement by the USSR Foreign Ministry representative published on 12 March singles out two factors which are also currently topics of discussion in the West. First, the question of monitoring [kontrol]. It was said that the Soviet side intends to devote particular attention to this question at the talks on an agreement. Second, the Soviet side is taking an understanding approach to the concerns of certain Western European states on the question of operational-tactical missiles. The statement of the Foreign Ministry representative says: We are ready immediately to begin talks on the reduction and total elimination of this class of missiles as soon as an agreement is signed on medium-range missiles. [video shows Kondrashov speaking to camera]

'Continues To Excite World'

PH161509 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Vladimir Peresada "International Review"]

[Text] Acclaimed by the Whole World [subhead]

Last week M.S. Gorbachev's 28 February statement remained at the core of discussions and reflections by sociopolitical circles in dozens of countries and commentaries by the press of all orientations, just as it was in the first few days of March. It can be said that it continues to excite the world. Here is a typical feature. As more reactions emerge, the more clearly we can perceive a unique fact: a worldwide positive assessment of the proposal for the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe.

To what can this be attributed? First, I think it can be attributed to the actual scope of the Soviet initiative. After all it is clear that, on a broad scale, its implementation would accord with the interests of countries not only in Europe but also in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. Second, to the fact that the USSR's proposal lays real foundations for practical actions. "Having withdrawn the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the total package of arms which were discussed in Reykjavik and having called for the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on this problem, the Soviet leader has achieved the withdrawal of the most difficult obstacle in the way of the decisive stage of East-West talks," according to the Bonn newspaper GENERAL-ANZEIGER. This assessment is essentially the same as most other assessments in Western countries, including the United States. This is an admission of an abiding fact: By means of its proposal the Soviet Union has taken a major step toward the West, making it possible not only to bring the positions closer but also to elaborate a detailed agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe.

What specifically are we talking about? Let me recall that it was agreed at the USSR-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik that the USSR and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe within 5 years. Within the same period the number of Soviet missiles of this class in the Asian part of our territory would be reduced to 100 warheads with the understanding that the United States could retain the same number of medium-range missile warheads in its national territory.

It is envisaged that, as soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR would withdraw from the GDR and the

CSSR, in agreement with these countries' governments, the longer-range operational-tactical missiles which were stationed there as countermeasures to the deployment of Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in West Europe. Regarding other missiles for operational-tactical purposes, the USSR is prepared to embark at once on talks about their reduction and complete elimination.

Now, since Washington has accepted the Soviet proposal in principle, it is up to the USSR-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva to immediately prepare a joint draft treaty on medium-range missiles. Even though the seventh round of these talks ended a few days ago, the group dealing with the problem of medium-range missiles is continuing its work by mutual agreement. This unusual but no doubt positive event is directly linked with the soviet initiative. Our proposal was immediately placed on the negotiating table, and a U.S. draft treaty was submitted just before the end of the round. Even though it is complicated and overloaded with technical details, there is no question that everything in it that corresponds with the meaning and spirit of the Reykjavik decisions will be received by us in a businesslike and constructive fashion. Much intense work lies ahead, and the Soviet side is ready for it.

Not To Miss the Chance [subhead]

For the talks to be fruitful, what is primarily necessary is a political atmosphere contributing to this. It is here, however, that matters are far from simple. It is, after all, no secret that both in the United States and in West European NATO countries there are influential circles which are appalled by the very idea of reducing the nuclear arsenals. Former ardent fans of the "zero option" on Euromissiles, now they make no secret of the fact that they were bluffing and are using their press to threaten some sort of "dangerous consequences" from the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. They have also launched a collection of diverse conditions, "provisos," and so on. Their obvious goal is to disrupt the atmosphere and distract attention from the essential points.

One of the ruses is the emphasis placed on the question of "inspection and verification." This question is now being treated as almost more important than the future agreement itself. A conference of representatives of the United States and European NATO countries on whose territories the U.S. medium-range missiles are stationed, held a few days ago in Washington, was especially dedicated to it. What does it all boil down to? According to THE WASHINGTON POST, it boils down to "presenting the Soviet Union with the harshest demands ever made regarding on-site inspection, which would make it not just very difficult but simply impossible."

It could not be said more cynically. Why is such a play on verification possible? Simply because our position on this question is diligently kept a secret from the public in the West. All this is irresponsible and fickle. After all, the Soviet Union is interested as much as the United States in reliable verification of the observance of accords. It would not be inappropriate to recall that it was Washington that repeatedly rejected in the past the Soviet proposals on verification, including those envisaging on-site inspection, and the initiatives on the utilization of international inspections. Verification poses no problem for the Soviet Union provided, of course, that it is commensurate concerning the United States.

There are also other obstructionist capers. This, for example, is how far K. Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has gone. Using the tone of an ultimatum, he declared at a news conference that the 100 warheads which are envisaged to remain in the Asian part of the USSR territory must without question be stationed wherever the Americans indicate. In such an event, it would be logical to

assume that the Soviet Union, in its turn, would be free to make demands as to where the 100 U.S. warheads would be. Nothing of the sort! "This is not up to them," Adelman said. "We will leave the warheads wherever we want."

One could, of course, make allowances for the fact that Adelman is famous as an outright "hawk." It must be borne in mind, however, that there is a whole pack of people like him in Washington. After all, a swoop by hawks is the only term to describe the report "On Soviet Nonobservance of Arms Control Agreements" sent to the U.S. Congress a few days ago. Everything contained in this forgery, which incidentally is the fifth in the last few years, fits in with the fabricated premise that the USSR apparently does not honor its pledges under the SALT I, SALT II, ABM, and other treaties.

Why have they felt anew the need for this lie, which, incidentally, has already been refuted in the United States itself by both university experts and the Center for Defense Information public organization and even within the CIA itself. The reason why is clear: to step up the propaganda of the USSR's "destructive image" now that a real opportunity has emerged to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles and, in the event the talks fail through the fault of the United States, to shift responsibility to the Soviet side.

Is the new secret directive on military policy in space, just signed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, not an equally provocative action? It is reported that it envisages an entire package of measures within the framework of the "Star Wars" program, including preparations for the creation [sozdaniye] of military space stations. This directive also appeared at the height of the move toward accord on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Meanwhile, people in the United States know perfectly well that, while separating out the problem of these missiles now, the USSR, as before, considers it highly important to reach agreement on the substantial reduction and subsequent elimination of strategic weapons which, of course, must be conditional on a decision to prevent the stationing of weapons in space in view of the organic interconnection of these questions. They know this, and yet they are still trying to erect artificial barriers across the path of freeing Europe from part of the nuclear burden and of nuclear disarmament as a whole.

Everything indicates that the struggle for a nuclear-free European home will be far from easy. Despite the difficulties, however, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe is possible, and it is prepared to contribute to it by all means. As a spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry declared, the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks has clear instructions to pursue the elaboration of a specific and reliable agreement within the briefest possible period. We expect the same constructive approach from the United States.

For Security in Asia [subhead]

"The Soviet leadership supplements its antimissile pressure in Europe with a new round of peace offensive in Asia." This is how the Indian newspaper PATRIOT both figuratively and correctly described the visit to Australia, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam which USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze completed this week.

These countries differ from one another, if only from the viewpoint of national background. Let alone the fact that some of them differ sharply in terms of their social systems and foreign policy principles. Take capitalist Australia, for example, which belongs to the ANZUS bloc together with the United States or, as another example,

Vietnam which is an active participant in the Nonaligned Movement and equal member of the socialist community. These states do have something in common. They are situated in the same — vast and troubled — Asian and Pacific region.

The route taken by the Soviet minister is directly linked with the USSR's desire to ensure that this region, where a considerable part of our own territory lies, is neither a source of tension nor an arena of military confrontation. The subject of the struggle for security in Asia and the Pacific was the main topic of all talks conducted by the leader of Soviet diplomacy in the course of his trip.

Our desire to discuss this topic time and again is based on the obvious fact that tension and worries can be reduced only through common joint efforts by states in the region. A need for such efforts does exist, and a major one at that.

Recently there has been a noticeable stepping up of attempts by U.S. imperialist circles to use the Asian and Pacific region as yet another zone of global military-political confrontation. The Pentagon is striving to create there a zone for the deployment of forward-based nuclear means, like the zone already existing in Europe and the contiguous Atlantic.

Even though two of the Pacific states with nuclear weapons — the USSR and the PRC — have pledged not to be the first to use them, the United States has stationed delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and nuclear warheads in one of the crisis zones, the south of the Korean peninsula. U.S. fighter-bombers meant to deliver nuclear strikes are stationed on Japanese territory. Right now the annual "Team Spirit" U.S.-South Korean maneuvers are being held once again to the south of the 38th parallel. Plans are being hatched to knock together a Washington-Seoul-Tokyo bloc.

The Soviet Union, and this was proved once again by the USSR foreign minister's trip, invariably opposes the U.S. "reliance on force" with a program to improve the situation in the region and to involve it in the process of creating an all-embracing system of international security. This program, set out in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok, just like the concept of building a nuclear-free and nonviolent world enshrined in the Delhi Declaration, provides a political basis for any "round of the peace offensive" by the USSR in Asia, including the latest.

Observers note the growing popularity of the USSR's approach toward Asian and Pacific affairs and of its course of strengthening international security as a whole. Full support for the Soviet Union's peace-loving policy was declared anew by the leaders of fraternal Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The joint documents which have been published say that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia can continue to count on the Soviet Union's invariable support in resolving tasks involving the defense of freedom and independence, the development of all-round cooperation, cohesion, and mutual assistance between the three Indochina states, the improvement of the situation in the region, and the establishment of lasting peace and stability there.

The talks demonstrated proximity or coincidence of positions with Indonesia on many fundamental problems of our time, including questions of curbing the arms race. The Indonesian side expressed support for the constructive ideas underlying the speeches by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok and Delhi. There was confirmation of mutual interest in the further strengthening and expansion of our relations which, as is well known, have had both high and low points.

There can be no question that points of contact were also found with Australia. Both sides spoke in favor of the deepening of political dialogue and the development of broad and stable cooperation.

Canberra highly appraised our initiative on medium-range missiles in Europe, while the

Soviet side emphasized that the USSR has joined the Rarotonga Treaty in support of the efforts of Australia and like-minded neighboring countries in the region to create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.

The situation in Southeast Asia, including the situation around Cambodia, was discussed at different stages of the trip. Advocating a most speedy political settlement around Cambodia, the Soviet Union believes that the basis for such a settlement has been outlined in the well known proposals by the PRK Government and the joint foreign policy documents of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and it supports their approach toward this question. The USSR's firm intention to further pursue a line of developing friendly relations with countries situated in Southeast Asia, and with ASEAN countries in particular, was also expressed during the trip.

Western propaganda, and U.S. propaganda in particular, has been claiming recently that the growing activeness of Soviet diplomacy in Asia and the Pacific is apparently "preparation for expansion." I assume the visits which have taken place have proved clearly enough the groundlessness of these fabrications about our country and its policy, whose aims are nothing but mutual understanding, respect for other states' interests, and equality and partnership for the sake of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world.

Aspin Remarks Derided

PM181003 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[Reprint of article in 9 March issue of the magazine DEFENSE NEWS by correspondent Timothy Christman followed by an article by PRAVDA international observer Yuri Kuznetsov in response to it published under the rubric: "Different Viewpoints"]

[Text] "'The United States Must Keep 50 Medium-Range Missiles in Europe,' Congressman Aspin Warns" [headline of Christman reprint]

According to Congressman Aspin, in order to maintain political stability in Europe, the United States must reduce its medium-range ballistic missiles "to approximately 50" instead of accepting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal on their total elimination.

Aspin, chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, stressed in an address to defense industry representatives last Tuesday, that the Geneva INF talks are a political rather than military problem. He added that Gorbachev's proposal on eliminating all U.S. Pershing and ground-based cruise missiles, along with Soviet SS-20 and SS-4 missiles, had satisfied left-wing forces, but had displeased right-wing forces in Europe.

According to Aspin, the left wants the withdrawal of all U.S. missiles from European territory, whereas the right views these missiles as a sign of U.S. dedication to the use of nuclear weapons for the defense of Europe.

"If you want to get a politically stable solution out of all this, it is necessary to reduce the number of missiles to an equal level on both sides...and reach agreement on verification," Aspin said.

The Armed Services Committee chairman told the participants of the quarterly seminar in the Congress that verification would be the biggest obstacle to the implementation of

his idea of retaining approximately 50 missiles on either side. He added that the Reagan administration has elaborated a proposal on verification of the observance of a ballistic missile agreement, which, in his opinion, is "too rigorous."

"To all appearances, it is a very rigorous proposal requiring a large number of on-site inspections," he said. Aspin added that the proposal had been sent to some European allies and they took a "very negative" view of it.

Despite the problems which, he believes, will crop up if the zero option is adopted, Aspin says that it will give the correct signal to left-wing political forces in Europe. "The signal is that a buildup is important for reductions," Aspin stated.

"Left-wing forces in all countries believe that peace can be achieved by cutting one's own weapons," he explained. "I think that to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union, buildup (of armaments) is necessary." Aspin pointed out that if Europe had not gone along with the deployment of Pershing and ground-based cruise missiles, the likelihood of the Soviets' dismantling their own SS-20's would be effectively zero.

A Cat Emerges [headline of Kuznetsov response]

In our view, L. Aspin's speech essentially reflects Washington's current desire to reassure the representatives of the mighty military-industrial complex -- don't worry, it says, we will not allow a sharp reduction in missile arsenals, and even if we have to hold talks we will make an accord dependent on tough verification demands.

How does this square with the congressman's view that the Reagan administration has elaborated a proposal on verification of a ballistic missiles agreement that is "too rigorous"? Aspin points out that certain U.S. allies took a "very negative" view of this proposal. Essentially he is telling the White House that it must operate more subtly, since excessive verification demands betray a reluctance to make a serious contribution to arms reductions.

Aspin makes a specific proposal: Not eliminate medium-range missiles altogether, but... leave "approximately 50"! In other words, the representatives of the "defense industry" in the United States will get their own way. The people in the West European capitals who see the shadow cast by the palisade of U.S. missiles as an essential part of their countries' future will also rest easier.

But to appease U.S. and other apologists of nuclear deterrence even further, Aspin concludes that only the "Left" wants all U.S. missiles withdrawn from European territory. It also generally believes, says the U.S. figure in an attempt at irony, that arms reduction serves peace. Then a rather large cat emerged from Mr Aspin's bag of arguments -- "I think that to achieve an agreement with the Soviet Union it is necessary to build up armaments." The gentlemen participating in the quarterly seminar, those defense industry profit-mongers, can breathe easy.

It is an old song, long since refuted by life and history. You can get nothing from the Soviet land by force -- one will understand this if one tries to take an unprejudiced view of the course of world events and of the correlation of forces.

In conclusion, one has to set such an authoritative opponent right on a specific matter: Who, after all, is to blame for the presence of entire flocks of missiles with nuclear warheads on European soil? Our country has never had imperial ambitions in Europe, it has never threatened neighbors, and it has never tried to steal a march on enemies in stockpiling and improving weapons. The Soviet Union's foreign policy

actions are determined not by juvenile considerations: "If you do that, I'll do it too," but by the general peace-loving nature of our policy as a whole.

Reactions from all over the world to the Soviet proposal on concluding a separate agreement on the total elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and sharp cuts in them on the territory of the USSR and the United States show that this initiative is seen as a real opportunity to impart momentum to the entire process of arms limitation and reduction. Does Congressman Aspin, who has often displayed considerable common sense in his approach to topical issues of the world situation, not see this?

Aspin on 'Political Targets'

LD172242 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] A report from Washington says that Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who is viewed as being one of the major U.S. congressional specialists on defense policy, has spoken out against the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. In his opinion, a certain number of these missiles — carrying from 50 to 100 warheads — must remain. Here is a latest news commentary with Viktor Levin at the microphone:

[Levin] The main thesis on which all Aspin's arguments are based is that Pershing-2's and cruise missiles have, so he says, a political significance rather than a military one. To a large extent, says Aspin, these are political missiles that are aimed at political targets in Western Europe. Such targets, in the congressman's words, are the ties of alliance between the United States and the West European states, and the missiles are supposed to reinforce these ties. The question of alliance links and mutual obligations in the NATO bloc is, of course, not simple.

It is known that there are political figures in Western Europe as well who consider it expedient not to completely dismantle medium-range missiles, but to limit reductions in them. These days there are few who are resolved to speak openly about this, for to speak from the same positions as those that Aspin defends means to speak out against the zero option. Though Aspin himself sees no difficulty in this, the zero option, he says, was a device — I quote verbatim — a device for affecting public opinion. Western Europe, it is thought, in frivolously rejecting what was for many years a trump card, would be acknowledging political shamelessness. But Aspin himself, I repeat, does not let this stop him. He evidently thinks that all means are alright in politics, both sophist's affectations that the missiles serve, as he says, not military but political aims, and the cynical acknowledgement that the discussions about the zero option were intended to deceive the public.

These are the means, but what is the aim? It clearly boils down to a striving to prevent humanity from achieving a nuclear-free world. It is, of course, impossible today to oppose the demands for cutting nuclear arms. Hardly anyone could allow themselves to reject the Soviet initiatives on the doorstep, as it is termed. While quietly piling up obstacles on the road to a nuclear-free world, by roundabout ways, rejection is considered to be possible in the West. This is why arguments on the political character of the U.S. nuclear missiles, which are aimed at ignorant people, are being put into circulation. But there are fewer and fewer ignorant people in our times, and people are understanding better and better what lurks behind the words of political figures. Do they want to rid humanity of the threat of nuclear annihilation or not? Aspin, as can be judged by his statements, has no wish for this.

CD Delegate Comments

LD171508 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0530 GMT 17 Mar 87

[Text] The disarmament conference is continuing in Geneva. A quarter century ago, the first session took place of this body for multilateral talks organized with the aim of drafting and coordinating an agreement on arms limitation and disarmament. This forum drafted a number of important international agreements in force today. However, in recent years the conference has been marking time as the saying goes. This stagnation is connected first and foremost with the position taken by the Reagan administration. Nevertheless, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, supported by the nonaligned states, success has been made in appreciably improving the situation at the conference. At present, talks are being held on banning and scrapping chemical weapons. This is what Yuriy Konstantinovich Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, said in an interview to our correspondent in Geneva:

[Begin Nazarkin recording] The aim of these talks is to draw up and conclude a convention that would exclude this kind of mass destruction weaponry from the life of mankind's society. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement of 15 January last year, in which he put forward a proposal on the banning of chemical weapons, initiated the beginning of an active phase of talks. In the course of last year, and this year too after the conference resumed on 3 February, the Soviet Union has put forward several series of proposals in the sphere of banning chemical weapons that have helped to shift the talks to a decisive phase and has made the concluding of a convention this year quite realistic. Active work is going on at the talks now to agree on the provisions of the convention. The matter of averting an arms race in space is very important. It is being examined, as is known, at both the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons and here at the disarmament conference. The point is that space does not surround only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also all other countries and peoples. Therefore, great attention is being devoted to this issue at the conference.

In describing the mood of the present situation at the conference one must not pass over the huge impression that has been made on its participants by the advancing of a new initiative on medium range missiles by the Soviet Union. Of course, this proposal only concerns the appropriate armaments of the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the significance of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on this issue would far exceed the bilateral limit. This is very well understood here and the Soviet initiative is welcomed. Its implementation would help in resolving many other problems including those on the agenda of the disarmament conference. [end recording]

U.S. 'Conditions' Noted

PM171407 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Koryavin dispatch: "What Americans Think About the Soviet Proposals"]

[Text] Washington--The topic of arms control, which has received a new impetus in the form of the statement on the elimination of medium-range missiles issued by M. S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, continues to be discussed in Washington political circles.

It is also featured in newspapers, television broadcasts, and speeches by state and public figures. Things that were suppressed for years have come into the open recently.

No one any longer dares to distort the truth and to deny that the Soviet Union has put forward constructive initiatives which open up real opportunities for achieving accords in the disarmament sphere.

Up to a point, the tenor of U.S. press reports is also changing. *TIME* magazine, for instance, emphasizing that the reaction to M.S. Gorbachev's statement is "very favorable," cites pronouncements by both American and West European politicians which reflect a certain amount of optimism about the prospects of the talks. The magazine describes the Soviet proposal as a "substantial step forward" and points out that "both sides have reason to seek the conclusion of a disarmament agreement."

M. Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks, is currently in Washington for consultations with the U.S. President. In his interview on the MacNeill-Lehrer program on television, certain key changes in his approach to the Soviet-American dialogue were noticeable.

In addition to his meetings with R. Reagan who, as reported, expressed a positive attitude to the Soviet proposals, the U.S. representative had talks, or rather -- as he emphasized -- "exhaustive consultations" in various U.S. departments including the military and the intelligence departments. He came to the conclusion that there is a real opportunity now to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles and then to tackle accords on reducing strategic arms.

However, despite all the optimistic assessments, it is impossible to overlook the fact that most U.S. commentaries invariably cite all sorts of conditions with respect to future accords such as, for instance, the need to set up a special institution for "inspection and verification" (*inspektsiya i proverka*) and present distorted facts about "Soviet superiority" in conventional arms or operational and tactical missiles. This is also true of the selfsame Kampelman interview in which, while assessing the prospects of the talks positively, he expressed many reservations.

Another detail is also illustrative: The fact that the Soviet Union has put forward more than one proposal on other types of nuclear arms and that it has emphasized that it is ready at any time to embark on practical talks on disarmament in other spheres is being suppressed in the United States.

Demands in the shape of ultimatums have also been expressed there. It has been said that, allegedly, it is necessary first of all to carefully calculate the balance of forces in Europe and only then to eliminate the Pershings. This is precisely what Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has advocated, pleading "supreme national interests." He complained that an agreement of medium-range missiles "could weaken the West European defense system."

However, observers perceive narrower than "national" interests in this new statement by S. Nunn. As is known, the Democrat from Georgia is planning to run for president and, according to observers, he does not want to give the Republicans the chance to conclude an agreement on arms control which the U.S. voters have long been calling for. They take the view that stopping the arms race is precisely what is in the national interests of the United States.

'Trap' for Reagan

LD210012 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1715 GMT 20 Mar 87

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, presented by international commentator Sergey Pravdin, with international journalists Sergey Losev, Aleksandr Lyutyy, Vitaliy Sobolev, Vyacheslav Lavrentyev, Igor Surguchev, and Vasiliy Lesovik]

[Excerpt

[Pravdin] One forms the impression that somebody or other in the U.S. Administration is attempting to portray even the Soviet Union's latest proposal on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe as virtually a trap for Ronald Reagan, is that not so?

[Losev] It is incredible, but it is a fact. That is precisely the way it is. Extreme right-wing circles in the United States are now warning the President in all manner of ways about certain dangers in an agreement with the USSR on medium-range missiles. THE WASHINGTON POST even gave space to an article headed: Gorbachev's Proposal is a Cunning Trap. And that is being said about a fair proposal by the Soviet Union to separate the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the package of issues, and to conclude a separate agreement on it, and, moreover, to do this without delay. There is simply not a basis for such a step, but there is virtually an accord drawn up. It was agreed in Reykjavik that over the next 5 years the USSR and the United States would eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe. In the same period, the quantity of Soviet missiles of that class would be reduced in the Asiatic part of our country to 100 warheads, on the understanding that the United States could leave the same number of warheads on medium-range missiles on its national territory.

As soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR will withdraw from the GDR and Czechoslovakia, with the agreement of the governments of those countries, the enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles that were sited [razmeshcheny] there in response to the deployment [razvertyvaniye] of Pershing-2's and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

As far as other operational-tactical missiles are concerned, we are ready, immediately after the signing of an agreement on medium-range missiles, to get down to talks aimed at the reduction and complete elimination of them. It must be said that the overwhelming majority of the governments of the countries of the world regarded the Soviet initiative as a real opportunity for giving dynamism to the whole process of limiting and reducing arms. The Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva received the clear directive to vigorously set about drawing up a concrete agreement in the shortest possible time, on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. Naturally, we expect the same constructive approach from the U.S. side, too.

[Pravdin] What is the real situation?

[Losev] As is known, President Reagan publicly welcomed the Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles and announced that Washington was introducing a draft of the corresponding treaty in Geneva, based on the formula agreed in Reykjavik. At the same time, in verbally expressing satisfaction at the fact that the Soviet Union is now proposing that the problem of medium-range missiles be separated from the overall

package at the talks, U.S. officials are slipping in a new NATO package, which would include the problem of conventional arms and armed forces, chemical weapons, and would make the elimination of medium-range missiles dependent on an accord on short-range missiles in Europe. The most unbridled militarist circles in the administration are striving to pile up new barriers on the path to an agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles.

Caspar Weinberger, the Pentagon boss, is openly demanding that the U.S. side should move away from the Reykjavik accords. In that regard, the prominent observer James Reston, in an article entitled Reagan's Last Chance, expresses the view that it would be useful if Ronald Reagan settled the argument about his government through nuclear arms control. The President has taken the first steps by welcoming the proposal of Mikhail Gorbachev, Reston writes. Now a new approach to Congress is needed, too -- Congress is to ratify the future agreement.

[Pravdin] Are the Soviet initiatives having a tangible influence on the mood of the American public?

[Losev] Of course, the iceberg has started to move, and it will gain momentum. In March the influential U.S. public organization The Council on International Relations, in cooperation with the Gallup Institute, carried out a public opinion survey in the United States. Still in thrall to official propaganda, many of the Americans questioned expressed agreement in principle with the present high level of U.S. military expenditure. However, at the same time the overwhelming majority of those questioned rejected the aggressive methods of conducting U.S. foreign policy, which are being used by the Reagan administration. Those questioned are against armed intervention abroad, against the doctrine of neoglobalism, against secret subversive operations abroad, and against financing counterrevolutionary groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and other countries.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON 28 FEBRUARY SOVIET PROPOSALS

'Active Repercussions' Aroused

HK050823 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 4 Mar 87 p 6

[Commentary by staff reporter Zhang Yunwen (1728 p336 2429): "A New Situation in the U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks"]

[Text] Washington, 2 Mar--Soviet leader Gorbachev suggested on 28 February that the Soviet Union and the United States sign an agreement on eliminating the medium range missiles in Europe.

This suggestion surprised many U.S. Government officials. In the opinion of the public, this indicated that the Soviet Union wanted to make progress in the arms control talks. The Soviet suggestion on signing an agreement concerning the medium-range missiles in Europe basically took shape as early as last October when U.S. and Soviet leaders were holding a meeting in Iceland. The agreement provides the following: Both sides should eliminate their medium-range missiles deployed in Europe, in the meantime the Soviet Union is allowed to retain 100 SS-20 missile heads in the Asian region of the country and the United States is permitted to retain the same number of medium-range missiles on its own soil; and both sides will limit the number of their short-range missiles. However, due to differences of opinion on the issue of strategic defense arms, both sides could not conclude any agreement on the above question.

On the question of medium-range missiles, the Soviet stand changed on several occasions. Some people are of the opinion that the Soviet Union's new suggestion will give an impetus to the deadlocked talks.

The Soviet suggestion aroused active repercussions in the United States and Western Europe. Observers pointed out that neither government officials nor members of Congress regarded the Soviet suggestion as an act of propaganda.

The White House expressed hope for the prompt conclusion of a certain agreement. Adelman, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, remarked that the Soviet suggestion indicated that the Soviet Union had not abandoned its hope of concluding an agreement with the United States during the last 2 years of Reagan's presidency. Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle, who has been considered a hard-liner to the Soviet Union, also said that the Soviet suggestion was a "constructive step." NATO Secretary General Carrington pointed out that the Soviet move was a "major step forward." Arms control experts hope that an agreement can be concluded on the issue of

medium-range missiles and that this can be a turning point in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks.

However, the program on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Western Europe has posed another problem for the arms control talks. For the U.S., the Soviet suggestion was put forward at a crucial moment when the Presidential Committee had just announced the investigation report on the "Irangate" incident and when the White House was concentrating its efforts on restoring the President's reputation. Analysts pointed out that the Soviet move is aimed at obtaining more concessions from the already-weakened position of the U.S. President. For a time, the Soviet Union tried to force the United States to make a concession on the issue of strategic defense weapons, but to no avail. Therefore, it considered making progress on the issue of medium-range missiles, by urging the U.S. Congress to restrict the U.S. Government's strategic defense program. Once a relaxed situation emerges in the arms control talks, the Reagan Administration's demand for allocating funds for the Star Wars program will encounter a big obstacle. The United States has tried to persuade leaders of Western Europe into accepting the "Star Wars" program and has tried to reexplain the treaty on anti-missile missiles. This will surely meet with a strong objection.

Even though both sides once reached unanimity of opinion on concluding an agreement concerning medium-range missiles, this would still be far from "reaching an agreement." The problem of examining missile launching sites to be dismantled and destroyed, for example, is a very complex issue.

The United States demands that factories and sites of both sides that produce and store medium-range missiles be thoroughly checked and supervised and that 100 medium-range missile heads be deployed in the part of Alaska that is near the Soviet border. It is difficult to predict whether these demands will be accepted by the opposite side. On the problem of limiting the number of short-range missiles, both sides are sure to engage in very heated bargaining. In addition, Western Europe looks upon the U.S. medium-range missiles deployed there not just as a force resisting the Soviet SS-20 missiles, but also as a deterrent force and a commitment to the security of Western European allies, leaving Western Europe in doubt about the "zero option" scheme. The contradictory mental status of Western Europe will certainly affect the progress of the talks. Whether the new Soviet suggestion will bring about a turn for the better in the arms control talks between the two superpowers remains to be seen.

Mentions Past 'Tricks'

HK050740 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 5 Mar 87 p 6

["Jottings" by Liang Fu (5328 1133): "People Are Waiting"]

[Text] Soviet leader Gorbachev issued a statement on 28 February proposing that the question of medium-range missiles in Europe be separated from the "package" scheme of nuclear and space weapons, and that an agreement on this single question be reached as soon as possible to facilitate a breakthrough in the deadlock following the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland last year. This has aroused widespread global reaction.

During the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland last year, the two sides originally reached agreement in principle on reducing the numbers of long and medium-range nuclear missiles; afterwards, deadlock ensued, because each side clung to its own view on space

weapons and would not yield. It is said that the current Soviet proposal to sign a treaty as soon as possible on the single issue of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe is aimed at winning over Western Europe and improving relations. And as far as the Reagan administration, currently mired in "Irangate," is concerned, if the President is able to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the medium--range missile issue during his last 20 months in office, this will be rated as a political success.

Therefore, if the two sides are capable of changing the previous negotiation method of only thinking of imposing limitations on each other in a bid to gain supremacy, and negotiate in all seriousness, then the possibility will still exist of finally reaching an agreement. However, in the past the United States and the Soviet Union have played too many tricks on the question of reducing nuclear armaments, and certain agreements they have reached have seen new problems unexpectedly cropping up, making them impossible to implement. The whole world is now waiting to see what will develop this time.

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CSO: 5200/4060

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC JOURNAL DISCUSSES SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

HK201253 Hong Kong, LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 11, 16 Mar 87 p 31

[Article by Tang Tianri (0781 1131 2480): "The New Soviet Disarmament Proposal"]

[Text] On 18 February, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev issued a statement putting forth a proposal on the question of cutbacks of medium-range missiles in Europe and urging that the question of medium-range missiles in Europe be separated from the "package" plan of nuclear and space weapons and an agreement concluded as quickly as possible. The statement said: As early as last October, the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik had decided through consultation the substance of this agreement; that is, the Soviet Union and the United States would completely destroy their own medium-range missiles in Europe within the next 5 years and the 2 countries would each retain 100 medium-range missiles on their own territory, with the Soviets' on their Asian territory and the Americans' on U.S. soil. This "sensation-creating" proposal that involves the security of Europe and Asia has been attracting the extensive concern of the world.

Since the 27th CPSU National Congress, there have been relapses in Soviet leaders' stand on the question of medium-range missiles in Europe. In his political report to the 27th CPSU National Congress, Gorbachev clearly declared that the Soviet Union planned "to independently solve the question of medium-range missiles in the European and Asian regions and not to link it directly with strategic armaments and the space issue." When the leaders of state of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Iceland last October, Gorbachev changed his stand and insisted that medium-range missiles and strategic and space weapons be solved in a "package" plan, while Ronald Reagan persisted in separating the former from the "package" plan and solving it independently. With the positions of the two sides diametrically opposed to each other, the meeting failed to reach any agreement on the substance of the question of European medium-range missiles, which had been decided previously through consultation. After the Iceland meeting, both sides held to their own positions. Although the U.S.-Soviet Geneva disarmament negotiations have been resumed, no progress has been made so far. The new disarmament proposal currently advanced by Gorbachev shows that the Soviet Union has returned from its Reykjavik stand to that adopted at the 27th CPSU National Congress.

Why are there such relapses and changes in the Soviet stand? Observers feel that at present, domestically, the Soviet Union is confronted with an acute contradiction between speeding up its development strategy and carrying out an arms race. To alleviate the contradiction, it is necessary to break the deadlock in the disarmament

negotiations. The Soviet Union previously thought that by persisting in the linking of medium-range missiles in Europe and space weapons, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of the United States could be delayed or killed off. However, since the Iceland meeting, the United States has adopted an uncompromising stand on the issue and announced an early deployment of the SDI systems. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union put forth its new disarmament proposal and made some concessions to strive for an agreement on the question of medium-range missiles in Europe and to lighten its increasingly heavy burden in the arms race. This will help the Soviet Union vie with the United States for superiority in comprehensive national strength.

People noticed that the announcement of the new Soviet proposal came at a time when the Reagan administration was in a difficult position.

The administration ran into considerable trouble in the "Irangate" affair and its reputation declined. To try a comeback in his remaining 20 months or so in office and to retrieve his reputation, apart from taking some measures at home such as personnel changes, Reagan needed to make some progress in the diplomatic field. Against this background, Gorbachev put forth his new proposal to bring pressure to bear on the Reagan administration and to try to impel the United States to conclude a disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union before the 1988 election. At the same time, West European countries expressed dissatisfaction with the recent U.S. broad interpretation of the U.S.-Soviet Antiballistic Missile Treaty and its announcement of an early deployment of the SDI systems and their fear that this might trigger a new arms race. Gorbachev's new proposal is also aimed at winning the sympathy and support of West European countries and utilizing the contradiction between Western Europe and the United States to bring pressure to bear on the United States.

With the announcement of the new Soviet disarmament proposal, the disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have become reactivated. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz promptly stated that he would visit Moscow soon to discuss Gorbachev's new proposal with the Soviet side. On 4 March, Maynard Glitman, American representative to the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons, formally tabled in Geneva the U.S. draft treaty of removal of medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe, the contents of which were basically the same as the understandings reached in the U.S.-Soviet Iceland summit. East European countries and most West European countries expressed welcome for the new Soviet proposal and hope that the United States and Soviet Union will reach an agreement through serious negotiations.

However, the negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on medium-range missiles in Europe involve the strategic interests of the two countries and the security of Europe and Asia. Therefore, some European countries fear that a complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe will expose Europe to the threat of conventional weapons, in which the Soviet Union has a considerable advantage. Asian countries demand the United States and Soviet Union synchronously and proportionately reduce and even destroy the medium-range missiles they have deployed in Europe and Asia and solve some specific problems including on-site verification of the destruction of medium-range missiles. It is estimated that the nuclear negotiations as a whole still need to iron out differences and surmount difficulties.

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CSO: 5200/4060

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ANALYZES WEST EUROPE REACTION TO USSR OFFER

OWO41945 Beijing XINHUA in English 1926 GMT 4 Mar 87

["News Analysis: Western Europe's Mixed Feelings Towards Soviet Arms Proposal (by Dai Lubing) — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Bonn, March 4 (XINHUA) — The latest Soviet proposal for scrapping medium-range missiles in Europe has aroused a mixed feeling of support and concern among West European countries.

While describing the Soviet offer as "constructive" and "positive", they fear that an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe may tip the regional balance of power in the Soviets' favor.

On Saturday, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev said his country was ready to strike a separate deal with the United States to dismantle medium-range missiles from Europe, revising his previous stand that intermediate nuclear forces must be considered part of a comprehensive package.

Government and opposition leaders of Federal Germany, Italy, Britain and other West European countries generally supported the Gorbachev proposal, some of them even regarding it as a "constructive and serious step" in arms control.

Local newspapers said Gorbachev's proposal has given life to the arms talks which have come to a deadlock since the U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit last October and might revive prospects for another U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.

A British newspaper also said the largest block to Europe's nuclear disarmament is being removed as the Soviets no longer insist that medium-range missile issue be linked with the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

On the other hand, however, West European leaders also expressed concerns in their statements that the proposed agreement on eliminating Euro-missiles may endanger European security and leave the region unprotected.

Federal Germany spokesman Friedhelm Ost said West European security should be taken into full consideration and this is of "decisive significance" to his country. Italian Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini stressed that during the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on medium-range missiles, Europe's needs should not be neglected.

The West European concerns are essentially the same as those expressed at the time of the Reykjavik summit when the superpowers agreed in principle to eliminate medium-range

missiles in Europe in five years, but the agreement was never signed because of their differences over the SDI issue.

West Europeans believe that peace of the region depends on the East-West nuclear balance and for them, U.S. Pershing-2 and ground-launched cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe remain the most important component of the balance.

Once the U.S. missiles are pulled away, the West European countries, they fear, can hardly maintain a nuclear deterrent, and will be exposed to Soviet superiority in short-range nuclear missiles and conventional weapons.

They also suspect that any U.S.-Soviet agreement may leave Western Europe unprotected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and even cause to separate the European defense from that of the United States.

Therefore, some Western Europeans, while welcoming the Soviet proposal, stressed the necessity to negotiate on short-range missiles and conventional weapons.

Italian Defense Minister Spadolini said the Soviet superiority in the other weaponry should also be considered at the negotiations on medium-range missiles.

While expressing opposition to the denuclearization of Western Europe, a French Foreign ministry spokesman suggested that certain issues, including those concerning the short-range missiles, be resolved during the superpower negotiations on medium-range missiles.

Apparently to avoid any U.S. unilateral move which may impair the European interests, Federal German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said yesterday that the United States and its allies should make a joint response to the Soviet proposal.

Despite their concerns, many European leaders believe the Soviet offer is welcome if it marks a real beginning for a series of arms control agreements. Genscher said he was optimistic about the Soviet proposal and believed that Washington and Moscow could reach an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe within the next six months.

But they also believe that the U.S.-Soviet negotiations will be an exceptionally tough process since neither side wants to be made inferior to the other. While the superpowers wrangle with each other, the Europeans will be anxious to see how their interests will be defended.

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CSO: 5200/4067

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY ON EUROPEAN REACTION TO GORBACHEV PROPOSAL

HK080839 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 8 Mar 87 p 6

[Commentary by correspondent Jiang Jianguo (3068 1696 0948): "Risk and Opportunity -- Western European Reaction to the New Soviet Disarmament Proposal"]

[Text] Soviet leader Gorbachev's proposal on resolving as a single issue the question of reducing medium-range missiles deployed in Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union opens up for the first time a prospect for the long-debated "zero option" to become reality. In the past few days, a variety of views on this matter have been coming from political, military, and media circles in a number of major Western European countries, guessing at Soviet intentions and studying their consequences. Generally speaking, there is hope mixed with anxiety and optimism tinged with unease.

The major Western European countries have basically welcomed this breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet disarmament, holding that by openly resolving as a single issue the question of medium-range missiles, the Soviet Union has removed a major stumbling block on the road of East-West disarmament. However, there are marked differences in the reactions of various countries. The West German attitude is relatively positive, the French is notably reserved, and the British has expressed "cautious optimism". West German Foreign Minister Genscher holds that in implementing its twin-track resolution, NATO has expressed the hope that the goal of the complete dismantling of medium-range missiles be reached through negotiations, and this opportunity has come.

The initial reaction in Paris was to reject the "zero option," on the grounds that "considering the situation regarding conventional and chemical weapons in Europe," Europe could not follow the path of "denuclearization." France believes that the Soviet Union has superiority in the field of short-range missiles, which is unfavorable for the West, and so the Soviet proposal is not particularly "attractive." After Foreign Minister Genscher talked by telephone with French Foreign Minister Raimond, he told foreign diplomats that France had no objections to the "zero option," it was just that France attached more importance than other NATO countries to the question of short-range missiles. However, Paris still has various reservations and continues to oppose the denuclearization of Western Europe.

This French role as ringer of the alarm bell in Western Europe is looked on with favor by West German media and Western European military circles. An editorial in the influential "DIE WELT" said that even if the "zero option" was attained, there would be little reduction in the Soviet threat to Western Europe, since it holds superiority in strategic, theater, and tactical nuclear weapons. "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG" said in an analysis that the political significance of the Soviet SS-20's and the U.S. Pershing-II's and cruise missiles could not be placed on a par. The SS-20 missiles

represent a move taken without sufficient political consideration at a time when the Soviet Union already has enough military power to threaten Western Europe, and in fact is "overkill." If the "zero option" is attained, there will be no fundamental change in this Soviet threat to Western Europe, whereas Western Europe's counterthreat measures will no longer exist. NATO's flexible response strategy will be lacking a link in the chain from East of the Rhine to west of the Soviet border.

Observers here hold that the differences among the Western European countries reflect the similarities and differences among them in the new situation. West Germany occupies a sensitive position in Western Europe, and an improvement in the "climate" of East-West relations is beneficial to strengthening West Germany's position in those relations and also for the further development of her own relations. For some time, West Germany has been very interested in the changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies, and has repeatedly expressed its desire to improve ties with the Soviet Union. France, for its part, possesses an independent nuclear force, and its room for maneuver in foreign affairs is greater than West Germany's. Hence it views the new Soviet proposal from a somewhat different angle than West Germany. According to reports, the main French concern is that if an agreement on medium-range missiles comes into effect, France's independent nuclear force will come under pressure from the Soviet disarmament offensive. France believes that Gorbachev's proposal on short-range nuclear missiles accords with West Germany's interests but not with those of France's security.

The Geneva talks have now entered the key stage, and both the U.S. and Soviet plans have been tabled. The question of verification of the dismantling of medium-range missiles and the question of subsequent talks on short-range missiles are becoming more and more conspicuous. It is held that the next 3 or 4 months will mark the final stage of talks on medium-range missiles. As for Western Europe's worries, the United States has guaranteed that its "nuclear protective umbrella" for Western Europe will still exist, because the United States also has land-based and sea-based nuclear weapons as well as nuclear bombers deployed in Britain. The Soviet Union has stated that the question of verification can be resolved. However, it remains to be seen what will come of Western Europe's fine aspirations in calling for disarmament and its doubts and suspicions about its future security. It remains to be seen what changes will occur in U.S.-European relations and in relations among the countries of Western Europe. An editorial in "FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG" on 2 March said that at present there are both risks and opportunities, and one cannot just look at the one and forget about the other. It should be said that this is precisely the sentiment in Western Europe.

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CSO: 5200/4060

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC MINISTER IN POLAND ON HOPES FOR INF AGREEMENT

OW140544 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1606 GMT 13 Mar 87

[By reporter Wen Youren]

[Excerpt]

Warsaw, 13 Mar (XINHUA) — Wu Xueqian, Chinese state councillor and minister of foreign affairs, talked about the issue of disarmament in Europe today in Warsaw. He expressed the hope that the two nuclear superpowers would reach agreement on medium-range nuclear missiles through earnest negotiation without harming the interests of other nations.

Wu Xueqian made this remark when he met with reporters before he concluded his visit to Poland.

He said: On the issue of disarmament in Europe, Gorbachev recently put forward a proposal. So did the United States. The Chinese stand is: First, China welcomes an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on the issue of medium-range nuclear missiles. Second, at the time when the number of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe is being reduced, medium-range nuclear missiles in the Pacific and Asian areas should be reduced as well before their final elimination.

On the issue of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific region, Wu Xueqian said: China is concerned over this issue. China supports a proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific region.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY FAVORS MISSILE REDUCTION

OWO40901 Beijing XINHUA in English 0855 GMT 4 Mar 87

[Text] Beijing, March 4 (XINHUA) — The reduction of the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe and Asia by the Soviet Union and the United States should be simultaneous and balanced and should be carried out according to the same principle until their total destruction, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said here today.

The spokesman made the comment in reply to a question about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new proposal concerning medium-range missiles at a weekly news briefing here this afternoon. The spokesman said, "The negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the issue of medium-range missiles concern the security of both European and Asian countries. The security of Europe and that of Asia are equally important and should be given equal attention."

As an Asian country, China is naturally concerned about medium-range missiles deployed in Asia, he added.

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CSO: 5200/4067

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC PEOPLE'S DAILY: INF TALKS FUTURE 'MERITS CLOSE ATTENTION'

HK130600 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 11 Mar 87 p 6

["Special commentary" by Xie Wenqing (6200 2429 1987) and Wang Zhenyin (3769 2182 0603): "A New Situation Arises in the U.S.-Soviet Talks on Medium-Range Missiles"]

[Text] Abstract: Gorbachev's proposal on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe has brought about a new situation in the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles. This matter is receiving worldwide attention. The U.S.-Soviet dispute over medium-range missiles began long ago. The change in the Soviet stand is due to various reasons. Key reasons include the slowing down of U.S. arms expansion and the reduction of its own heavy military burden for the purpose of its "speeding up development strategy". The Soviet suggestion may possibly lead to the conclusion of a U.S.-Soviet agreement, but their talks will not be smooth sailing. Quite a number of nations believe that the elimination of medium-range missiles should not be restricted to Europe and that the United States and Soviet Union should also reduce the medium-range missiles deployed in Asia. [end abstract]

A new situation has appeared in the U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles. The new Soviet suggestion has won positive U.S. appraisal, and West and East European countries have expressed appreciation for it. A few days ago, U.S. and Soviet representatives put forward their draft proposals in Geneva. They are optimistic about the prospects for reaching an agreement on medium-range missiles.

This development began on 28 February. In a statement, Soviet leader Gorbachev made a new suggestion on reducing medium-range missiles. This suggestion consists of three main points: The first point is separating the issue of medium-range missiles from a "package" of problems and suggesting making immediate preparations for concluding an agreement on their talks; the second point is reiterating the principled agreement laid down by both sides at the Iceland summit — that is, within 5 years both sides will eliminate all their medium-range missiles in Europe, and the Soviet Union and United States will retain 100 medium-range missile warheads, the former in the Asian region, the latter on its own soil; and the third point is that the Soviet Union will withdraw its long-range tactical missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Finally, once an agreement on medium-range missiles is reached, negotiations on the reduction and elimination of their tactical weapons will begin. Soviet Army Chief of Staff Akhromeyev pointed out at a 2 March news conference that the Soviet Union favored the most effective verification, including on-the-spot verification and a check by one side on the other. This was an attractive change in the Soviet stand on disarmament talks since the Iceland summit last October.

The U.S.-Soviet dispute over medium-range missiles began in 1977 when the Soviet Union began to deploy its SS-20 mobile medium-range missiles. To cope with this situation, NA1 made a "dual resolution" in December 1979 deciding that the United States should deploy 108 Pershing-II missiles and 464 cruise missiles in 5 European countries and at the same time demanding that the United States and Soviet Union hold talks on medium-range missiles. Since then, their talks have experienced a long and complex course. During their talks from November 1981 to November 1983, both sides kept bargaining and making many suggestions, but merely for the sake of reducing the medium-range nuclear power of the opposite side. In November 1983, the United States started its original plan of deploying medium-range missiles in Western Europe. The Soviet Union immediately withdrew from the talks and adopted a very strong countermeasure of increasing its medium- and short-range nuclear power in Europe.

The Soviet Union and the United States reopened their talks in March 1985. These are a "package" of talks in Geneva that include space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-range missiles. There have been seven rounds of such talks so far. During the previous rounds of talks, both sides still had serious differences of opinion on the issue of medium-range missiles. These differences are mainly as follows: The Soviet Union tried to freeze or reduce SS-20 missiles in exchange for the United States stopping the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, whereas the United States insisted on either dismantling all of the U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles or on each maintaining the same number of medium-range missiles; the Soviet Union suggested placing British and French medium-range missiles within the restrictions provided by the talks, whereas the United States objected to this, maintaining that the U.S.-Soviet talks could not involve other countries; and the Soviet Union also proposed that the talks on medium-range missiles should involve the European region and that the Asia problem could be settled separately, whereas the United States favored a worldwide balance of medium-range missiles between the two sides.

At the U.S.-Soviet Iceland summit, both sides made major progress on the issue of medium-range missiles and basically reached unanimity of opinion. However, as the Soviet Union insisted on relating the issue of medium-range missiles with the problem of space weapons, the talks broke up in discord.

The new Soviet suggestion has put an end to the stalemate in the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks since the Iceland summit. As analyzed by world public opinion, there are many reasons why the talks on medium-range missiles have turned for the better. The first is that the Soviet Union wants to take the issue of medium-range missiles as a breakthrough point in pushing forward the U.S.-Soviet disarmament talks, with the goal of slowing down the U.S. arms expansion and reducing the heavy Soviet burden in the arms race. After the formulation of the "speeding up development strategy" at the 27th CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union began to attempt to strengthen its position in the contention with the United States through developing its science, technology, and economy. It hoped to control the pace of the arms race by reaching a disarmament agreement through negotiations. However, this did not come true at the Iceland summit, and it seemed impossible for the Soviet Union to resolve the three problems of space weapons, strategic nuclear weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons at one stroke. Under such circumstances, the Soviet Union chose the issue of medium-range missiles as a breakthrough point in pushing forward their talks.

The second reason is that the United States wants to conclude an agreement before the U.S. presidential election for the purpose of maintaining the channel of negotiations and laying a foundation for future agreements. There is not much time left until the 1988 presidential election. Once a fierce competition starts between the Republican and Democratic Parties, the Reagan administration will have no time to consider other

problems. Moreover, when the new administration assumes office, it is unlikely that it can seriously engage in disarmament negotiations, because it will concentrate its efforts on domestic affairs during the 1st and 2nd years. On the part of the Soviet Union, if it cannot conclude any agreement with the United States, it would mean a loss of 2 to 3 years. For the United States, because the Reagan administration is in a passive position as a result of the Irangate incident, it also hopes to accomplish something in the diplomatic field and strives to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles, with the goal of holding a summit with the Soviet Union and improving its own position.

On the part of Western Europe, although West European countries are worried that they will be under the threat of the Soviet conventional military forces and short-range missiles if the United States withdraws its medium-range missiles from Western Europe, they will hope that the Soviet Union and the United States can conclude an agreement on reducing medium-range missiles in Europe to relax the military confrontation of the two superpowers in Europe. The Soviet Union was aware of this point and made the above concession in the hope of expanding U.S.-European contradictions and relaxing Soviet-European relations.

West European countries generally welcomed Gorbachev's new suggestion. In their opinion, his suggestion is an "important, positive measure," an "essential step" in the disarmament issue, and "paves the way" for concluding an agreement on medium-range missiles between the United States and Soviet Union. The United States also made a positive response, saying that the suggestion indicated a "positive development trend."

Gorbachev's new suggestion has made it more possible for the Soviet Union and United States to conclude an agreement on medium-range missiles in the near future. But we should also understand that the talks on medium-range missiles will not be smooth sailing. Many contradictions and differences of opinion remain to be resolved between the United States and Soviet Union and between the United States and Europe. First, the United States and Western Europe need to reach unanimity of stand on the issue of defense, and Western Europe wants a U.S. guarantee before it agrees to the United States signing an agreement with the Soviet Union. Second, although in principle the Soviet Union agrees with on-the-spot nuclear verification, it is difficult to predict whether it will completely accept U.S. demands. Third, the United States and the Soviet Union will engage in fierce bargaining over how to resolve the Soviet superiority of conventional forces and short-range missiles after the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

In conclusion, a heated debate will occur between the Soviet Union and the United States over the deployment of 100 medium-range missile war heads in Asia by the Soviet Union and another 100 on American soil by the United States. This will also involve the security of Japan, China, and other Asian nations. Many Asian countries, and some Western nations, point out that the elimination of medium-range missiles should not be restricted to Europe only and that the medium-range missiles deployed in Asia should also be reduced and finally eliminated according to the same principle. Therefore, the trend of the future U.S.-Soviet talks on medium-range missiles merits close attention.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA ON BALANCED REDUCTION, ASIAN SECURITY QUESTION

OW130853 Beijing XINHUA in English 0756 GMT 13 Mar 87

["News Analysis: Can Washington and Moscow Strike a Bargain Over INF? (by Ren Zhengde)" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Geneva, March 13 (XINHUA) — The current U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) have incited unusual optimism on both sides with their new proposals on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe.

The euphoria springs from the talks' first advance following proposals from both Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe.

On February 28, Gorbachev dropped his insistence that any arms accord must be linked to an agreement on the controversial U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as the "Star Wars" program, thus freeing the way for a separate accord on medium-range missiles.

Four days later, U.S. arms control negotiators in Geneva formally presented a 40-page draft accord on scrapping the weapons in Europe.

Both proposals call for a complete dismantling within five years of the 316 U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles deployed in Western Europe and the 270 Soviet SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe.

While both proposals permit either side to retain 100 medium-range warheads on its own soil, Moscow and Washington have also narrowed their differences over the controversial verification problem.

Can Washington and Moscow strike a bargain this time?

While progress at the U.S.-Soviet Geneva talks is in the interest of both sides and the chance of separate deal on the Euromissile issue now appears greater than before, difficulties lying ahead should not be under-estimated.

In the United States, Reagan, with two years ahead in office, has suffered his biggest setback with the Iran-contra scandal. A breakthrough in foreign diplomacy would help to divert domestic and international attention away from the affair.

And in the Soviet Union, progress in arms control would boost domestic economic development. The Soviets, taking advantage of Reagan's embarrassment over the Iran-contra affair, launched a new offensive at the medium-range missiles talks aimed

at distancing Western European allies from the United States and ending the standstill in Geneva so as to block the research and development of the U.S. "Star Wars" program.

In addition, the Soviets believe the "zero option", or elimination of Euromissiles, would only benefit them since the Soviet SS-20 missiles cannot reach U.S. territory, while the U.S. cruise and Pershing-2 missiles are targeted right to the center of the Soviet Union.

However, a number of obstacles remain, making the prospects for the elimination of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe uncertain.

First, the effective verification of such elimination remains a major problem as medium-range missiles are small and mobile weapons.

The United States, requiring "very strict" verification provisions, insists on on-site inspection and 10 unannounced inspections each year.

The Soviet Union, in an about face, went even further than the U.S. demand by proposing that nothing be barred from inspections, and that the Soviets be allowed to inspect even private U.S. companies manufacturing missiles.

Second, the U.S. draft accord also contains sections on Soviet shorter-range systems with a 500- to 1,000-kilometer striking range, capable of reaching Western Europe. Western estimates say the Soviet Union has eight times as many short-range weapons as the United States.

Moscow, while expressing its willingness to scrap all its shorter-range missiles deployed in Czechoslovakia and Democratic Germany, insists on leaving the matter to discussion after a U.S.-Soviet accord on INF is reached.

Third, U.S. West European allies have expressed mixed feelings about the Soviet acceptance of the "zero option." On the one hand, they are looking forward to a superpower agreement on Euromissiles which they believe would ease world tension and reduce the danger of a world war. At the same time, they are worried that such an agreement would jeopardize Western nuclear deterrence by breaking up the North Atlantic alliance defense system, and expose Western Europe to the Soviet shorter-range missiles and superior conventional forces.

Therefore, West European allies have demanded that discussions on conventional forces and short-range missiles be included in the current round of U.S.-Soviet INF talks with the aim of seeking a "total military balance".

In the past few days, the euphoria has been calmed. The Soviet Communist Party newspaper "PRAVDA", in a commentary, cautioned the West against being overly-optimistic. In Washington, the same old tune is being played, calling for linkage between an INF accord and improvement in human rights and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Even if the superpowers dismantle INF missiles in Europe, each still has 100 such warheads. Reports have speculated the Soviet Union would deploy its 100 in western Siberia, posing a direct threat to China, Japan and other Asian countries.

A final question: Why don't the superpowers seek a balanced elimination of nuclear weapons in Asia as well as in Europe?

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA CITES MOVES TO EASE U.S.-USSR TENSION

Problems Remain

OW090648 Beijing XINHUA in English 0632 GMT 9 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, March 9 (XINHUA) — Signs have appeared recently that the strained ties between the Soviet Union and the United States have somewhat eased.

Relations between the two countries became tense after Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan failed to reach any agreement on disarmament at their meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland last October.

Four and a half months later, Gorbachev declared on February 28 that his country decided to single out the Euromissile from other disarmament issues and proposed to sign "without delay" a separate agreement on elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Washington "welcomed" the Soviet initiative and tabled its own draft treaty on Euromissiles at the Soviet-U.S. arms control talks in Geneva in early March.

Although the seventh round of Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms ended without progress on March 3rd, the two sides agreed that the group studying the problems of medium-range missiles is to stay on for several more weeks to start working out a joint draft text of the treaty.

In his radio address March 7th, U.S. President Reagan noted that "breakthroughs" had taken place of late in some spheres of relations between the two countries.

Reagan has also announced that Secretary of State George Shultz will visit Moscow in mid-April and he will discuss with Soviet leaders all issues of relations between the two countries, including the possibility of Reagan's third meeting with Gorbachev.

While general bilateral relations have eased to a certain extent, the two superpowers still have deep divergences on many issues, such as space weapons, nuclear testing and regional conflicts.

As to Euromissiles, there are also troublesome problems which remain to be resolved.

For example, the two sides have differences on how to "control and verify" the process of eliminating all intermediate missiles in Europe, and how to deal with short-range missiles in Europe.

Roundup Views Arms Talks

OW061842 Beijing XINHUA in English 1829 GMT 6 Mar 87

["Roundup: Signs of Hope in U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Talks (by Shi Lujia)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Washington, March 6 (XINHUA) -- After two years of tough bargaining and setbacks, there are signs that the two superpowers are heading for a possible agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe at their arms reduction talks in Geneva.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in a statement last month that the Soviet Union will not adhere to its original position and is willing to make a separate agreement on medium-range missiles with the United States. Gorbachev expressed the Soviets' willingness to reach an agreement as soon as possible with the United States on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe within five years. The possible agreement will allow the Soviet Union to retain 100 medium-range missile warheads in its Asian part and the United States 100 warheads on its territory.

Washington responded positively by saying that the Soviet move is "a constructive step" and "removes a serious obstacle" in the way of reaching a new arms-control agreement.

While welcoming the Soviet move, the United States insisted that on-the-spot verification should be conducted on the Soviet elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe after a treaty is signed. It also insisted on the withdrawal of Soviet short-range missiles from some East European countries.

There are signs that the Soviet Union will make concessions on these two points raised by the United States. Soviet officials told a press conference earlier this month that they supported the idea of on-the-spot verification on both sides' elimination of missiles. And Gorbachev had said in the statement that the Soviet Union will withdraw its short-range missiles from Democratic Germany and Czechoslovakia and immediately begin negotiations on theatre missiles with the United States once an agreement is reached on the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

U.S. political analysts have expressed optimism about a possible U.S.-Soviet agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, but some said it takes time to sign such an agreement because of long-standing differences between the two countries.

The two superpowers tentatively agreed in Iceland last October to eliminate all medium-range missiles in Europe. But Moscow insisted on linking the issue of intermediate nuclear forces (as well as that of the strategic weapons) to strict limits on the research and testing of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, officially known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). As a result, no final agreement was reached at the Iceland summit.

Though the Soviet Union has now shown flexibility on medium-range missiles, it still insists on a linkage between the reduction of strategic weapons and the strict limiting on the U.S. "Star Wars" plan.

Gorbachev said in the statement that any agreements on the reduction or elimination of strategic nuclear weapons "should be conditioned by a decision on the prevention of deployment of weapons in outer space." This indicates that still tougher and more complicated negotiations on arms control lie ahead for the two superpowers.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRC JOURNAL ON WEST EUROPE DEFENSE, U.S.-USSR TALKS

HK140731 Beijing GUOJI WENTI YANJIU in Chinese No 1, 13 Jan 87 pp 44-49

[Article by Jiang Jianqing (5592 1696 3237): "Western Europe's Defense and the U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks"]

[Text] Since the U.S.-Soviet summit in Iceland, Western Europe has been extremely worried and anxious about the trend of developments in U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. At present in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks there is haggling going on and it is still in doubt whether a "package agreement" can be worked out. The United States and Western Europe are frequently exchanging views in an attempt to gain Western Europe's support for the U.S. talks program. Within Western Europe there is also intensified consultation so that they can exert more influence on the U.S.-Soviet talks and plan their own avenues. These various signs indicate that changes will occur in the relationships between Western Europe and the United States and the Soviet Union. The problems which have long been latent within NATO will thus be greatly exacerbated.

I. The Secret Concern of Western Europe [subhead]

The initial hopes of Western Europe for the Iceland summit were not realized. It appears that prior to the summit the United States did not solicit the agreement of its Western European allies. Thus, since the end of the Iceland summit, the positions of the various countries in Western Europe have been both circumspect and quite disoriented.

Until today, the major characteristic attitudes of the various countries in Western Europe have been, on the one hand, to welcome "major progress" in the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks and hope that through continued efforts positive results will be achieved; on the other hand, they are worried that the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in "over-the-head diplomacy" which will result in an agreement which will harm Western Europe's interests. They have grave doubts and are very wary about the true intentions of the United States and the Soviet Union. They believe that the reason the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to realize progress is that, in the Soviet view, one of their aims is to bring about a collapse in the defense bond between the United States and Western Europe and to strive for military superiority in the European theater. Meanwhile, the United States, in order to realize its long-term aim of global military strategic superiority, may not pay attention to and hence harm Western Europe's current defense needs. The focus of Western Europe's attention is the United States' deployment of nuclear forces (especially medium long-range [zhong yuan cheng 0022 6678 4453] nuclear forces) in Europe and the degree and speed of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reductions. They are worried that if the United States and the Soviet Union suddenly realize an agreement, it may greatly weaken the U.S. "nuclear umbrella."

The above attitudes of Western Europe originate from their location and their basic strategic ideologies.

For a long time, the strategic ideology of Western Europe was that "detente in defense matters equals security." In East-West and U.S.-Soviet arms control questions, Western Europe advocates the realization of a "low-level balance" and requires that both the United States and the Soviet greatly reduce both nuclear and conventional arms. After the arms reductions, an overall balance of military power will be achieved. Neither side should use the arms talks to seek military superiority. If the arms control talks develop in this direction, then in the international arena the Western Europeans will be able to improve their position, increase their independence, and increase their maneuvering room between the two superpowers.

At the same time, they will be able to improve their domestic situation and be able to avoid being squeezed between the two aspects of expanding arms production and developing their economies. They will also be able to reduce the pressure of the peace movement on various governments.

It is because of this that the results of the Iceland summit have put the governments of various Western European countries in a dilemma. With respect to the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to greatly reduce medium-range and strategic nuclear weapons, Western Europe can only express support. If it does not it will be acting in contradiction to its long-advocated stand that there should be detente in East-West relations and a great reduction in arms. However, Western Europe believes that on the basis of the U.S.-Soviet plan, after both the United States and the Soviet Union eliminate the deployment of medium long-range nuclear weapons in Europe the pressure on Western Europe from the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional weapons will undoubtedly greatly increase. Also, the medium short-range [zhong jin cheng 0022 6602 4453] and short-range [jin cheng 6602 4453] nuclear weapons which are not included in the agreement will form new "gray weapons." [hui se 3500 5331] Furthermore, the Soviet Union has a great superiority in these types of weapons. In such a situation, the threat of conventional warfare and limited nuclear war will be unprecedentedly increased. Thus, after the United States greatly reduces its weapons, whether the remaining weapons will be able to safeguard Western Europe becomes the question. Western Europe shudders at the thought of this impossible scenario. It is for this reason that the government leaders of many countries in Western Europe have recently repeatedly claimed that "the security of Western Europe cannot be separated from the security of the United States" and that "arms control talks must prevent nuclear war in Europe and they must also prevent conventional warfare."

II. Arms Control Talks and the Crisis in the NATO Military Structure [subhead]

The results of the Iceland summit have again sparked off a "structural crisis" in NATO.

Since NATO implemented the flexible response strategy in 1967, NATO has been required to have an appropriate ratio of conventional forces, tactical nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces. This is the so-called "three-in-one" military capacity. The guiding ideology in determining this strategy is that NATO relies on this force to deter enemies and this force can be used to resist any invasion. The structure of the "three-in-one" force has the following characteristics:

1. In theory, the position of conventional forces was increased, which required the strengthening of conventional forces and the expansion of this role so that they could resist limited-scale attack. Even if they were unable to rebuff the attack, they would be able to gain the necessary time for an anticipated nuclear escalation.

2. The tactical nuclear force plays the key role in the "three-in-one" deterrent force. Strategy determines that when conventional forces "cannot withstand a Warsaw Pact attack," then in a "cautiously controlled escalation of the war" tactical nuclear forces will be used "in a selective and restricted manner." The aim is to increase the selective capacity to carry out limited nuclear warfare against the Warsaw Pact and increase the determination to carry out flexible response strategies. This will allow NATO to use tactical nuclear forces deployed in Europe to engage in a limited nuclear war with the Warsaw Pact without employing U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

As to the scope of tactical nuclear forces, they include short-range (range under 500 kilometers), medium short-range (500 to 1,000 kilometers), and medium long-range (1,000 to 5,000 kilometers) missiles, fighter and bomber aircraft which carry nuclear weapons and other types of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. This is both a means of deterring the enemy from using their weapons and also the link between Western Europe and the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force.

3. If, in the end, there is no alternative, they should use strategic nuclear forces, predominantly U.S. strategic nuclear forces to engage in all-out nuclear war.

The above shows that the flexible response strategy is, like the large-scale retaliatory strategy in the cold war period following World War II, a "deterrent strategy" with U.S. nuclear forces as its mainstay. In the 40 years since the war, the military power of Western Europe has greatly increased, but the basic situation of relying in defense matters on the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" has not changed.

Looking at things from the actual development, this NATO structure is increasingly less suited to the changes in the balance of military forces between the United States and the Soviet Union and the two major military blocs in Europe. An overall balance has already been achieved in terms of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces. According to estimates, the ratio of Warsaw Pact military personnel stationed in Europe compared to NATO personnel at present is 1.2 to 1. However, because of the deployment and composition of Soviet forces and the wide and broad geographical conditions, the actual superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in terms of troops and weapons exceeds this figure. In terms of biological warfare capacity, the quantities of chemical weapons stores which the United States and the Soviet Union have deployed in Europe differ greatly, with the Soviet Union having a great superiority.

In terms of medium long-range guided missiles, because the U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles have been deployed in Western Europe, they are about a match for the Soviet SS-20's and other guided missiles. In terms of medium short-range guided missiles, since the Soviet Union deployed improved SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 guided missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia in recent years, they (the USSR and the Warsaw Pact) clearly lead NATO both quantitatively and qualitatively. As to the nuclear capacity of the British and the French, although through several years of development they have gained a certain strength, first, their strength is greatly limited when compared to that of the United States and the Soviet Union, and second, they are to differing degrees independent and it is difficult to simply include them in the above comparison of forces.

Because of changes in the balance of forces, whether or not NATO's "three-in-one" strategic structure has sufficient flexible response ability and is capable of guaranteeing Western Europe's security has become the most basic problem for NATO. Since the beginning of the 1980's some representative international study organizations as well as well-known government and private individuals have repeatedly spoken of the "historical and structural crises" within NATO and the Atlantic alliance. Of these, the most influential was a joint report by the heads of four major international study organizations and Kissinger's "Plan for the Transformation of NATO." Their main points

were: At a time when there is a basic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear capability, once Western Europe is subject to a serious threat from the Soviet Union, the United States will find it difficult to make the decision to use nuclear weapons and willingly risk a nuclear attack on its own territory in order to protect Western Europe. The present military structure of NATO has been inherited from the immediate post-war period when the United States monopolized nuclear capability and Western Europe was unprecedentedly weak. However, today Western Europe has become much more powerful economically and politically and has the obligation and ability to take on more of its defense responsibilities, especially in terms of conventional forces.

In this way it will be possible within NATO to truly form "two mainstays" of the United States and Western Europe. In both the United States and Western Europe, whether in the public or private sector, no one is willing to differ on the above major points, because the facts are clearly thus. The problem is how to divide the defense responsibilities between the United States and Europe and how to form and strengthen the "Western Europe mainstay" to free NATO from its "crisis." For various reasons Western Europe will find it difficult to establish an independent defense force capable of contending with the Soviet Union, particularly in terms of nuclear forces. Although NATO has repeatedly passed resolutions on strengthening conventional defense and Western Europe has made some efforts in this, it is still far from being able to match the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, to date there remains the basic contradiction in which Europe's defense must rely on U.S. nuclear protection but the U.S. nuclear umbrella is becoming increasingly less dependable. It is the same situation as before.

In the last decade or so, this internal basic contradiction in NATO has been sometimes hidden, sometimes open. Some influential persons from the United States (such as (Sonnenfeldt) [suo nan fei er de 4792 0589 6316 1422 1795], Kissinger and Reagan) have stated that it should not be hoped, in the event a war breaks out in Europe, that the United States will employ strategic nuclear weapons to safeguard Western Europe. This has without a doubt been a great irritation to Western Europe and it has provoked a great response. It is only through the common needs of both the United States and Western Europe that the U.S. nuclear umbrella still covers NATO and the past disputes have not developed into real crises. The "balance of nuclear terror" has been the objective maintainer of peace in Europe in the 40 years since the war.

However, the Iceland summit again caused this basic contradiction within NATO to surface. Western Europe's concern is that since the United States, without first soliciting agreement from the Western European allies before the summit, reached a consensus (although an agreement was not reached) with the Soviet Union during the summit on the reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons and strategic weapons, then in the future the United States might not pay attention to Western Europe's interests and conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union on these matters. If the United States and the Soviet Union indeed reach an agreement based on the intentions at the summit, then the contradictions in the military structure of NATO will become more serious than before and the Soviet Union's superiority in conventional forces will be even more in evidence. As to the flexible response bonds, these will be further weakened by the removal of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles based in Europe and there will be no guarantee after large-scale U.S. reductions that the remaining strategic weapons will be able to safeguard Europe. Not only have the FRG and the United Kingdom reacted strongly on this, but even the French Foreign Minister Raimond has recently said that the possibility of "the United States withdrawing all its guided missiles from Europe" is extremely "frightening."

III. Western Europe's Efforts in Strengthening Defense and the Difficulties Faced [subhead]

The Iceland summit exacerbated Western Europe's sense of crisis in the defense area. Western Europe has made the following assessments on the development trends in the strategic situation:

First, they believe that for quite a long period to come the major danger faced by Western Europe will be the Soviet Union's conventional military threat. Seen from the actual developments since the 1970's, although the European situation has for a time been relaxed, the Soviet Union has not slowed its efforts in the conventional forces area and in fact there have been continuous obvious improvements in conventional forces' tactics and technology.

It is estimated that by the beginning of the next century its capacity to launch a conventional attack on Western Europe will have greatly increased.

Second, once the United States removes its medium long-range nuclear weapons from Europe, Western Europe will have to "make up the deficiency" itself.

Third, the new round in the arms race which is centered on the United States and the Soviet Union vying for superiority in space, may greatly weaken Western Europe's strategic position. In the new arms race Western Europe must work out its own long-term plans and seek its own avenues.

The above ideas did not just appear after the Iceland summit. At the end of the 1970's they had already begun to appear. Reagan's proposal of the "Star Wars" plan and the recent Iceland summit have caused these ideas to become more prominent daily. On the basis of the above assessments, in recent years Western Europe has made a series of new efforts, mainly in the following areas.

1. They have strengthened conventional forces, putting special efforts into modernizing the equipment of their conventional forces. Western Europe knows that in terms of the number of troops in active service and reserve troops, even if they put more efforts into this, there is no way they will be able to match the Warsaw Pact forces. Thus, they have put efforts into increasing the technical superiority of their troops' equipment. In order to increase their troops' ability to engage in protracted war against an enemy attack, the tanks and antitank weapons of the major Western European countries have all been improved. For example, the FRG has 300 new improved Panther II tanks and the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have completed or are in the process of planning new replacement tanks. The FRG, Italy, and other countries have already accepted the "Roger's' Plan" battle principle on in-depth strikes and are now developing in-depth strike capabilities, whereby there will be continuous strikes by echelon formation after the enemy has been obstructed. There have also been advances in strengthening escort capabilities and antisubmarine capabilities. In order to accord with the long-term challenge, the various major countries of Western Europe have been successively setting about formulating plans for developing conventional weapons prior to the year 2000. Also, within NATO, together with the United States, an "in-principle military program" has been proposed which will be the guiding policy of developing weapons after the year 2000. All of this shows that Western European countries have further raised the position of conventional forces in their military strategy.

2. The nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have been increased. In November of 1986 the French cabinet meeting passed the "1987-1991 Military Program Act"

(it awaits passage by Parliament). In this, the modernization of strategic nuclear weapons and especially the modernization of guided missile nuclear submarines in the maritime strategic forces is in prime position. At the same time, it is adhering to plans to develop new land-based guided missiles. The British Conservative Government is persisting in using U.S. Trident missiles over the next few years to replace the existing Polaris missiles, in order to strengthen the power of its nuclear submarines. In the development of British and French nuclear forces great stress is being placed on strengthening instantaneous defense and survival abilities of the nuclear weapons.

3. They have explored the possibility of establishing an outer-space defense capacity for Western Europe. The various major countries of Western Europe have already started discussing their own space strategies and some action has been taken. The United Kingdom and France have already separately established leading organs for developing space forces.

From the information revealed it seems that the French, in developing space forces, are going to concentrate on antisatellite systems, feeling that this is a simple and effective way to counter the strategic defense systems. The British are more concerned with developing a weapons system to counter the Soviet Union's anti-medium-range guided missile systems. In this area, the FRG has quite great potential and is secretly developing space forces. Italy is also discussing relevant plans.

4. They have strengthened defense alliances. Since the Western alliance was revived, conferences have been held regularly in order to link and coordinate the defense policies of relevant countries. In the concrete defense area Western Europe's cooperation is developing from joint development in conventional arms to cooperation in the strategic and high technology fields. In 1985 the United Kingdom, Italy, the FRG and Spain concluded an agreement to invest \$30 billion in the joint development of 800 "European fighters." This is the first joint development agreement of major equipment in Western Europe. At a conference of defense ministers from the European bloc of NATO in the winter of 1985, the FRG proposed that Western Europe develop an anti-short-range missile system mainly based on lasers and electromagnetically guided guns. This gained general endorsement from the participating countries and now relevant concrete plans are being discussed. Recently France has also made known that the long-discussed "Europe 2000 Spaceflight Plan" has already seen beginnings, since it received strong financial support from France and the FRG. This is composed of major projects including the development of the Arienne 5 rocket and the "Hermes" space shuttle and the equipping and launching of the "Columbus" space station. After the Iceland summit, foreign policy advisors of the government leaders of the United Kingdom, France and the FRG formed a working group to coordinate the stand of the three on the U.S.-Soviet arms control issue. When the British and French heads met in Paris, they also put forward the issue of cooperation in terms of the two countries' nuclear forces. These trends have attracted international attention. It is felt that the three major Western European countries sitting together and having a coordinated stand on the U.S.-Soviet arms control issue is "an unprecedented action" and that cooperation between the United Kingdom and France in terms of nuclear forces is a "forbidden zone" which has always been seen as difficult to enter.

The above developments are of a sort rarely seen in the history of Western Europe since the war and show a sense of urgency in strengthening defense and defense cooperation in Western Europe. They also show that there have been definite breakthrough in this area. However, some serious obstacles and difficulties remain in this area.

The differences in situations and in defense policies have restricted the alliance process in Western Europe. The FRG is situated in the NATO forward position, is

subject to the greatest threat from the Soviet Union, and has the greatest reliance on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Added to this are the remnant effects of being a defeated nation during the war. Thus, even today there are still various restrictions in its defense developments (a major one is that it cannot have nuclear arms). Although the situation of France and the United Kingdom in the European area is better than that of the FRG, to maintain their position as major nations in international politics and ensure their spheres of power they have to make efforts which exceed the ability of their economic strength in order to maintain and extend a military force generally commensurate with their positions. Thus, after France withdrew from the integral military structure of NATO in the De Gaulle period, they all along pursued an independent defense policy. At the same time as paying attention to developing a nuclear deterrent force, they put efforts into the overall strengthening of nuclear and conventional forces.

In strategic ideology they stressed "fortress France" (they mainly stressed safeguarding the security of France's territory), while France's foreign interests were in second place. In recent years France has changed its "all-direction defense" policy, adopted an "expanded protection" policy and stressed "putting France's strategic focuses on those places in Europe and the Mediterranean area which are subject to the most serious Soviet threat." However, the core of the defense policy — the independent policy which has as its main part safeguarding French national interests — will certainly not change. The United Kingdom's policy is to maintain, with U.S. assistance, a small strategic nuclear force and, at the same time, to maintain as strong as possible a conventional force composed of the three branches of the Army, Navy and Air Force in order to maintain "super-regional influence." The FRG's military strategy and policies have been established on the basis of the NATO system and its entire armed forces are under the unified command of the supreme headquarters of the NATO allied forces. The core of its defense policies is defense cooperation and coordination with the United States. Because of differences in the situations and defense policies of these major Western European nations, and the many doubts and fears on the political level, it is difficult to achieve full cooperation and unity of purpose in coordinating the development of the various defense forms and in strengthening Western Europe's defense alliance. Therefore, both realizing agreements and implementing them are full of difficulties. Economic difficulties have stood in the way of defense plan implementation. Since the middle of the 1970's Western Europe's economy has been in a slump. Although recently there has been an easing, in the next few years it is unlikely that there will be a rapid improvement. At present, the various countries are trying to control or reduce their financial budgets and cut down their financial deficits. The military expenditures of major West European countries occupies quite a high proportion of the financial budget and, in a situation where money is tight, it is very difficult to further expand the proportion of military expenditures. At the end of the 1970's, NATO passed a resolution on increasing military expenditures (a real growth of 3 percent annually). However, in the last few years virtually no country has been able to realize this. In the future, regardless of whether we speak of conventional arms, nuclear arms, or space defense development, because of the adoption of new technology and new equipment, expenditures will be greatly in excess of past figures. Therefore, the economic impediments will become more prominent. Even if Western Europe is able to strengthen the alliance to reduce difficulties in this respect, when the responsibilities have been divided up, it is not going to be easy to concretely implement them.

IV. Several Ideas on Future Trends [subhead]

1. In the U.S.-Soviet arms control talks, because of the restrictions of the various contradictions and their great complexity, it will certainly not be easy to achieve a

"package agreement" the short term. However, the two sides, in accordance with the requirements of the new round of the arms race (improving and strengthening strategic weapons and developing space weapons), have reduced the overload situation in their economies produced by the arms race and they have both greatly cut back on their hopes for existing outdated nuclear forces. Thus after an intense round of haggling it is quite possible that they will reach an agreement in several areas. In the future, in arms control talks the United States and the Soviet Union will have both dialogue and confrontation and it is possible that a new situation may emerge. On the one hand they will be seeking an unprecedentedly large compromise and on the other hand they will be developing a higher-level intense rivalry. This will lead to a more intense and turbulent situation.

2. The conflicts between Western Europe and the United States and the Soviet Union will be exacerbated to different degrees. The Western Europeans are now planning various countermeasures to increase their influence in U.S.-Soviet arms control talks and prevent agreements which will harm them.

The recent proposals by Western European countries that reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of strategic weapons and medium-range weapons should be related to the reduction of the medium long-range and medium-range nuclear weapons and conventional arms deployed in Europe is an initial demonstration of these countermeasures. However, regardless of whether we speak of the medium-range nuclear weapons based in Europe or the strategic weapons, in the final analysis, all are in the hands of the United States and the Western Europeans have only a limited right to speak. Because the interests of the United States and Europe in the arms control question are not exactly the same, in the course of future discussion it will be difficult to avoid the exacerbation of conflicts. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, in order to allay Western Europe's fears, it will adopt some measures pandering to Western Europe and reduce its intervention and its attempts to divide the United States and Europe. However, the Soviet Union will not make any substantial concessions which will weaken its conventional superiority in the European theater. Also, the restriction on British and French nuclear forces is an established policy and, at a certain stage, it is certain to put this back on the agenda. Thus if we look at the essentials, a deepening in European-Soviet conflicts is inevitable.

3. Corresponding profound changes will occur in internal NATO relationships. In the defense area, the United States and Europe need each other. It is difficult to see the current situation of Western Europe relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella changing in the foreseeable future. However, the hidden crisis in NATO's flexible response strategy are becoming deeper and more obvious daily. The United States is already considering new strategic ideas, but Western Europe's worry that the United States will eventually "unhook" itself from Western Europe in defense matters have become more intense daily. In the future a transitional period may occur when old strategic ideas change to new strategic ideas, and because it will be difficult to ascertain if Western Europe, with regard to new strategic ideas, will be able to guarantee the stability of the U.S.-European alliance and the security of Western Europe, the internal NATO contradictions will accordingly be exacerbated.

4. It is imperative that Western Europe strengthen its defense forces and defense alliances. Seen from past history, the greatest achievements in Western European alliances have been realized under strong external threats. Although there are all sorts of serious difficulties in the Western European defense alliances, it would be very difficult to achieve the aim of defense independence. However, in the present grim situation it is possible some breakthroughs might appear. These will undoubtedly

be of benefit in strengthening Western Europe's independence and improving its position in international relationships.

5. The situation in Europe may, as a consequence of the above developments, become more complex, and this will affect all sides. What sort of changes this will bring to the international relationships structure which has formed in Europe since the war is a question worthy of attention and study.

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CSO- 5200/4060

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

XINHUA CITES SOVIET SOURCES ON EUROMISSILE ISSUE

Arms Negotiator on 'Breakthrough'

OW070645 Beijing XINHUA in English 0630 GMT 7 Mar 87

["Soviet Official: Breakthrough for Euromissile Talks" — XINHUA headline]

[Text] Paris, March 6 (XINHUA) — Soviet chief negotiator Yuliy Vorontsov for superpower arms talks in Geneva said here today that the superpower nuclear negotiations on Euromissiles had made a breakthrough.

In three or four months, Vorontsov said, a treaty on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe can be expected for signing.

However, the Soviet official said, Moscow would accept all forms of verification of an accord on dismantling medium-range missiles in Europe on the condition that the United States would accept the same procedures.

This issue should be solved on a strict base of reciprocity, the Soviet official told a press conference in the Soviet Embassy here.

He said that British and French missiles were not discussed in the recent superpower talks but would be taken into consideration in the future.

Vorontsov arrived here today after the 7th round of superpower nuclear disarmament negotiations concluded in Geneva.

PRAVDA on 'Obstacles'

OW081604 Beijing XINHUA in English 1510 GMT 8 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, March 8 (XINHUA) — Amid widely spread optimistic speculations that an agreement on eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe is within the reach, the Soviet Communist Party daily PRAVDA said today that there are still obstacles [that] lay in the path.

"Groundwork has been laid for a practical resolution of the problem", since Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced the new proposal on February 28, PRAVDA said.

However, PRAVDA noted that obstacles and difficulties have appeared on the way towards an agreement. It criticized the U.S. Defense Department for conducting "malicious propaganda" on the issue.

For example, PRAVDA reported, the Pentagon has said that "even if all the American missiles are withdrawn from Europe, several hidden Soviet SS-20 missiles could be used to blackmail NATO."

PRAVDA pointed out that "other difficulties are also cropping up" on the way towards an agreement and "ultra-rightist militaristic forces are bringing pressure to bear not only on the European allies of the United States, but even on the Washington administration itself."

The Soviet party newspaper stressed that the solution to medium-range missiles in Europe requires reciprocal moves from the U.S. leadership, although the Soviet side is prepared to sign an agreement on the issue as soon as possible.

It was reported earlier that chief Soviet arms negotiator Yuliy Vorontsov said in Paris Friday that there had been a breakthrough in Soviet-American talks on cutting medium-range nuclear missiles, and the U.S. delegation attending the current round of Geneva arms talks also said in a statement that there are "good prospects for reaching an agreement" on Euromissiles.

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CSO: 5200/4067

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

BRIEFS

OBSTRUCTION OF CW BAN—Geneva, 6 Mar—The question of banning chemical weapons occupies a special position at the current Disarmament Conference session. Many delegates consider it possible to reach agreement on an appropriate international convention as early as this year. In the last few sittings alone this ban has been said by representatives of the CSSR, Kenya, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia. According to Italian delegation head Aldo Puglese, the elimination of an entire category of terrible mass destruction weapons is perceived as an important task by all countries. Regarding verification difficulties, they ought to be resolved in a spirit of cooperation and goodwill. The Italian delegation considers the Soviet proposals made in mid-February are useful. USSR delegation head Yu.K. Nazarkin made several additional remarks on individual aspects of the convention to ban and destroy chemical weapons aimed at reaching agreement on it as soon as possible. He noted at the same time that while the Soviet Union displays a constructive approach and aims its efforts at bringing positions closer and finding solutions to various complex questions, the U.S. delegation tries to hold back the talks and avoids the quest for mutually acceptable accords. [TASS report: "Positions Moving Closer"] [Text] [Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4 PM]

'DEFENSE NEWS' ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS—Washington March 10 TASS—Full-scale production of the newest chemical weapon, the "Bigeye" bomb will start in the United States by the mid-1989. The newspaper "DEFENSE NEWS" reports with reference to Assistant Defense Secretary Robert Baker speaking at a subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services that the Pentagon requests 25 million dollars for 1988 fiscal year to complete the "Bigeye" bomb development program, and for the next fiscal year—as much as 99 million dollars. The "Bigeye" bomb, stuffed with a highly toxic agent, is only one of the "novelties" that the Pentagon intends to replenish its chemical arsenals with in the next few years. From Baker's pronouncements it was clear that the U.S. Defense Department requested for the next fiscal year 31 million dollars for the development of the chemical warhead for multi-barrel jet units which are to be developed by 1991, the "DEFENSE NEWS" writes. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1010 GMT 10 Mar 87 LD]

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: COMPLAINTS OVER RADIATION LEAKS FROM U.S. TESTS

Leaks 1964-1984

LD191019 Moscow TASS in English 0855 GMT 19 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 19 TASS — By TASS correspondent Igor Borisenko:

The Nevada test range has again, for the third time since the beginning of the current year, been rocked by a new explosion. A nuclear device was detonated in a deep tunnel drilled under the Rainer-Mesa Plateau at 10:28 a.m. local time on March 18. As the TASS correspondent was told by Jim Boyer, a spokesman for the command of the test range, its yield was "less than 20 kilotonnes." In his words, the test code-named Middle Note was "arms-related."

Has a release of radioactivity into the environment as a result of the nuclear blast been registered? No, nothing of the kind has happened, the spokesman for the test range said. This is by no means an idle question, since on April 10, last year, after the nuclear test codenamed "Mighty Oak" radioactivity was released into the tunnel. As the AP news agency said, this resulted in the destruction of measuring instruments "worth millions of dollars". This was far from being the single case. Instances of the release of radioactivity into the atmosphere were repeatedly registered after the U.S. nuclear tests. A whole number of similar examples is cited by the authors of the report recently prepared by the working group of the Centre for International Security and Arms Control of Stanford University.

Thus, on March 13, 1964, after the U.S. nuclear test codenamed "Pike" radiation reached the Mexican border. On April 14, 1965, as a result of a nuclear test, radiation reached Canada. In December 1968 traces of the nuclear test project Schooner were registered by four Canadian tracking stations, as well as in the territory of Mexico. A major release of radioactivity occurred in 1970 as a result of a nuclear test code-named "Bansberry". The soil cracked over the place where the blast was conducted, a radioactive cloud soared into the atmosphere and passed over the western part of the USA and the Canadian territory. Radiation leakages took place in 1981 as a result of the nuclear test Kiola and in 1984 after the nuclear test Agrini.

Common sense prompts that it is high time to put an end to nuclear tests to stop the death-carrying nuclear conveyor. Yet, the Washington Administration is turning a deaf ear to the voice of reason. In disregard of world public demands, the USA is continuing nuclear experiments in Nevada Desert aimed at modernising the already existing nuclear warheads and creating fundamentally new types of weapons, including nuclear-pumped lasers for the "Star Wars" programme.

State Department Contradicted

LD181118 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0749 GMT 18 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 18 TASS — TASS correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

On Tuesday the U.S. State Department admitted that, as a result of at least two underground nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada test range, there were incidents of "seepages" of radioactive gases into the atmosphere: On 25 September 1980, and on 31 March 1984.

A spokesman for the State Department assured that "barely detectable" levels of radioactivity were detected within the test site boundaries only, but he admitted the very fact of the incidents.

In the light of this admission, one is puzzled by the State Department's assertion that "since 1970 there have been no ventings from U.S. nuclear tests".

At a recent briefing a State Department spokesman maintained that, as a result of Soviet nuclear tests, there had been releases of radiation and that radioactive debris had allegedly been blown beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.

When he was asked whether he could name a country or countries in the atmosphere of which the said radioactive debris had been allegedly detected, he had to answer briefly: No.

When asked how in this context did matters stand with U.S. nuclear tests, the spokesman did not give an intelligible answer.

By its admission the Department of State is obviously trying to confuse the issue still further and, besides, is reaffirming its desire to lay the blame at somebody else's door.

It is well known in Washington that no country announced the detection of radioactive material over its territory as a result of Soviet underground nuclear tests.

Moreover, through the unfounded accusations being levelled at the Soviet Union and the assertions about the 'harmlessness' of U.S. tests, the administration would like to play down indignation around the world and in the United States itself over Washington's unwillingness to contribute in practice to curbing the arms race, and first of all, to agree to ending nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union observed its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, for a year and a half. The moratorium had to be discontinued only owing to the stand taken by the United States.

Throughout the Soviet moratorium, the United States is known to have gone ahead with an intensive program of nuclear tests during the development of new types of nuclear weapons, including SDI-related systems, for the purpose of gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union.

To distract attention, the administration is busy turning out various kinds of "reports" and "surveys" about alleged Soviet "violations" of almost all Soviet-U.S. treaties and agreements in the field of arms control. At the same time Washington prefers "not to take note of" not only documented Soviet rebuttals of these fanciful allegations but also reasoned statements by U.S. specialists. So, for instance, the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon have all so far "not taken note of" a report published here in February by a group of eminent scientists prepared for Stanford University or of research by the authoritative Defense Information Center in Washington, both of which demolish the allegations about "Soviet violations."

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CSO: 5200/1359

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET WEEKLY ON MORATORIUM: 'BRIDGES NOT BURNED'

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 10, 16 Mar 87 pp 8-9

[Article by NEW TIMES political analyst Sergey Golyakov under the rubric "Observer's View": "Bridges Aren't Burned"]

[Text] The USSR observed its moratorium on nuclear tests for over 18 months. It extended the deadline five times. And as often, the Soviet leadership found itself facing the dilemma of whether to continue the moratorium or abandon it. Are we not running too high a risk, it asked itself. Isn't time against us?

Those were legitimate doubts. Nevertheless, again and again, we opted for restraint. This accorded with our philosophy, our socialist morality, our sense of responsibility for the fate of civilization. We are convinced that the might of a state—especially a large one—does not lie in the endless demonstration of its ability to build up and improve its war machine or in chasing the spectre of military supremacy. Not at all. Security can be achieved through the elimination of nuclear weapons. It must be maintained not by force of arms, but by joint efforts, by political means. The task now is to learn to live together rather than to build up superweapons so as eventually to throw each other onto the rubbish heap of history.

A world without nuclear explosions offers a shortcut to a nuclear-free world. That was the idea of our moratorium, and we applied all our restraint and good will to make it a reality. The Americans responded with 26 new tests, which were carried out with ostentatious defiance, and timed to coincide either with a further prolongation of the moratorium, or with this or that Soviet peace initiative. We were even invited to Nevada to see how it was all going with our own eyes.

We know who we are dealing with and what the other side wants us to do. The Soviet Union had every reason to resume tests. But we realized, nevertheless, that our restraint was not in vain. The moratorium has convinced us that the end of tests is a realistic proposition. Without tests there will be no improving nuclear weapons, of which both sides have stockpiled more than enough.

This simple logic is winning increasingly wide support worldwide. Mighty political and social forces ranging from the Delhi Six and the Socialist International to most non-aligned states favour a joint Soviet-American moratorium,

an agreement on banning all nuclear tests. Such an agreement is also insisted upon by most UN member states, an authoritative and sizable section of the world community.

A spate of messages from politicians and public figures, private individuals, movements and organizations from all over the world—the U.S. and NATO countries included—have poured into Moscow, asking us not to resume nuclear tests and to give those who will stop at nothing another chance.

We have given them five such chances. Using them would have contributed to confidence, the triumph of common sense, and open international communication. All our partners had to do was to display new political thinking, which Washington did not.

No matter how alluring the prospects of a nuclear-free world are, no country can attain this goal single-handed. All nuclear powers must pool their efforts in this direction. Quiet in Kazakhstan and a nuclear rumble in Nevada could not continue forever. Finally, the situation has come to a head.

Who can blame us for that? Our conscience is clear. Having exhausted its patience, weighed the sacred interests of security and heeded the alarmed voices of its citizens, our state has decided to resume testing. In and outside the country, this has been taken as a forced measure imposed on us by the American nuclear warmongers.

"We in Sweden welcome the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests, but we can understand why the USSR has resumed testing," Ingemund Bengtsson, Speaker of the Swedish Riksdag (parliament) told Andrei Gromyko in Moscow.

"The U.S. has played an unseemly role in this business, and an analysis of Washington's stand on disarmament only adds to this impression, which most countries, the allies included, share," the Paris newspaper LE MONDE wrote.

The allies are not entirely without sin themselves, though. Horst Ehmke, deputy chairman of the SDP faction in the Bundestag, is of the opinion that they, too, are to blame since "they didn't press Washington hard enough to join the Soviet moratorium.

This is a just reproach. In the fight for a nuclear-free world every voice matters, and every country must do its bit. No government and no public force has the moral right to shun responsibility or stand idly by. Such is the imperative of the nuclear-missile age.

The underground explosion near Semipalatinsk on February 26 has not changed the principled stand of the Soviet Union.

The bridges have not been burned. The possibility of an agreement remains. Today, too, the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate the banning of all nuclear tests anywhere, at any forum, and at any level but with, of course, the U.S. present. The objective may be attained stage by stage, beginning with the ratification of the Soviet-American 'threshold' agreements of 1974 and 1976

and the imposition of intermediate restrictions on the quantity and yield of nuclear explosions. Such is our plan, and whether the West accepts it or not time will tell. As for us, we are not going to waste our time. We shall not give up looking for ways of reaching mutually acceptable agreements. The new proposals Mikhail Gorbachev put forward in his statement of February 28 are an earnest of this. Symbolically, the statement was published on the threshold of spring, an appropriate time for the awakening of new hopes and taking a resolute step into a non-nuclear future!

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CSO: 5200/1356

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA DEPUTY EDITOR PRAISES NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR POLICY

HK170704 Auckland THE NEW ZEALAND HERALD in English 9 Mar 87 p 3

[Text] New Zealand can best play a role on the international stage by determining and sticking to its true national interests, says Mr Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, a deputy editor of the Soviet Communist Party newspaper PRAVDA.

"New Zealand must be New Zealand," he says. "What I mean is that to be outside the rivalry of big outside powers is for the benefit of all the nations in the South Pacific."

He believes that in the present state of the world it is most important that each nation should have the right to choose its own foreign policy, friends and allies.

Mr Ovchinnikov, whose newspaper has a daily circulation of about 13 million, came to the South Pacific for the visit of the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Shevardnadze, to Australia. He has been in New Zealand for the past few days and will leave today.

He says that the Soviet leader, Mr Gorbachev, in his speech in Vladivostok last July, reminded the world that the Soviet Union was a Pacific country. He also invited a common effort to work out something like a code of behaviour for the region.

It was not to be a pact or an alliance — just a set of mutually acceptable principles that would reflect the interests of every nation participating in the effort.

"We emphasize that we do not have any ready-made recipe or magic key to solve the problems of Asia and the Pacific.

"What we want is the South Pacific to be a very peaceful area. We think now that it is a very good example for the other regions of the world, and if it is outside the military rivalry of any outside power, so much the better."

Of foreign military bases in the Pacific, Mr Ovchinnikov says that in principle the Soviet Union stands for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories.

"But we recognize that the question of eliminating them is most difficult, and if we move to comprehensive Asian and Pacific security it would be difficult to start with that particular point.

"We have to start with easier things, such as how we can cooperate in fighting terrorism on the sea and air routes over the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or in solving some ecological problems and in finding ways to preserve fishery resources."

Mr Ovchinnikov says New Zealand is a good example of how a country that is not a superpower, nor even a big power, can play an important part in the campaign for the survival of mankind. Its anti-nuclear policy is highly appreciated in the Philippines, Japan and Indonesia, and in his own country.

"Even in Eastern Europe I think the international image of New Zealand has greatly improved.

"While on holiday in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria I was often asked whether I had been to New Zealand and what I thought of Prime Minister Lange and his anti-nuclear policy, of possible pressures from outside, and of the chances of the Labour Government's being re-elected.

"So New Zealand is no longer some forgotten corner of the world."

Mr Ovchinnikov is a sinologist, with a special interest in Chinese philosophy and literature. He has worked for seven years in China and for seven years in Japan, and for five years he was London bureau chief of Pravda.

He has written 15 books on those countries.

Mr Ovchinnikov's name means "sheepskin-maker" in the Russian language.

"I am very proud to admit that fact in this country," he says. "In Japan I have to keep it secret. In Japan people who deal with the skins of animals are untouchables.

"I am going to buy some sheepskins here. They are the best souvenirs one can have with a name like mine."

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CSO: 5200/1356

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: FRANCE USING KERGUELEN FOR NUCLEAR TESTS

LDO42031 Moscow TASS in English 1630 GMT 4 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 4 TASS — By TASS news analyst Valeriy Vavilov:

Kerguelen, a volcanic island lost in the expanses of the Indian Ocean, has lately riveted the attention of the French military command. Large amounts of equipment have been delivered there, powerful explosions are rocking the island, and French naval ships and air force planes are involved in the operation.

According to official reports from Paris, "scientific experiments are in progress" on the island "to study the structure of the earth crust."

The press, however, has interpreted these experiments in a different manner — in actual fact preparatory work is under way to build a new nuclear test center on that island. It will be used instead of the existing nuclear test range situated on the island Mururoa in the Pacific.

Perhaps, French authorities have heeded the voice of protest of the people living in the southern part of the Pacific who proclaimed that region a nuclear-free zone late last year. For the Rarotonga Treaty signed by the nations of that region manifestly prohibits any nuclear explosions as well as the burial of radioactive wastes within the limits of the zone covered by the agreement.

Perhaps this is the reason why French authorities have decided to transfer their testing facility to another part of the planet — to an island in the Indian Ocean situated thousands of kilometers from densely-populated regions?

The answer is "no, by no means". It turned out that Mururoa Island is no longer suitable for that. 83 nuclear devices were detonated there since June 1975. In the opinion of experts, this has caused geological conditions of the island to deteriorate. It has become an extremely dangerous place from the standpoint of radiation leaks. The level of permeability of its geological structure is very high. The atoll has sustained fractures and has become useless as a site for the burial of radioactive wastes.

Paris is apparently unprepared to think in terms of a nuclear weapon-free world. This is evidenced among other things by France's new military program designed for the period from 1987 until 1991. The plan calls for the modernization of the country's nuclear arsenal, the replacement of strategic missiles based on submarines, the development of land-based mobile strategic missiles, as well as of new tactical nuclear missiles that can be fitted out with either an atomic or a neutron warhead.

Such a wide-scale program for nuclear arms build-up requires an experimental base. This is what explains France's intention to build a new nuclear testing facility in the Indian Ocean.

Such a stand organically combines with a negative attitude to French missiles in Europe. Demonstrating its loyalty to Atlantic solidarity, France comes out in favor of keeping American nuclear weapons on the European continent at any cost.

In a demonstration of a deficit of new thinking, French authorities are opposed to the prospect of ridding Europe from a substantial portion of the nuclear burden and are unwilling to seek and find mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world. Instead, they are drafting new plans for the arms race, including the race in nuclear arms. The construction of a nuclear test range on Kerguelen Island is but one more step in that dangerous direction.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRC COMMENTARY DISCUSSES SOVIET NUCLEAR TEST RESUMPTION

OW031115 Beijing in Russian to the USSR 1800 GMT 2 Mar 87

[Station commentary]

[Text] On the occasion of the recent nuclear explosion conducted by the USSR at Semipalatinsk, an employee of our radio station made a short commentary, in which it was noted that this was an important reaction by the Soviet Union to the U.S. refusal to stop nuclear tests.

In August 1985, the Soviet Union declared a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, while the United States, during the same period, conducted underground nuclear explosions on more than 20 occasions. Therefore, on 3 February when the United States conducted the first nuclear test this year, the Soviet Union immediately responded sharply, noting that this was a demonstrative challenge thrown in the face of the world community.

The Soviet Union also announced the resumption of nuclear tests to counteract the U.S. threat and to ensure the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. On the question of nuclear tests, the commentary continues, the United States and the Soviet Union have made their own calculations. The Soviet Union, by means of a moratorium on nuclear explosions, is attempting to prevent the United States from fulfilling the American Star Wars program. The United States, on the other hand, intends to reach a technical breakthrough in space weapons by means of continued nuclear tests. People are concerned at the appearance of a new escalation in the arms race between the United States and the USSR.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

TASS: FRANCE TO CONTINUE TESTS—Paris March 7 TASS—France will continue nuclear tests on Atoll Mururoa in the Pacific Ocean in the future as well, said Vice-Admiral Pierre Tiraut, commander-in-chief of the armed forces in French Polynesia, FRANCE PRESSE reported today from Papeete, the administrative centre of this overseas department of France, where Atoll Mururoa, converted into a nuclear bridgehead, is located. Tiraut also reported that France's Navy in French Polynesia would soon be fortified with two purpose-build patrol ships. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1948 GMT 7 Mar 87 LD]

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CSO: 5200/1359

RELATED ISSUES

TASS COMMENTS ON RICHARD PERLE'S RESIGNATION

'Negative' Towards Disarmament

LD122119 Moscow TASS in English 2043 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Washington March 12 TASS — TASS correspondent Igor Ignatiev reports:

U.S. Assistant Secretary for Defence Richard Perle announced his coming resignation at today's news conference in the Pentagon.

By his activity, first in the apparatus of the U.S. Congress, and in the past six years as Assistant Secretary for Defence Richard Perle earned a firm reputation as a "hawk" and a "hardliner" with regard to the Soviet Union. He was among those who drew up the Jackson-Vanik agreement that consolidated a discriminatory approach to trade with the USSR, and was pressing for its adoption in the seventies. Holding a post of prominence in the Pentagon, Perle made no secret of his negative attitude to the idea of general and complete disarmament. He took direct part in working out the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, the interpretation that was endorsed by President Reagan and that is viewed by many American experts as a step toward abandoning that important agreement in the sphere of arms control.

Summary of Career

LD131031 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0003 GMT 13 Mar 87

[Text] Washington, 13 Mar (TASS) — TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev reports:

Assistant U.S. Secretary for Defense Richard Perle announced his imminent resignation Thursday. At a press conference held here on this matter he said this will happen in the near future, when his successor has been selected.

Perle has essentially committed his entire career and his rapid rise up the official ladder of anticommunism, to fierce hatred of socialism, and to loyal service of the U.S. military-industrial complex. During his career Perle has earned a solid reputation of being an outright "hawk". Both in the apparatus of the U.S. Congress and in the past 6 years in his influential post in the Pentagon, he has literally done his utmost to put a brake on the normal development of U.S.-USSR relations and to block progress in the field of arms control. Closely linked with Zionist circles in the United States, Perle was one of those who initiated and "pushed" through the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which was passed by the U.S. Congress in the 1970's and established the discriminatory approach to trade with the USSR.

Having obtained a high post in the Pentagon under the Reagan administration, Perle did not conceal his hostility toward the idea of full and universal disarmament. His recent statement in Munich caused a real scandal, when he called all proposals concerning the possibility that "one fine day the world will be able to rid itself of nuclear weapons," "stupidity verging on the absurd".

Striving to do all he could to ensure this does not happen, Perle faithfully implemented the program for the "rearmament of America" advanced by the present administration. He expressed his feelings on this matter in a letter to President Reagan, in which he stressed "I will always be most grateful for the opportunity of participating in the program to restore the national strength" of the United States.

Perle took the most direct part in elaborating the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty that has been approved by the White House and which many U.S. experts view as a step toward renouncing this important agreement in the field of arms control.

Pentagon chief C. Weinberger expressed his "profound regret" regarding Perle's departure, but did note Perle had agreed to "continue to provide assistance and to make a recommendation for his successor". Perle explains his departure is "for personal reasons", but local observers see his resignation as yet more evidence of the lack of stability of the present administration, which has been gripped by the loud political scandal of "Irangate."

TASS Doubts Perle's 'Optimism'

LD121948 Moscow TASS in English 1934 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS -- Commentator Vladimir Vladimirov writes:

As reported by the ASSOCIATED PRESS from Washington, assistant secretary of defense of the United States Richard Perle has predicted success at the talks on the problem of eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe. Does this mean this man from the Pentagon who is known worldwide as a "hawk" has now become a "dove"? No need to hurry with an answer and here are the reasons why.

The very same Mr Perle recently spoke in one of the congressional committees and demanded that the number of American military personnel in Europe be increased in 1988-89. This is necessary, in particular, to service land-based cruise missiles, those very missiles which should be liquidated in the event of a successful outcome of the Soviet-American talks. Optimism or not, but the deployment of American missiles in Western Europe should be continued -- such is the present credo of the assistant secretary of defense of the United States. What also comes to mind is that several days ago Perle remarked when speaking about verification of a possible future agreement that verification is not just very difficult but is simply impossible. So there is every reason to doubt the sincerity of Mr. Perle's "optimism".

The Pentagon is clearly reluctant to part with medium-range missiles in Europe, especially with the Pershing-2 ballistic missiles. So it appears that if "worst comes to worst", it is suggested to reduce their range and classify them as theatre missiles.

As THE WASHINGTON POST reported on March 5, the opinion is voiced in the United States that the problem of theatre missiles might become a "serious stumbling block" on the road to any whatsoever accord on medium-range missiles, Washington would want to have the possibility to build up its arsenal of missiles of this class in Europe. So already now the agreement on the elimination of medium-range missiles is being viewed by some members of the American Administration not as a step to a nuclear-free Europe but as a switching of emphasis in the arms race to other directions.

All this goes to show that the new self-proclaimed "doves" have the talons of hawks.

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CSO: 5200/1366

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE VISITS INDOCHINA STATES

Vietnam-Soviet Communique

PM161137 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

["Soviet-Vietnamese Joint Statement"]

[Excerpts] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, was in the SRV on an official friendly visit from 11 to 13 March 1987 at the invitation of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] Central Committee and the SRV Council of Ministers.

E.A. Shevardnadze laid a wreath at the Ho Chi Minh mausoleum and laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin memorial in Hanoi.

A meeting took place between the USSR foreign minister and Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee; Truong Chinh, chairman of the SRV State Council; Pham Van Dong, chairman of the SRV Council of Ministers; and Le Duc Tho, advisor to the CPV Central Committee.

Talks were held between E.A. Shevardnadze and Nguyen Co Thach, member of the CPV Central Committee Politburo, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and SRV foreign minister, on a broad range of issues of bilateral relations and on the present international situation.

The meeting and the talks passed in an atmosphere of friendship, cordiality and complete unanimity of views.

During the exchange of opinions on key international problems, the two sides expressed their concern at the tension which continues to exist in the world, and at the absence of substantial progress in the direction of improving the political climate of the globe. The responsibility for this lies completely with imperialist quarters, and the United States first and foremost, which are conducting a policy of neoglobalism and which stubbornly refuse to recognize the realities which exist in the world. In connection with this, attention was focused on the increasing importance of further increasing joint actions by the countries of the socialist community and by all forces of peace and progress in the struggle to break the tendency toward an increase in the danger of war, to avoid a nuclear catastrophe, to put an end to the arms race on earth and to prevent one in space, and to strengthen peace and international security.

E.A. Shevardnadze stated that the USSR values highly Socialist Vietnam's contribution to the implementation of the agreed policy of the fraternal countries in the international arena, and to the cause of consolidating peace, security, and cooperation in Asia and worldwide.

It was stressed by the Vietnamese side that the program to create a nuclear-free world by the end of the present century, set forth in the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the concept of creating a comprehensive system of international security submitted by the 27th CPSU Congress, and other wide-ranging peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union are in accordance with the vital interests of all countries. The CPV and the working people of the SRV fully support the Soviet foreign policy initiatives.

The USSR and the SRV consider that through the fault of Washington, a historic chance was missed in Reykjavik to achieve far-reaching agreements on nuclear disarmament. They are convinced that the proposals the Soviet Union submitted in the Icelandic capital, which are in accordance with the interests of all peoples of the globe, can be realized if the U.S. Administration will manifest a realistic approach.

The statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 28 February this year, which contains the proposal for the immediate conclusion of a separate agreement on medium-range missiles, is yet another major step toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposal gives a chance for an immediate start of movement toward a reduction in nuclear weaponry and toward total nuclear disarmament.

The Vietnamese side welcomes and resolutely supports the Soviet Union's new peace initiative as a manifestation of the USSR's good will, of its high sense of responsibility for the destinies of mankind, and it notes that the peoples expect a positive response to the Soviet proposal.

The two sides stress the importance of the USSR's decision for the creation of reliable security not only in Europe, but in Asia as well.

The sides devoted great attention to the Asia-Pacific region, where the military activity of the United States and its allies continues to increase. It is the opinion of the two sides that the increasing of the militaristic trend in the policy of the Japanese Government, in particular its decision to abolish limitations on the growth of the military budget, and also Tokyo's joining in with the space arms race through participation in the so-called U.S. "Strategic Defense Initiative," and the course of forming an aggressive Washington-Tokyo-Seoul bloc, which is fraught with serious threats to the prospects for the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, cannot fail to arouse concern. The SRV confirms its complete support for the proposals expressed by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Vladivostok with regard to ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region.

As convinced supporters of the idea of turning the Asia-Pacific region into a region of peace, stability, neighborliness and cooperation, the Soviet Union and Vietnam are quite determined to move toward the achievement of this goal upon the basis of an integrated approach to the problems of ensuring security in Asia by means of creating an atmosphere of trust and constructive cooperation of all states in the region on a bilateral and multilateral basis. This is the thrust of the well-known initiatives by Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, the DPRK, the DPRK, and a number of other Asian states.

The practical solution of problems, such as preventing the buildup and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, creating nuclear-free zones, lowering the level of armed forces, conventional arms, and military activity, reducing naval activity, and implementing confidence-building measures, is topical for the entire region.

The Vietnamese side welcomed the results of the Soviet-Indian summit meeting and the Delhi declaration on the principles of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence, as a shining example of new political thinking and a realistic and constructive approach to the realities that have evolved on the planet. The SRV shares the ideas of the declaration, and considers them to be a good foundation for constructing interstate relations in a nuclear-space age. The sides valued highly India's active role in the international arena, its contribution to the strengthening of peace and stability on the continent of Asia and throughout the world.

The USSR and the SRV expressed concern at the further complication of the situation in the Indian Ocean, condemned attempts to build up a foreign military presence there, expressed themselves in favor of implementing as soon as possible the United Nations declaration, declaring the Indian Ocean to be a zone of peace, and recognized the need for convening an international conference on this issue as soon as possible, and no later than 1988.

The USSR and the SRV consider that the normalization and improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam on the one hand, and the PRK on the other, on a basis of principle and of equal rights, and not to the detriment of third countries, would be a weighty contribution to the cause of improving the situation in the continent of Asia.

The Vietnamese side gave information about efforts being made by the SRV, jointly with the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) and the PRK, to institute a constructive political dialogue with ASEAN states for turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, neighborliness, and cooperation. The Soviet Union supports the constructive course and practical steps by Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in this direction. The USSR and the SRV confirm their support for the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia which would be in accordance with the interests of all peoples living in this region. E.A. Shevardnadze noted that the fraternal alliance of the three countries of Indochina is an important factor for peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

He confirmed the Soviet Union's support for the efforts of the SRV, the LPDR, and the PRK for strengthening the cohesion of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the struggle to build socialism and in the defense of their national independence.

The participants in the talks expressed the firm conviction that settlement as soon as possible of the situation around Cambodia would encourage an improvement of the atmosphere in Southeast Asia. The USSR considers that a foundation for such political settlement is set out in the well-known proposals of the PRK Government and in the joint foreign policy documents of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The Soviet side shares and supports the approach the SRV, the LPDR, and the PRK take to this issue. The Soviet Union and Vietnam resolutely advocate giving the PRK its legitimate place in the UN and other international organizations, and they condemn the use of these organizations for purposes of interference in that country's internal affairs.

The Soviet and Vietnamese sides value highly the decisions of the extraordinary extended plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, and express complete support for the political line of the Afghan leadership, aimed at creating conditions for the start of an open, all-Afghan dialogue with the object of establishing a durable peace and national concord in Afghanistan.

The SRV welcomes the decision to withdraw part of the Soviet troops located temporarily in the Mongolian People's Republic from that country as an act of goodwill which will encourage a strengthening of mutual understanding and trust, neighborly relations, and cooperation between countries and peoples of the Asian Continent, and as a concrete step toward creating the foundations of a comprehensive system of peace and international security in the vast Asia-Pacific region.

The Soviet and Vietnamese sides support the efforts of the DPRK for the peaceful unification of the country and its proposals for setting up a nuclear-free zone throughout the whole Korean peninsula, and for holding military-political talks between the north and south of the country.

The Soviet Union and Vietnam express themselves in favor of a collective search for ways of settling situations of conflict in the Near and Middle East, in Central America and in southern Africa by political means, by means of talks, and upon a basis of respect for the sovereignty and independence of states and the right of each people to decide its own fate without foreign interference.

During an examination of the Iran-Iraq conflict, deep concern was expressed over the fact that it has not so far been possible to achieve an end to the bloodshed and the start of political talks about settling the conflict between the sides.

The Vietnamese side noted with satisfaction the signing by the Soviet Union and China of protocols to the Rarotonga treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. It expressed the hope that other nuclear powers would also approach this initiative with the proper level of responsibility and said that for their own part, they would do everything in their power to ensure a truly non-nuclear status for the declared zone.

The USSR and the SRV noted the growing role of the Nonaligned Movement as an authoritative participant in the struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism, aggression, racism, and for ending the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons, for the peace and security of the people. The Soviet Union and Vietnam consider that it is essential to seek more actively the institution of a new world economic order, guaranteeing equal economic security for all states. They expressed themselves in favor of holding talks within the UN framework, in which all states would take part with the object of finding a global solution to the most important international economic problems.

Lao-Soviet Communique

PH101616 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

["Joint Soviet-Lao Communique"]

[Excerpts] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, was in the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR] 8 through 10 March on an official friendly visit at the invitation of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Central Committee and the LPDR Government.

An exchange of opinions which took place on topical international problems reaffirmed the fully coinciding assessments of the present state of the world situation and the causes of its dangerous exacerbation. The participants in the talks expressed concern at the continuing growth of tension in the world due to the adventurist course of the aggressive circles of imperialism, a course of achieving military superiority, kindling conflicts, and interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. This course is incompatible with the realities of the modern world, runs counter to the vital aspirations of all peoples, and entails a mortal threat to the preservation of life itself on our planet. Through the fault of the U.S. Administration, at the Reykjavik meeting a real opportunity to reach an agreement on key disarmament problems was lost.

In the course of the talks, the Soviet Union and Laos reaffirmed their determination, together with the other socialist countries and all peace-loving forces, to wage a tireless struggle against the nuclear danger and for disarmament and the maintenance and strengthening of universal peace.

The Lao side warmly supports the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on concluding without delay a separate agreement on medium-range missiles as an important new step in the cause of implementing the comprehensive Soviet program for freeing the world from the threat of nuclear destruction. The two sides noted the great significance of the Soviet proposal both for Europe and for the Asian and Pacific region.

The Lao side expressed full support for the Leninist foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, the program elaborated by the 27th CPSU Congress for creating a comprehensive system of international security, the constructive Soviet initiatives aimed at ensuring a nuclear-free world on earth and in space, which meet the vital interests of the peoples, and the Vladivostok proposals for the normalization of the situation and the establishment of cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region.

The LPDR fully shares the provisions of the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons, and notes its great significance for the development of interstate relations in the present situation.

Devoting particular attention to discussing the situation in the Asian and Pacific region, the sides expressed concern at the fact that in various parts of the Asian continent and the Pacific Ocean region tension continues to grow and attempts are being stepped up by U.S. imperialist circles and their allies to turn that extensive region of the world into another arena of military-political confrontation with the socialist states. They resolutely condemned Washington's policy of knocking together military-political blocks and closed groupings in the Asian and Pacific region and noted their concern at the stepping up of the militarist thrust in Japan's policy.

In this regard, it was stressed that the USSR and the LPDR are in favor of further stepping up collaboration among the socialist countries of Asia in developing cooperation with all states of the Asian and Pacific region, as well as the joint quest for ways of settling regional problems and strengthening peace in that part of the globe.

They are convinced that providing guarantees of a lasting and just peace in Asia and the Pacific would be an important element of the formation of an all-embracing system of international security. In order to achieve progress in this sphere it is

important, in the opinion of the sides, to implement measures to prevent the buildup and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, turn the idea of creating nuclear-free zones into a reality, and find ways of lowering the level of ground forces and military activity, and reduce naval activity.

The talks participants confirmed their approval of the peace-loving initiatives of the MPR and DPRK, which are making a substantial contribution to efforts to improve the situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Joint 'Communique'

PH111705 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

["Joint Soviet-Cambodian Communique"]

[Excerpts] At the invitation of the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea [KPRP] and the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, USSR minister of foreign affairs, has been staying in the PRK on an official friendly visit from 10-11 March.

E.A. Shevardnadze laid a wreath at the monument to fighters who perished defending the cause of the revolution.

The USSR minister of foreign affairs has had meetings with Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee, chairman of the PRK State Council. Taking part in the Soviet-Cambodian talks which were held were, on the Soviet side, E.A. Shevardnadze; and on the Kampuchean side, Hun Sen, member of the KPRP Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, and Hong Xorm, member of the KPRP Central Committee and PRK minister of foreign affairs. A wide range of issues concerning the further development of Soviet-Cambodian cooperation and topical international problems were discussed at the talks.

During their discussion of topical international issues, the participants in the negotiations expressed profound concern over the continuing tension in the world caused by the policy being pursued by the aggressive circles of imperialism, and, above all, by U.S. imperialism, of stepping up the arms race; by the U.S. intentions of extending it to space; and by Washington's actions to aggravate the situation in various regions of the world and to interfere openly in the affairs of sovereign states. In conditions under which there is no turn for the better in the development of the international situation, particular significance is assumed by further cohesion of all progressive and peace-loving forces, the immediate activization of their efforts in the struggle to remove the threat of nuclear war, the consolidation of international security, and ensuring the rights of peoples to self-determination, independence and social progress.

The Cambodian leaders confirmed their full support for the Soviet Union's peace-loving initiatives on crucial problems of disarmament, especially of nuclear disarmament, averting militarization of space, and putting an end to nuclear weapon testing. They voiced their conviction that implementing these proposals would bring about an essential and positive change in the situation throughout the world, deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear and chemical annihilation, and would offer mankind

opportunities for entering a qualitatively new stage of development without nuclear weapons and without the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The constructive initiatives, aimed at strengthening peace and stability in Asia and in the Pacific basin, at establishing wide-scale cooperation among all countries of the region on an equitable and mutually beneficial basis, which were contained in the speech of M.S. Gorbachev in Vladivostok, are also in line with these objectives. In this context, nonaccumulation and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, implementation of practical measures on setting up nuclear-free zones here, and reductions in the land forces and military activity would be of great significance.

The Cambodian side welcomes and supports the new initiative of the Soviet Union on the issue of the reduction and elimination of medium-range nuclear weapons. Both sides stressed the importance of the decision of the USSR for the creation [sozdaniye] of reliable security, both in Europe and in Asia.

The sides voiced the opinion that, under the conditions of the nuclear-space age, the Delhi Declaration on the principles of a nonviolent world free from nuclear weapons is a most important and topical document. The Cambodian leaders said that the PRK fully shares these principles and is resolutely in favor of their implementation.

Having spoken in support of the well-known initiatives of the Mongolian People's Republic concerning the conclusion of a convention on mutual nonaggression and the nonuse of force in relations between the states of Asia and the Pacific Ocean and on the creation [sozdaniye] of machinery that excludes the use of force in the relations between the countries of the Asian-Pacific region, the participants in the talks noted that their implementation would facilitate normalization of the situation in that part of the world.

Both sides voiced their support for the well-known DPRK proposals directed at a peaceful, democratic unification of the country and at turning the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. The implementation of these initiatives would facilitate the process of making the situation healthier and lessening tension in the Far East.

The sides expressed the hope that the PRK will take its legitimate place in the Nonaligned Movement and voiced their deep conviction that the PRK would make a worthy contribution to the struggle of this movement for peace and for eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

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CSO: 5200/1366

RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS INDONESIA

Arrival Statement

LD051048 Moscow TASS in English 1033 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Jakarta March 5 TASS -- TASS correspondents Oleg Abramkin and Valery Fedortsov report:

Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, arrived here today on an official visit at the invitation of the Indonesian Government.

He was welcomed at the airport, which was decked out with Soviet and Indonesian flags, by Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumastmaja of Indonesia and other officials.

Shevardnadze made the following statement upon his arrival:

"We have arrived in Indonesia guided by the awareness of our common responsibility for the fate of the world, for peace in the region and for goodneighbourliness in our bilateral relations.

"Our guide in the long travel to you has been the memory of the past in which the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Indonesia showed distinctly. In those years we got on well and cooperated equally well. Today this is more essential to us than ever before because all our disagreements are nothing compared with the mission of saving mankind and our own nations from nuclear destruction. It is only by the effort of all states that this mission can be performed and the foundations laid for a comprehensive system of international security.

Indonesia, one of the largest and most influential states in the Asia-Pacific region and a founder and active member of the Non-aligned Movement, is making a no small contribution to stronger stability in this vast part of the world.

And the call, made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech, for Asian and Pacific countries to launch a joint search for ways of ensuring security for each and everyone in this region should have, in our opinion, a special appeal for it.

The principles for a nuclear weapon-free and non-violent world, set forth in the Delhi Declaration, should be especially understandable to this country, which has presented the peoples with the Bandung spirit.

Having become common property of human history, the ideas of Bandung keep serving the present day and have merged with the Lodestar ideas of the present.

Life has come up over the time with quite a few questions — not only problems, which we can discuss with mutual benefit to our countries, and we attach much significance to the forthcoming meeting with the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mr. Suharto.

We count on productive talks with my colleague Mr. Kusumaatmaja. We expect reaching agreement to strengthen contacts between the foreign ministries of our two countries. A brief stopover on Bali Island three days ago has been a promising prelude to Indonesia. Today, after arriving in its capital, we can see better your country's beauty, variety and pace of life.

I wish happiness and prosperity to the citizens of Jakarta and of the entire republic."

Eduard Shevardnadze then answered a number of questions from correspondents.

Arrival News Conference

BK051525 Jakarta TVRI Television Network in Indonesian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his wife arrived at 1440 West Indonesian Time [0740 GMT] this afternoon at Jakarta's Halim Perdanakusumah Airport aboard an Aeroflot plane. They were welcomed by Foreign Minister Mohhtar Kusumaatmaja and his wife, the Soviet ambassador to Indonesia, high-ranking officials of the Foreign Affairs Department, and Soviet community in Jakarta. The Soviet foreign minister is now on an Asia-Pacific tour — with Thailand as the first leg of his journey — aimed at discussing the Cambodian problem. He has already visited Australia for talks on nuclear disarmament in the Pacific region. Today he began his visit to Indonesia. During his visit to this country, in addition to talks on bilateral ties, he will discuss world peace, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified Russian interpreter speaking in Indonesian] We would like to greet all Indonesian journalists, who are the representatives of the great Indonesian people. I believe we will be discussing what the two great countries and peoples can do to safeguard peace, stop the arms race, and prevent humanity from perishing in nuclear [word indistinct]. Therefore, anything can be done to guarantee peace.

[Shevardnadze speaking in Russian followed by interpreter in Indonesian] Of course, we want to look into our bilateral relationships in a detailed and concrete way, namely in the economic, trade, political, scientific, and technological fields. We feel that there are good prospects in these areas. Relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Indonesia have an interesting and useful history. There are, of course, difficult moments throughout these relations, but we believe that the history of our relations is not [words indistinct]. I believe we will uphold this principle and make continued progress. [end recording]

Discussions With Mokhtar

LD060756 Moscow TASS in English 0746 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] Jakarta March 6 TASS -- Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, minister of foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R., who arrived in Indonesia for an official visit had a meeting with Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, minister of foreign affairs of Indonesia, today. The two ministers discussed bilateral relations, the situation in the region and international affairs.

Mokhtar on Nuclear Policies

BE060715 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1300 GMT 5 Mar 87

[Report on remarks made by Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja to unidentified station correspondent -- date not given]

[Text] During a conversation with a Radio Moscow correspondent, Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja said that Indonesia, like other countries, appreciates the foreign policy initiatives made by the Soviet Union following the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The foreign minister of the Republic of Indonesia expressed the hope that the proposals contained in Mikhail Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok last July will receive a positive response from the countries concerned, including the United States.

The foreign minister of the Republic of Indonesia reiterated that Indonesia's stand on the nuclear arms race is absolutely clear. The cessation of this race must be our main common target. The reduction of the nuclear arms buildup will play a role in the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons as a means of mass destruction. Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja stressed that Indonesia welcomes the establishment of nuclear-free zones as a means to control the nuclear arms race, adding, however, that this is only a partial step. He added: For us, genuine peace is more dimensional than merely an absence of wars. Peace means respect for each other, an absence of ambitions and intention to impose views on another country, cooperation, and common efforts to overcome common issues. Nations should have the right to live in accordance with their own wishes.

Gerasimov Moscow Briefing

LD051600 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 5 P.S. 87

[Text] Moscow 5 Mar (TASS) -- The USSR regards as important relations with Indonesia an influential state of the Asian-Pacific Ocean region, and active member of the Nonaligned Movement, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Foreign Ministry at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists held today. The official visit of Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, who arrived in Jakarta today, will last till 8 March.

It is remembered in the USSR, said Gennadiy Gerasimov, that the Bandung principles were born precisely on the soil of Indonesia. He stressed that the national interests of the USSR and Indonesia have never clashed. As far as a number of international problems is concerned, the positions of both countries are close and even identical.

In the course of his visit Eduard Shevardnadze will meet Indonesian president and other officials. The main directions of the further development of bilateral cooperation, international and regional problems, including the problems of Asian-Pacific Ocean region, in conjunction with the proposals, made by Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech in Vladivostok last year, and also during his visit to India, will be examined.

Further on Talks

LD061453 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Excerpt] Jakarta March 6 TASS--Eduard Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja conferred here today.

During the talks, which passed in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere, they stated the closeness or identity of the positions of the USSR and Indonesia on such cardinal issues of the times as those of building a comprehensive system of international peace and security, bridling the arms race, first of all the nuclear arms race, preventing it from spilling over into outer space, and putting an end to nuclear testing.

Stress was made on the need to establish a new international economic order and the close connection between the problems of disarmament and development. Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja positively received information about the latest Soviet proposal on medium-range missiles.

Much attention was paid to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region. Eduard Shevardnadze dwelled upon the key aspects of the Soviet program for stronger security and peaceful and equitable cooperation in Asia and the Pacific, which has been set forth in Mikhail Gorbachev's statements in Vladivostok and New Delhi. The Indonesian side voiced support for the constructive ideas laid down in the program.

Mokhtar Speaks at Dinner

LD061837 Moscow TASS in English 1821 GMT 6 Mar 87

[Text] Jakarta March 6 TASS -- Indonesian Foreign Minister Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja has expressed profound satisfaction with the continued strengthening of understanding and development of mutually beneficial cooperation between his country and the Soviet Union.

He was speaking here today at a dinner for Edward Shevardnadze, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR.

Commenting on the world situation, Kusumaatmaja said the ongoing arms race was not benefiting any country, while posing a threat to the very existence of mankind.

That was why, he stressed, it was a duty of all nations, in the first place the nuclear powers, to show a sense of responsibility and apply efforts to achieve a multilateral agreement on a complete end to nuclear weapons testing.

The Indonesian foreign minister expressed himself for a peaceful settlement of regional conflicts. In this connection he spoke with satisfaction about steps taken to settle the situation concerning Afghanistan, in particular the significance of the Soviet Union's initiative towards this goal.

One of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia, he said, would continue making a positive contribution to efforts to attain the aims and lofty ideals of that movement.

Shevardnadze Responds

LD062215 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 87 p 4

[TASS report under the general headline: "Talks in Jakarta"]

[Text] Shevardnadze delivered an answering speech. The sight of your necklace of islands, the Soviet minister said, reminded me of the song about Indonesia which describes how it draws a man to itself and leads him to the southern lands. That song was very popular in our country at one time. I should like that motif to be as familiar to present generations as it is to my own. However, now other motifs which extend far beyond the bounds of our countries, have brought us to Indonesia.

The main one is - security.

Universal and all-embracing security.

Regional security.

Security for each and equal for all.

In repeating this word — a key word for the destinies of mankind — we are not indulging in incantations. Security as we understand it is not a rhetorical premise, not an abstraction. The way we interpret this concept, and what we see in it and beyond it, were described convincingly by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of our party, in his Vladivostok speech.

Security means first and foremost a reduction in the level of military activity and military rivalry everywhere and at all levels.

Security means a reduction of the military presence of all powers beyond the confines of their national borders.

Security means trust among countries arising as a result of the implementation of certain measures which give them complete confidence that force, or the threat of force, will not be used against them.

To fill out this triple formula with concrete content, let me draw your attention to M.S. Gorbachev's speech at the recent Moscow forum, "For a Nuclear-Free World, for the Survival of Humanity" — to that part of the speech which dealt with the necessity of fully eliminating foreign military bases.

If our partners are serious in what they say about trust and are prepared to underpin it with the appropriate monitoring [kontrol] measures, then it will be necessary to reach agreement on access to military bases for the purpose of inspection. This is to enable one to be certain that activity banned by this or that agreement is not being carried out there. Evidently, the cooperation of the states on whose soil these bases are located will be required here.

Your shores are washed by the waters of two oceans — the Pacific and the Indian. There is a fortunate combination of currents and streams here.

In that same region a concentration of islands with a military threat, dangerous for peace and security, has emerged, an entire archipelago of military bases.

They should not be here, as, moreover, there should be no permanent foreign military presence in any region of the world. We relate that demand, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, to ourselves as well, taking practical steps in that direction.

For example, in supporting the efforts of Indonesia in the regional dialogue, the aim of which is to turn Southeast Asia into a nuclear-free zone, we should like to hope that this will meet with the same support from the other nuclear powers.

Unfortunately, some precedents in the recent past have saddened us. Not only us — all nations are disappointed that the other side wrecked the moratorium on the conducting of nuclear weapons tests. Nevertheless the Soviet Union intends to continue to cooperate closely with those states which wish to end the arms race. We know that Indonesia wants that.

There are two diametrically opposed approaches to the issue of arms, possessing them and getting rid of them.

With the first, the traditional one, it is as though the improvement and accumulation of arms is sanctified through invoking the people, carried out on their behalf and for their sake. In this case they say that, arms are necessary to defend the people.

With the second — I shall not be afraid to call it innovative and fully in accord with the realities of the time — there is a real desire to rid oneself of suicidal arms for the sake of the genuine, vital and essential interests of the people. In this case they say that disarmament is necessary to defend the people against an excessive burden of expenditure, to raise the standard of their life and make it happy and full-blooded.

Today, probably, the highest state and political wisdom must be nourished, not by falsely understood ideas of strength and superiority, but by something else.

Today, strength and superiority consist of common sense and a realization of the total senselessness of nuclear arms.

It is precisely in the sense of this strength that one must examine M.S. Gorbachev's recent statement on singling out the issue of intermediate-range missiles from the familiar Reykjavik package — which opens up the opportunity for a significant reduction of such missiles in Asia, too.

This is dictated by an awareness of our responsibility for the fate of the world. None of the other explanations of our decision correspond to the reality. Some of them are laughable. We can only smile at the claims made by certain Western statesmen to the effect that only forceful pressure on the Soviet Union compelled it to take such a step.

Everything undertaken by us in building the edifice of international security has sound foundations. Copyright [avtorskoye pravo] and the experience accumulated by other peoples are being deeply interpreted from the current standpoint. We can see a direct spiritual and political kinship, for example, between the Bandung principles, formulated over 30 years ago, and those of the Delhi declaration, signed last year.

In our talks with you, Minister, we see a model of the activeness in contacts between the states of the region which are contacts seeking to maintain in it an atmosphere of trust, goodneighborliness and cooperation. We value the atmosphere of frankness in which the discussion of the state of affairs in the world, regional problems and the state of our bilateral relations took place.

Our attention to the Asian-Pacific region is based on the obvious fact that tension, threats and anxieties can be alleviated only through joint efforts.

We continue to take as our starting-point the fact that there are in this region no problems that could not be resolved by political means at the negotiating table on the basis of the principles of equality, noninterference in one another's internal affairs, and mutual recognition of parties' legitimate interests.

I should like to return home with the conviction that our meetings and talks will serve to strengthen and develop the friendly relations, and deepen the mutual understanding and trust, between the Soviet Union and Indonesia. For all this, in our view, accords with the fundamental interests of the peoples of our countries, and with the interests of international peace and cooperation.

Talks With Suharto

LD070959 Moscow TASS in English 0949 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Text] Jakarta March 7 TASS — Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR foreign minister, who is currently on an official visit here, has met with President Suharto of Indonesia today.

In the course of the meeting, the Soviet foreign minister explained to the Indonesian president the Soviet stand on matters pertaining to ensuring international security, curbing the weapons race on earth and its non-proliferation into outer space, prohibition of nuclear tests. President Suharto said that they in Indonesia highly valued the Soviet Union's efforts aimed at totally eliminating nuclear, chemical and other types of mass destruction weapons.

In discussing questions pertaining to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, both sides pointed out the pressing need for stepping up the quest with the participation of all Asian states for ways to ensure peace and stability in that region, create here an atmosphere of goodneighborliness and constructive cooperation at the bilateral and regional levels.

The sides declared for a political settlement of problems in South-east Asia, creating a peace zone in that region.

Eduard Shevardnadze reaffirmed the Soviet Union's intention to further pursue the policy of developing friendly relations with the ASEAN member states.

Mutual readiness was expressed for a further broadening and deepening of friendly and mutually beneficial relations between the USSR and Indonesia in the interests of the peoples of both countries, of strengthening peace in Asia and all over the world.

Gives Lecture, Meets Aktiv

LD071447 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1110 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Text] Jakarta, 7 Mar (TASS) — Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who is here for an official visit, today gave a lecture entitled "New Political Thinking in the Nuclear-Space Age" at the Center for Research and Development of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. On the same day he held a news conference during which he answered questions from journalists.

At the USSR Embassy in Indonesia a meeting of the aktiv of employees of Soviet bodies took place at which Eduard Shevardnadze gave a talk on the tasks of foreign policy in the light of the decisions by the January (1987) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Hold News Conference

LD071922 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Mar 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report on USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Indonesia by correspondent Ilyashenko, identified by screen caption]

[Text] In the 2d half of the day there was a news conference.

[Begin Shevardnadze recording] We think highly of the active role of Indonesia in international affairs and note with satisfaction the proximity and coincidence of our positions on many key questions of a global nature. The Soviet Union and Indonesia have the same view of a very great many problems and concerns of the modern world. The talks showed that our two countries have a lasting foundation for cooperation on a regional basis.

The main thing is that we are agreed on the need to prevent any increase in military activity in the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and to move toward reducing it. [end recording]

[Ilyashenko] Comrade Shevardnadze answered numerous questions from journalists.

Announces Talks With Shultz

BK071230 Hong Kong AFP in English 1128 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Excerpts] Jakarta, March 7 (AFP) — Visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze confirmed Saturday that he would meet U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz for disarmament talks in Moscow next month.

Mr. Shevardnadze said at a press conference that he would raise the issue of the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the U.S. space defence program popularly known as "Star Wars," during his talks with the secretary of state.

"Central to those talks will be problems related to nuclear disarmament and the preserving of outer space as a peaceful domain. These questions will be central in our negotiations," Mr. Shevardnadze said. [passage omitted]

Mr. Shevardnadze, on the third day of his four-day visit to Indonesia, confirmed at the press conference that Mr. Shultz would visit Moscow "probably" in mid-April. He did not mention the precise dates.

He said the Soviet disarmament proposal followed a decision by Moscow to separate the problem of SDI from that of medium-range missiles, rather than link them as Moscow had insisted at the Reykjavik summit between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

Mr. Shevardnadze said discussions on the problems of strategic weapons and outer space would continue and that Moscow expected to make "separate deals" on these issues.

At the Reykjavik summit, he said, the two sides had discussed reducing the number of medium range missiles to 100 warheads in Soviet Asia and a similar number in the United States.

"This is not a final resolution, but it is a step towards a solution. It will depend on whether we can agree with the Americans," Mr. Shevardnadze said.

On Friday, Mr. Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union was ready to give up its role as a nuclear power but only if the United States did likewise.

Foreign Military Presence

BK071601 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1500 GMT 7 Mar 87

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze has described as correct and reasonable Indonesia's position that a foreign military presence in Southeast Asia as a means to safeguard security in the Asia-Pacific region is unnecessary.

Speaking to newsmen in Jakarta this evening, Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union believes that no country in the world should be allowed to have its troops beyond its national boundaries.

As for economic and trade relations, he said that the two countries need to take new steps toward having direct contacts between their corporations and organizations. He added that Indonesian-Soviet cooperation can include the development and utilization of new energy resources, such as nuclear energy, the development of transportation and communications systems, the exchange of scientific information, the preservation of the environment, and the cultivation of marine resources.

Joint Communique

PM09102C Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Mar 87 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Joint Soviet-Indonesian Communique"]

[Excerpts] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, was in Indonesia on an official visit from 5 to 8 March 1987 at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

E.A. Shevardnadze was received by Suharto, president of the republic. In the course of the meeting it was noted with satisfaction that friendly relations between the USSR and Indonesia, founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence among states, equality and mutual respect, self-determination and noninterference in internal affairs, are taking on a more and more stable and varied character. Mutual interest in further strengthening and broadening them was confirmed. It was stressed that the official visit by President Suharto to the Soviet Union will be a weighty contribution to the development of relations between the two countries.

Talks were held between E.A. Shevardnadze and Mokhtar Kusumaatmaja, Indonesian foreign minister, in the course of which there was discussion in a frank [otkrovenniyy] and friendly atmosphere of the state of and prospects for the development of Soviet-Indonesian ties, and a review was made of a wide circle of international problems of mutual interest. The ministers expressed themselves in favour of stepping up exchanges of opinions at various levels on bilateral relations and on the international situation.

Expressing deep concern about the continuing tension in the world, the escalation of the nuclear and conventional arms race and the increase in the danger of its spreading to outer space, the sides stressed that safeguarding peace and international security is the most pressing issue of the present time. They expressed their conviction that all states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons, must play their part in removing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and stated their readiness to cooperate in achieving these goals with all other countries irrespective of their size and differences in sociopolitical systems.

Attention was drawn by the Soviet side to the program, put forward in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January 1986, for totally eliminating nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the present century, to the proposal of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries regarding setting up an all-embracing system of international security, and to the principles drawn up in Delhi for building a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons. The content of the new major initiative of the USSR on the issue of medium-range missiles was elucidated.

The Soviet Union and Indonesia advocate an immediate halt to all nuclear weapons tests and the earliest possible conclusion of a multilateral treaty completely banning them.

The ministers spoke out in favor of preventing the arms race from spreading into space and of developing international cooperation in the exploitation of space exclusively for peaceful purposes. They also stressed the need to step up efforts at the disarmament conference to conclude a convention on banning chemical weapons.

Special attention was paid during the talks to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

The ministers noted the urgent need to step up the search, with the involvement of all Asian states, for ways to ensure peace and security in the area and to create an atmosphere facilitating the development of friendly and cooperative relations at bilateral and regional levels.

In connection with this, the Soviet side gave a detailed explanation of the package of initiatives aimed at guaranteeing security in Asia and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and at establishing peaceful cooperation and interaction in the Asian and Pacific region, as expounded in M.S. Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok.

Having affirmed their position in favor of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the Soviet Union and Indonesia called for the urgent convening of an international conference on this issue, which should begin work no later than 1988. They gave support to the idea of creating nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, regarding these as an important step in the interests of international peace and security. They welcomed and expressed their support for establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESS BRIEFING 12 MARCH

'New Approach' of Soviet Leadership

LD121820 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1625 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow, 12 Mar (TASS) — A briefing on current international issues was held today in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center. Speaking at the briefing, B.D. Pyadyshov, first deputy head of the International Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed that the visit by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, to the countries of Southeast Asia is perceived abroad as a concrete and businesslike manifestation of the Soviet leadership's new approach to the problems of that extensive zone, as set forth in the Vladivostok speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

It was announced that M. Armacost, U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs will visit Moscow to continue the exchange of views on regional problems. Taking part in the discussions from the Soviet side will be Yu.M. Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, and other ministry officials. It has been agreed in principle that M. Armacost will be received by the USSR ministry of foreign affairs. As is known, the USSR recently put forward a whole range of concrete proposals for a just political settlement of the most acute regional conflicts and for strengthening regional cooperation in the name of peace and development. The hope was expressed that the American side will also take a constructive stance with regard to these affairs.

Commenting on reports about U.S. deliveries of a large batch of "Stinger" missile units to the [DRA] dushmans, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative noted that such a step by the U.S. Administration not only exacerbates the hotbed of war in the Middle East; at one time, the United States posed the question of taking measures to prevent portable antiaircraft units getting into the hands of irresponsible groups who might use the weapons to carry out acts of terrorism, including attacks on civilian aircraft; but the United States also is directly supplying arms to these bandits, who are well-known for their acts of terrorism. The latest U.S. antiaircraft weapons are filtering from the dushman camps into other regions through sluice gates opened by the U.S. Administration. In this way, the U.S. authorities' immoral act is spurring on international terrorism.

Attention was drawn to the fact that there has been another outburst of anti-Sovietism in official Washington speeches and documents over the past few days. A low standard of morality and ethics is displayed by the Presidential report "on Soviet nonadherence to arms control agreements" and the U.S. President's recent radio address on regional conflicts.

In answer to a request to comment on the U.S. State Department's statement that February's nuclear test in the USSR resulted in a violation of the nuclear test ban treaty, it was stressed that the blast, which was carried out in the USSR after a lengthy interval, was within a strict framework and in observance of all safety requirements. By disseminating many versions, are the authors reckoning of concealing the U.S. policy of military preparations, which was the reason for the breakdown of the moratorium?

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative made a statement in connection with the Soviet proposal for the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe.

Questions were answered.

Euromissiles Proposal

LD122047 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] At a briefing on current questions of international policy, which was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center, a statement was read out by a spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry in connection with the Soviet proposal on the complete liquidation of medium-range missiles in Europe. We broadcast the text of that statement.

The positive reaction by other states to the Soviet proposal to conclude a separate agreement on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and a sharp reduction in them to 100 warheads for the USSR in the Asian section and for the United States on their national territory is being received with satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

Of course, the reaction abroad has been varied, but it all points to the fact that the Soviet initiative is being seen as a real opportunity to give impetus to the whole process of limiting and reducing armaments.

The Soviet delegation at the talks on nuclear and space armaments in Geneva has a clear instruction to work vigorously towards working out a specific agreement in as short a time as possible.

As is known, the Soviet proposal is on the conference table. It contains all the necessary parameters, on the basis of which the working out of a reliable agreement on this issue is possible. The Soviet delegation has been instructed to display the necessary flexibility and constructive approach in a bid to achieve such accords on each aspect of the future development that would best correspond to the general task of removing all medium-range missiles from European territory.

It is from this angle that the Soviet delegation approaches the examination of the draft proposal from the American side, and that is whether this draft has as its objective reaching an agreement on the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, and as quickly as possible, too. The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that a would-be agreement should be a substantive, well-considered and thoroughly balanced document, taking into account the interests of both sides and European security.

The Soviet delegation intends to devote special attention to question of verification [kontrol]. This is understandable. We wish to be completely confident that measures of verification and monitoring [proverka] reliably ensure the process of fulfilling commitments according to the agreement and guarantee the nonviolation of the commitments assumed by the sides.

The Soviet side approaches with understanding the concern of certain West European countries over the issue of tactical missiles and is prepared immediately to start talks with the clearly defined objective of reducing and totally eliminating this type of missile.

As soon as an agreement is signed on eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union, in coordination with the governments of the GDR and the CSSR, would withdraw its extended range tactical missiles from these states.

Our position is clear and definite. The Soviet side views with hope the possibility of solving the problem of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe and is prepared to work towards this in every way. We expect the same constructive approach from the United States of America as well.

U.S. Radiation Protest

LD121549 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS — "A Soviet representative in Washington did not accept a protest by the U.S. Department of State which contends that radioactive sediments had been ejected into the atmosphere as a result of a nuclear test in the USSR in February of this year and reached an area outside of the USSR," said Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the International Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

"I would like to stress in this connection that we in the Soviet Union treat such statements by the other side with maximum attention and maximum seriousness," he went on, "but so far it appears to us that the data provided by the American side is not sufficiently weighty, is not convincing. And for this reason we did not accept the already mentioned protest."

"I would like to note that in the past, regrettably, there have been numerous instances of groundless accusations by the United States against the USSR about all sorts of 'violations'. I believe that this time too we are dealing with a similar case," Boris Pyadyshev said further. "In any case I would like to stress in no uncertain terms that nuclear experiments in the Soviet Union are conducted within a strict framework with the observance of all safety requirements, and this is the main point. Considering the present political mores in the Washington circles it can be conjectured that this statement is an attempt to cover up the policy of the United States directed at intensifying military preparations, a policy that causes worldwide indignation and precisely which has made impossible a further continuation of the Soviet nuclear moratorium".

Reagan's Report to Congress

LD121552 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 13 TASS — The latest presidential report "on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements," the fifth one sent to Congress, differs little from the previous ones. It contains the same set of falsifications, speculative evaluations of the Soviet position and outright lies, said Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the International Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. He spoke at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists here today.

One can see how low the standards of morality and ethics are in Washington quarters today, the spokesman said, if only from the report's hint that the USSR might have violated its moratorium on nuclear tests that lasted 19 months. The Presidential statements of the past few days also contain uncivilized language. For instance, Reagan's radio address on regional conflicts which is filled with insults and invectives.

In circulating such false reports and statements Washington is trying to cover blunders in its foreign and domestic policies, Pyadyshev said.

Shevardnadze Southeast Asian Tour

LD121520 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 12 Mar 87

[Text] Moscow March 12 TASS — The tour of countries in the Pacific and South East Asia by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and foreign minister of the USSR, was a major foreign policy act that evoked response beyond that region, a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told a briefing for journalists here today.

He observed that the visit to three countries of Indochina clearly revealed the intention of the USSR, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam to strengthen peace and security in the region.

As to the Kampuchean issue, the Soviet spokesman said, the USSR believes that the Kampuchean leadership's efforts to start talks with various Khmer opposition groups or individuals (on condition that the criminal Pol Pot clique be excluded) constituted a positive step towards achieving national reconciliation in the country and normalizing the situation around Kampuchea.

Shevardnadze's visit to Indochina was of great importance for the further consolidation of all-round cooperation between the USSR, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam. Its results would have a positive effect on the international situation in South East Asia, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

Pact Ministers To Meet in March

LD121903 Prague Television Service in Czech 1830 GMT 12 Mar 87

[No video available]

[Excerpt] Boris Pyadyahev, a spokesman for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced today that a regular session of the Warsaw Pact 'Foreign Ministers' committee would take place in Moscow in the last 10 days of March. The Ministers will be discussing, in particular, matters connected with the Soviet proposal to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. They will also concentrate on more energetic progress in the process of halting the arms race, reducing conventional weapons and equipment in Europe, and achieving a ban on chemical weapons. They will also exchange views on the most successful and constructive ways of winding up the Vienna follow-up meeting. [passage omitted]

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CSO: 5200/1366

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S YAKOVLEV VISITS SPAIN

Airport Send-Off

LD081536 Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 8 Mar 87

[Text] A delegation of the foreign Affairs Commissions of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet, led by Aleksandr Yakovlev, candidate member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, left Moscow for Madrid today on an official visit at the invitation of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Congress of Deputies of the Cortes Generales of Spain. Deputies Aleksandr Aksekov, Georgiy Arbatov, Natalya Bagina, Merab Berdzenishvili and Petr Telepnev are members of the delegation.

At the airport the delegation was seen off by Slyunkov, candidate member of the Politburo, and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Ayuytel, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Manteshashvili, secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; Zagladin, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign ministers; and by other officials. Among the send-off party was Alvaro de Moriega, Spanish charge d'affaires in the USSR.

Madrid Arrival Statement

FM101057 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under general heading: "Delegation's Arrival"]

[Excerpts] The delegation arrived in Madrid on 8 March. It was met at Barajas Airport by J. F. de Carvajal Perez, president of the Senate (upper chamber) of the Cortes Generales, and other officials, including Jose Cuenca Anaya, Spanish ambassador to the USSR. S.K. Romanov, Soviet ambassador to Spain, was among the welcoming party.

The cardinal aim of the visit is to exchange views with the parliamentarians of Spain on ways to overcome the present dangerous development of the international situation, on how to bring the situation in the world back to normal, on how to humanize international relations, to get rid of the fear of a nuclear catastrophe, the fear of wars, the fear for the future of our children, and on how to secure that prejudices in relations between peoples, distrust and suspiciousness disappear."

These are critical, urgent tasks and, as experience shows, they require in many respects new approaches. The problem is virtually as follows: Either political thinking and practical actions match the realities of our times, or our civilization, the very life on earth, may vanish.

At a time when man has become technically capable of putting an end to his own existence, to depend even more on military means in politics and in international relations does not guarantee genuine security for any country or any person, but increases danger for all. There is only one way out: peaceful coexistence, cooperation between countries, and a search for ways and means of interaction.

To come to realize this and, upon realizing it, to build practical policy in accordance with the new realities — herein is the essence of the way out of the suicidal impasse, the essence of the analysis from which the Soviet Union proceeds in its policy.

The Soviet Union and Spain have much in common in their approaches to many international problems, both global and regional ones. We are united in the main thing: in the realization of the need to avert the nuclear sword from mankind.

It is possible to interact on such a basis, and to cooperate constructively in the solution of world, European, and other issues. This basis is humane, lofty, and vital.

We have experience in such cooperation. A good deal has been done over the past decade. Fruitful exchanges have been established along all lines, including those between the parliaments of the two countries. The USSR Supreme Soviet attaches much importance to further expansion of contacts with the Cortes Generales of Spain, and regards it as a substantial factor in the development of Soviet-Spanish relations, mutual understanding and trust in our bilateral relations, and in European relations as a whole.

You look at Europe from the Pyrenees and we look at it from the Urals. Our two countries are like two 'walls' of the common European home, and we are equally worried and concerned over everything that takes place in this home and over how it lives.

A question of immense importance is being decided now: Will Europe get rid of the objects which are obviously useless for the common 'home' — medium-range missiles?

There is another question: Will the process of developing security and cooperation in the continent intensify, or will the forces which do not wish our home well and to whom this home is foreign gain the upper hand again?

We have come to Spain in the period of serious, large-scale changes in the life of the Soviet Union, and of our entire society. The purpose of the transformation is to make the life of the Soviet people and of every Soviet person fuller, more interesting, and spiritually richer. Creation is the objective, and it is inseparable from peace and is blended with it.

In conclusion, allow me to convey the sentiments of deep respect and traditional sympathies being entertained by Soviet people toward the friendly Spanish people, and wishes for peace and prosperity."

Meeting With Cortes Official

PM111112 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Soviet Parliamentarians in Spain"]

[Excerpts] Madrid, 10 Mar (TASS)--A delegation of the Foreign Relations Commissions of the two chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet which arrived in Madrid for an official visit paid a visit on 9 Mar to Las Cortes Generales of Spain.

The delegation, led by Aleksandr Yakovlev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of USSR Supreme Soviet, had a meeting with Felix Pons, president of the Congress of Deputies (one of the two chambers of Las Cortes Generales), and members of the presidium of the Congress.

A.N. Yakovlev said that the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet Chambers' Foreign Affairs Commissions are grateful to their Spanish colleagues for the invitation to visit Spain. In our country, he went on, people know your country's history well, and know about the value the contribution of your people to the development of civilization. But we will be glad to know even better how Spain fares nowadays, which problems concern its people at present. There are certain problems among them which have a bearing on the interests of all nations. Peace has become very fragile. The situation should be changed drastically to safeguard it and make it really strong. And this requires corresponding measures both on a multilateral basis and in the sphere of bilateral relations.

We want the relations between the USSR and Spain to broaden and grow stronger all the time. Only 10 years have passed since the moment of their establishment. On the other hand, considering the fact that the period is not too long, we may expect our relations to develop and the pace of development to accelerate with each passing year.

We have a profound mutual respect and readiness for cooperation. No territorial or other disputes exist between us. And we are confident that the Soviet Union and Spain can make a substantial contribution to the improvement of the situation in the world.

This is true first and foremost of Europe which is filled with nuclear weapons to the limit. We should rid this continent of the lethal burden and reaffirm its allegiance to the lofty traditions of culture, its civilizing role and start by ridding it of the medium-range missile.

Talks With Gonzalez, Fernandez

PM111114 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Mar 87 First Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Soviet Parliamentarians in Spain"]

[Text] Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez received Aleksandr Yakovlev, alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee Political Bureau, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Foreign Relations Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, who heads a Soviet parliamentary delegation currently making an official visit here, in Moncloa Palace today.

Aleksandr Yakovlev conveyed to the head of the Spanish Government a personal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Felipe Gonzalez expressed his heartfelt gratitude and emphasized that he recalled with great satisfaction his interesting conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in May 1986, and hoped to carry on with personal contacts with the Soviet leader.

Such contacts between the leading figures of states acquire special importance for building up East-West trust and enhancing mutual understanding at the current crucial moment of international development.

During an in-depth and detailed exchange of views Felipe Gonzalez and Aleksandr Yakovlev discussed major international problems and prospects for the development of Soviet-Spanish relations.

It was emphasized that realistic opportunities exist for beginning to rid Europe of nuclear weapons.

All states can and should contribute toward the accomplishment of that historic task. The effective realization of that prospect would accord with the vital interests of the Soviet Union, Spain, and all European countries.

It was emphasized that the Soviet-Spanish dialogue was called upon to become an increasingly important factor in ensuring a drastic change for the better in the European and world affairs.

On the same day Aleksandr Yakovlev had a meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez. They had a concrete discussion of a number of major international problems and certain matters pertaining to bilateral relations between the USSR and Spain.

Both sides expressed the idea that in the existing international situation the role of Europe and each European nation in the effort to improve the political climate in the world, reduce the level of military confrontation and promote cooperation between all countries and peoples showed particular growth.

In that context the Spanish side noted that the Soviet Union's recent proposal on examining separately the issue of the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe opened realistic prospects for progress in disarmament.

The sides stressed the need for continuing the Soviet-American political dialogue and broadening cooperation between the Soviet Union and Spanish both on a bilateral basis in international affairs.

Speech to Parliamentarians

PM121441 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[Excerpts] A meeting took place in the afternoon between the delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the leadership of the Foreign Affairs Commissions of the Chambers of the Spanish Cortes Generales: of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate.

Addressing the participants of the meeting, the head of the Soviet delegation expressed sincere gratitude to the leadership of the Cortes Generales for the invitation to visit Spain. We have arrived here ready to discuss complex present-day issues of the international relations in an open and frank way, he said, to acquaint you with the processes taking place within the Soviet Union, and naturally, to learn more about today's Spain.

A restructuring is under way in our country, A.N. Yakovlev noted. To put it very briefly, it is an alteration of the running of the economic system which has grown up over the past decades, and change in the social life of the country as a whole. These efforts aim at accelerating the socioeconomic development of the country, at casting socialism in the most up-to-date molds of social organization, on the basis of developing democracy, ensuring the long-term potential of raising the living standards of the Soviet people and their intellectual elevation.

I will especially underline: Today we are talking not only about intentions and plans but also about real actions. Appropriate decisions have been made on the party, and on the state level. Public organizations correlate their actions according to these decisions. These are the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress, the importance of which was confirmed by the January CPSU Central Committee Plenum, which put forward the task to develop and give concrete form to these decisions. It is the adopted laws and legislative proposals, which are now being examined by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. From the point of view of final goals and tasks of restructuring, we are still at the very beginning of the journey. The most important lies ahead, but we have already embarked on this journey, and the process will grow stronger, will develop.

A few words about the international aspect of restructuring. It is hardly necessary to prove that a country which pays so much attention to all aspects of its internal development is a country which needs peace and aspires to peace. As a matter of fact, our choice has always strictly been toward peaceful coexistence and extensive cooperation. It stems from our social essence. We are simply confirming this choice again, once more.

The restructuring in the USSR in no way runs counter to the interests of other peoples. No one will be worse off because we want to live better. On the contrary, the stronger we are economically, the more possibilities there will be for broadening the participation of the Soviet Union in the international division of labor and increasing the volume of its contacts with other countries.

The course aimed at the restructuring inside the country once again reaffirms the predictability of the Soviet Union's policy and its reliability as a partner. Predictability is necessary in all affairs and in international affairs in particular.

Some people in the world interpreted our restructuring as a sign of "weakness" in the Soviet Union, as a possibility of putting even stronger pressure on us, including economic, through the arms race. I am convinced that time will show the complete untenability of such hopes. But at what price? This is not an empty question. I am not even talking about the amorality of such calculations.

Good contacts, A.N. Yakovlev went on to say, have been established between the parliaments of our countries, a regular exchange in opinions. As far as our side is concerned, there are no topics closed to discussion in this dialogue. The Soviet-Spanish political contacts of the recent years, including those at the summit

level, have shown that our countries stand for removing the threat of a war and for lessening international tensions. The USSR and Spain are united — in a major, fundamental way — by their commitment to detente and reliable security.

The Soviet view of the situation in the world as dangerous and volatile is well-known. As a matter of fact, everyone faces the same question: Shall mankind continue to live, or shall everything be finished in a nuclear catastrophe?

Our vision of the world was set out a year ago at the 27th CPSU Congress. We did not, however, limit ourselves to giving an account of our philosophical concept of the world; we offered concrete terms of reference for a comprehensive system of international security. What is involved is a system which would embrace the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres and would be based on the principle: one's own security cannot be built at the expense of the security of others.

Our concept of security has been supported by the majority of the UN member states. It is gradually permeating the ideological fabric of international relations and practical policies. The Delhi declaration, signed last November by the top leaders of the USSR and India, is an example of that.

The Soviet Union makes no claims to possessing a monopoly on truth. We understand that truth cannot be decreed through votes; it cannot be brought by violence, or generated by muscle. Truth comes as a result of searching and honest efforts taken by all.

Now about some specific international problems, the most pressing ones from our point of view:

Questions of limitation of the arms race and of disarmament. You know that the Soviet Union has put forward a program for eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It was announced on 15 January 1986 in a statement by M.S. Gorbachev, and has been at the basis of many Soviet initiatives.

We went to Reykjavik with the understanding that the final goal was a nuclear-free, nonviolent world, but that the way toward it was not simple, and that the problem could not be solved immediately. It seemed that there was accord within the limits of the attainable, both for the near and long term. In fact, however, the U.S. side's commitment to SDI, to the "Star Wars" program, the aspiration at all costs to create space weapons thwarted the accord.

We are acting with such conviction, stubbornly struggling against SDI, since we consider this weapons system, even the start of work on it, as deeply destabilising the situation; as threatening not only existing treaties but also the very process of negotiations. [paragraph continues]

In essence instead of movement toward weapons reduction, more stability and security, they are trying to impose upon us a plan for a new spiral in the arms race, dangerous in its unpredictability. Everything that had been done earlier, at the cost of no little efforts by each of the sides, is being struck out. For the sake of what?

It is sometimes said that the development [razrabotka] of SDI will allow a technological breakthrough to be carried out which will benefit everyone, including civilian industries and the mass consumer. This is something absurd which does not fall within the bounds of reason. What sort of approach, what sort of system is it if it is capable of ensuring progress only through the perfecting of weaponry? There

arise many "why" questions. Why, in particular, cannot those same technologies be created for peaceful purposes? Why cannot the efforts of all countries be united in such a way as to make science and technology move forward in the interests of all? Why, finally, not discuss all these problems openly [otkryto]?

We are continuing and we shall continue to search for ways out of the situation which has developed. The result of this search is known to you. They are our new proposals, which envisage the solution of the issue of the medium-range missiles in Europe separately from other parts of the "Reykjavik package" — the strategic offensive weapons and the problem concerning the preservation of the ABM Treaty.

There are many other problems. Among them we ascribe a great significance to further development and deepening of the pan-European process of strengthening peace and development of cooperation. We give a high appraisal to the results of the Madrid and then Stockholm stages of this process. Now it is important to achieve a breakthrough in Vienna, and at the same time to include in this process the biggest problems of European security, including the radical reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces, elimination of chemical weapons, and the creation in Europe of nuclear and chemical weapons-free zones.

Yet another observation: Recently the Soviet Union along with our allies, has brought to the fore a number of concrete and constructive proposals concerning all three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act.

We proposed the convocation in Moscow of a conference for profound discussion of questions of humanitarian cooperation — of contacts between people, of information, culture, and education in the context of the implementation of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other human rights and freedoms.

The main thing now is to think of the future, to begin with a credit of mutual trust. People may say there is a risk in this. I won't deny this. There is, especially for us, but in present international relations — in their condition and trends of development — there is considerably greater risk. Measures must immediately be taken to ensure that the mistrust that exists today does not pile up any further.

I am not advocating that the two different worlds should look at each other through rose-tinted glasses. What is needed is a realistic and, at the same time, responsible view: when disagreement does not engender hatred and criticism does not engender hostility, when conflict of views and interests does not evolve into confrontation.

Meeting With King, Minister

PM121501 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Mar 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Visit to Spain"]

[Excerpts] Madrid, 10 Mar (TASS)--The delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers, led by Aleksandr Yakovlev, alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has been received today by the head of the Spanish state King Juan Carlos the First.

Aleksandr Yakovlev extended to Juan Carlos the first greetings and good wishes from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He pointed out that the visit of the Spanish king to the USSR in May 1984 is recalled with a warm feeling in Moscow, when Soviet-Spanish dialogue at the summit level began. The king's pronouncements in favour of strengthening detente, peaceful coexistence and international security are remembered in Moscow.

It is believed in the Soviet Union that the times themselves call now for vigorous actions based on new political thinking. Such steps in the USSR's foreign policy are aimed above all at achieving the aims of real detente and as speedily as possible ridding of Europe and the whole world of nuclear weapons.

The head of the Spanish state expressed gratitude for the warm statement, and, on his part, extended to the Soviet people and leadership wishes of success and prosperity. He stressed that Spain is profoundly committed to the ideas of peace and is prepared to make its contribution to the development of Spanish-Soviet relations for the benefit of the peoples of both countries, in the interests of international cooperation.

Present at the meeting were USSR Ambassador to Spain Sergey Romanovski and Spanish Ambassador to the USSR Jose Cuenca.

Yakovlev Press Conference

LD121311 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1950 GMT 11 Mar 87

[Special video on 11 March news conference given by Aleksandr Yakovlev, alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Soviet and foreign correspondents in Madrid; correspondents unidentified--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Yakovlev] As you know, we have come at the invitation of the Spanish Cortes to discuss with the foreign affairs commission those questions that concern both our country and Spain, as well as those questions that concern people throughout the world. [Video shows Yakovlev, with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute, among officials on the platform; camera pans audience where correspondents can be seen addressing their questions to Yakovlev]

These past 2 days -- and the 2d day is already drawing to a close -- shows that we had similar views on many issues, especially international ones, and particularly with regard to problems of peace and surviving a nuclear catastrophe. A source of permanent satisfaction to us is the fact that more and more people see no other reasonable way out of the situation that has arisen but to follow the road from recklessness to reason; that is, from the category of thinking in nuclear terms -- the category of force, the category of nuclear containment, and so on, to utterly different categories: the categories of peace, of the need for mutual understanding, the clearing of the obstructions that have arisen on the road to peaceful development, obstructions that are holding up both the development of man and the development of mankind -- that is, the development of a civilization common to all mankind.

We proposed, as you know, at our latest party congress the concept of the interdependence of the world, of its wholeness, of its indissolubility, a concept that amounts to viewing the problem of the survival of mankind as being the most important problem, even more important than the contradictions that separate us. So, it is precisely this main conceptual line that must become our line of conduct, our way of thinking — and conduct not only inside the country but also conduct in the international arena. We are restructuring both our diplomatic service and our foreign economic ties. [my perestraivayem i diplomaticheskuyu sluzheu i nashi uneshnyeekonomicheskiye svyazi].

[Correspondent, in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation] What is your view of the current scandal in the United States? Is it affecting the prospects for arms control?

[Yakovlev] The Soviet Union is not taking advantage of those difficulties for foreign policy purposes, or for the purpose of somehow influencing internal developments in the United States. Moreover, we would, all the same, like to give a certain signal to U.S. leaders, saying that we can have this attitude, that it is possible not to take advantage of it with the aim of kindling mistrust and enmity between the states', that these matters, these problems that are now happening in the United States are purely a U.S. domestic affair. Were we now to link missiles, the issues of disarmament to situations that are difficult, or good, for the government, then I think that we would never reach an agreement.

[Correspondent, in Spanish with superimposed Russian translation] How do you assess Spain's role in the European process?

[Yakovlev] I think that it has a positive role, a positive one. I have already mentioned nuclear-free Spain today — that is an important contribution to European policy, to the European situation. Spain is sincerely, and with great interest, acting to develop bilateral relations. It has been demonstrated to me that there is less prejudice here, fewer stereotypes and cliches regarding other countries, and greater tolerance of another's point of view and a desire to understand the other side. When we say that we have no sole claim to the truth, we don't have truth by the beard, we expect the other side to also realize that it should not have a monopoly on the truth. Our talks here took place on the basis of mutual understanding and equal rights and mutual respect.

Thank you, goodbye.

Interviewed by Spanish Paper

PM191303 Madrid YA in Spanish 12 Mar 87 pp 23-24

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and Central Committee Secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev by Enrique Serbeto in Madrid; date not given]

[Excerpts] [Serbeto] With respect to the proposal made by Mikhail Gorbachev to eliminate nuclear weapons by the year 2000, it seems, to be realistic, that this issue is not solely political, since the knowledge and the techniques for

making new nuclear weapons exist and will continue to exist in the future in the hands of any country which so intends. For instance, Pakistan has just announced that it has a nuclear bomb. If the big powers destroy their deterrence arsenals, could they not remain in the hands of any country which has a single missile?

[Yakovlev] If the United States accepted this proposal by the Soviet Union, no sensible government could exclude itself from this process. Of course, where there is no stable government, a country could make new nuclear weapons, but if the United States and the Soviet Union begin the disarmament process and we succeed in reducing the arsenals to a reasonable level for their defense, all countries should join in this process, including France, Britain, and China. [paragraph continues]

Those countries believe that the process should be started by the Soviet Union and the United States, but at a certain stage disarmament should occur on a broader front.

European Unification [subhead]

[Serbeto] What is the Soviet Union's opinion of the process of European unification?

[Yakovlev] I know Europe's history a little from the scientific viewpoint, and politically I believe that this issue will arise perhaps for the generation of your children or grandchildren. I believe that it is a very lengthy process. From the economic viewpoint, we believe that it is objectively unavoidable. Today nobody can develop in isolation, but as far as political unification is concerned, I know that there are nationalist feelings in many of the European countries, and it seems to me that they are not weakening and are sometimes increasing. There are problems with the development of the national cultures and even with national pride. There is a good deal of talk about this process, but I do not believe in it. As far as the Eastern bloc countries are concerned, these processes do not worry us at all, provided that they are peaceful and not directed against us.

[Serbeto] Let us talk about current relations with the United States.

[Yakovlev] They are very complex relations, and it cannot be said that they are going well. We would like to improve them, but one side's desire is not sufficient in specific instances. If we consider the steps taken by the United States over the past 6 or 8 years, almost all the agreements have been eliminated. Now cultural relations have been restored slightly and commercial flights have been resumed, but we see no signs of an improvement until the disarmament problems which we deem fundamental are tackled. I believe that these relations thus remain incomplete. We will carry on with the negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament and on the elimination of bacteriological and chemical weapons. Our program in this respect is well-known. Now it seems that there could be some light, but the disinformation propaganda which has built up a great deal of hatred must first be stopped. Have you seen the movie "Amerika?" It is not something whose influence on Soviet peoples worries us. We would even be interested in showing this movie in the USSR, and the only thing that would happen is that the Soviet people's good feelings toward the Americans would diminish, because people would not understand how a movie leveled against another country could be made.

[Serbeto] Would the Soviet Union undertake any program in response to a possible starting of the U.S. SDI?

[Yakovlev] We believe that the SDI is an unfeasible project -- a fantasy which exists only in movies. It has a pointless dispute and a destabilizing project. We have no intention of responding with another, similar project, but nor will we sit back and do nothing. The debate about shields against new weapons is very old and has always had the effect of creating new weapons. We have already warned the Americans that in the event we would organize our countermeasures. I will not enter into technical details, but it seems to me that it is much easier to destroy one of the SDI space platforms, which would be in fixed and predictable orbits, than to place them there. Our response would therefore cost approximately 2 or 4 percent of the expenditure which the United States intends to devote to the SDI.

/9738

CSO: 5200/1370

RELATED ISSUES

MOSCOW TALK SHOW: ASIAN SECURITY, INF, NST 'CROSSROAD'

LD152038 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 15 Mar 87

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Nikolay Agayants, All-Union Radio foreign politics commentator; Yuriy Emmanuilovich Kornilov, TASS political observer; and Boris Dmitriyevich Dmitriyev, doctor of historical sciences]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] We invite you to listen to the program "International Observers Round Table." It is conducted by Nikolay Agayants, All-Union Radio commentator on foreign politics.

[Agayants] Hello, comrades. First of all I'd like to introduce to you the participants in our meeting today. They are: Yuriy Emmanuilovich Kornilov, TASS political observer, and Boris Dmitriyevich Dmitriyev, doctor of historical sciences. They are both well-known international affairs journalists; both are authors of many books on the problems of contemporary political relations in general and the politics of the United States in particular, books which are a success with the readership, not only in this country but also abroad. I mention this in particular because many letters which come to our editorial desk from radio listeners, contain requests to introduce our collocutors in greater detail. (Lev Sador) from Vitebsk, the Leningrader (Petr Illich Konopko), (Galina Borovikova) from Saratov, for example, and many others write about this. In fulfilling this wish, I, for my part, call on those who listen to the program "International Observers Roundtable" to give their opinion about it. Does the format that exists at present, 30 minutes, suit you, comrades, or is there a need to increase the duration of the program? Is there a need to make it thematic, selecting for discussion, let's say, one important key problem? In a word, if you have any observations about the program or wishes for the future, write to this address: Moscow; 19, Ulitsa Koroleva; All-Union Radio International Information Department. Thank you.

And now, as the saying goes, let's not continue to beat about the bush, [rastekatsya mysl'yu po drevu]; let's get down to business.

The trip by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, member of the Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, to countries in the Asiatic and Pacific area and Southeast Asia, has ended. There were visits to the SRV, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Australia. There was a meeting with the leadership of Thailand in Bangkok. What can be said about the results of this trip, Boris Dmitriyevich?

[Dmitriyev] It is plain throughout that Comrade Shevardnadze's trip was a major foreign policy step, which got a response beyond the limits the vast Asiatic and Pacific region. The world press, in the majority, assesses the visit by the Soviet minister of foreign affairs as a specific and businesslike manifestation of the new approach by the leadership of the Soviet Union, set forth in the speech by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Vladivostok. The leaders of the region's countries assess highly our vision of ways of resolving issues of international political and economic security, first and foremost in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. This was manifested both in the course of talks and in joint documents. During visits to three states in Indochina, the intentions of the Soviet Union, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam to strengthen peace and security in this region were clearly identified.

[Agayants] This is what I'd like to add to what has been said: The Helsinki process of dialogue, negotiations, and agreement functions -- be it only so-so -- in Europe. This brings a certain stability to relations between the Old World's states and lessens the probability of the rise of armed conflicts. In the Asiatic and Pacific region, which we're talking about, this, unfortunately, does not exist, or barely exists. Moreover, militarization and the buildup of the threat of war in this part of the world is beginning to gather a dangerous speed.

The Pentagon is trying to turn the Pacific and Indian Oceans into internal American lakes. This is why our country has addressed an appeal to all the region's countries and peoples for cooperation in the name of peace and security. In Vladivostok and in Delhi, I will remind you, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev put forward a broad program of measures to lessen tension and to begin talks on cutting down the activity of navies in the Pacific Ocean, in the first instance, vessels equipped with nuclear weapons. Limiting rivalry in the sphere of anti-vessel weaponry would also undoubtedly further the strengthening of stability. Moscow has emphasized once again that we are ready to conduct with the United States and interested Asiatic states negotiations on confidence measures in the military sphere, as applied to Asia and the adjacent waters of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These were the aims of the talks that took place during Comrade Shevardnadze's visit.

[Kornilov] Nikolay Ivanovich, I would add one point which, it seems to me, is important to mention: In the course of the trip, in the course of the visit by the Soviet minister of foreign affairs to various countries in Asia, there was particular emphasis on the ever-growing role of the Nonaligned Movement, that influential force which energetically advocates the adoption of measures to secure universal peace and security and the establishment of a new international economic order. There was particular emphasis on the importance of the decisions adopted by the 8th conference of heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries in Harare.

[Agayants] This week, the Soviet Union's new peace initiative on Euromissiles has still been in the center of the international public's attention.

The positive response of other states to the Soviet proposal to conclude a separate agreement on the complete liquidation of medium-range missiles in Europe and their sharp reduction -- to 100 warheads -- in the USSR's Asiatic part and in U.S. national territory have been met with satisfaction in our country. But what is the situation at the Geneva talks themselves, Boris Dmitriyevich?

[Deltiriyev] The actual state of affairs at the Geneva talks is such that, in fact, so far there has been no final Soviet draft of the agreement, or an American one. On the Soviet side, we have expounded clearly worded proposals whose purpose is to agree, in the shortest possible time, on the liquidation of all the medium-range missiles in Europe and on the corresponding decision relating to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union and the national territory of the United States. We have expounded a plan for the concrete implementation of this proposal of ours. For its part, the American delegation has submitted a fairly voluminous document which, according to them, is not a plan either, but rather a set of considerations pertaining to ways toward the solution. The Soviet and American documents differ in a number of parameters, both in volume, content, and formulations of certain questions. One could say they are directed toward a single goal, toward resolving the question of medium-range missiles. Only a few sessions have taken place so far, and the work ahead is not easy but the Soviet delegation has emphasized that a document on this issue can be worked out within a short period.

[Kornilov] The difficulties with which the ruling classes of the capitalistic world are coming to understand reality and the periodic relapses of attempts to resolve by force all the group of variances dividing the two worlds are not accidental, of course. It was stressed at the 27th party congress that imperialism has been urged toward translating the competition between the two systems into the language of military confrontation also by internal springs, by its socioeconomic essence itself, and that, owing to its social nature, imperialism is constantly generating an aggressive adventurous policy. One could speak here about an entire complex of stimulating motives, about the ravenous appetites of arms manufacturers of influential military-bureaucratic groupings, about the mercenary interests of monopolies in sources of raw materials and markets, about the fear of bourgeoisie of the changes that are taking place, and, finally, about the attempts to resolve their own aggravating problems at the expense of socialism. One can see the extent to which these problems have become aggravated by the so-called Irangate that is unfolding now in the United States. All that I have mentioned, all these stimulating motives generating aggressive policy, are particularly characteristic of U.S. imperialism.

[Agayants] Yuriy Emmanuilovich, I would like to focus your attention and that of our radio listeners on the following. The influential American public organization, Committee for National Security, not so long ago published a special study of arms control issues. The conclusions reached by that document represent not only the view shared today by authoritative American politicians and public figures, former U.S. statesmen and military figures, scientists and representatives of religious circles; the content of the document, entitled "The Way Out of the Impasse," reflects a problem central to the broad discussions under way in the United States. The study quite clearly identifies this problem as Reagan's Star Wars program and the U.S. Administration's stubborn unwillingness to agree to the Soviet Union's proposal to restrict work in the SDI framework to laboratory research. The document was compiled with the participation of such authoritative specialists as Paul Warnke, former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former head of the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American SALT II talks, William Colby, former director of the U.S. CIA, and Vice Admiral Thomas Davies.

Analyzing the situation in the world, the authors of the study write that the United States and the USSR are now at an important crossroad; one road leads to total demolition of arms control and the acceleration of the deadly dangerous rivalry in the nuclear sphere to an as yet unprecedented pace, while the other leads to consolidating existing treaties and concluding of accords on a deep, stabilizing reduction by both sides of accumulated nuclear arsenals.

[Dmitriyev] The silvery cover of the leading U.S. foreign policy journal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, displays the title of that issue's main article: The United States Is a Country of Liars. The article cites striking instances and examples of just how deep down lies, deceit, and falsification have penetrated into American life. And this affects literally everything. The article states that Wall Street still has not recovered from the vast scandal surrounding a financier-intriguer by the name of Boesky, who earned hundreds of millions of dollars through deceit. America has been swept by a wave of exposures of swindling in scientific research. A House of Representatives subcommittee has estimated that one out of three Americans starting jobs has forged educational qualifications. The journal writes that whereas previously deceit could remain in relative obscurity at some railway station or other, now it can be sent via satellite to millions of people at different ends of the earth.

The very latest events are supplementing the already long register of machinations and falsifications in the very highest Washington circles with more and more new facts. The fifth, I think, presidential report under the title "On Soviet Nonadherence to Arms Control Agreements" has been sent to the U.S. Congress. In content, the report differs little from the previous ones -- the same collection of falsifications, speculative assessments of the Soviet position, and simply flagrant lies. Just how low standards of morality and ethics are in Washington circles today is shown, in particular, by the suggestion that the Soviet Union, as the presidential report states, allegedly might have been able to secretly violate its moratorium on nuclear explosions. Or another absurd claim from the report, and I quote: Inexplicable events took place during the moratorium which might be connected, and at the same time might not be connected, with the Soviets' adherence to their moratorium. End of quote. So you can take it as you will, either black or white. Unfortunately, certain other presidential documents and statements over the past few days are notable for their uncivilized language, including Reagan's recent radio address on regional conflicts, which contained so many crude and indecent remarks against our country that I don't even wish to comment on them.

[Kornilov] The 70th anniversary of the October Revolution -- and this is particularly stressed in the address by our party's Central Committee to the Soviet people -- is approaching a situation in which the human race is faced with the problem of survival. The future of the world, a contradictory but integral and interrelated world, is being determined today. The planet can and must be freed from the threat of nuclear war; life in conditions of security, independence, and progress can and must be guaranteed to all peoples. Not everything depends on us, on the Soviet Union and socialism, but we shall do what does depend on us and do it fully. The address notes especially that we are applying our entire political authority and the entire tremendous international influence of our country to the peace struggle, and that they will be the more effective the better things go here at home and the deeper our cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries. Socialism and peace are inseparable, and the more powerful socialism is, the more stable is peace.

[Dmitriyev] In all our affairs we act jointly with the fraternal socialist states. Our community is not merely an alliance of states united by common political and ideological principles; it is also a fusion of many national experiences, traditions, and original long-term projects. This is our common internationalist wealth, which we hold dear.

A regular session of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-state is soon to take place in Moscow. This forthcoming session is of a distinctively anniversary nature. Let me remind you that the first session of the committee was held exactly 10 years ago in 1977, and it was even held in Moscow.

There is no doubt that this time the ministers of the allied states will discuss the state of affairs regarding the Soviet Union's new initiative on eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. Indeed, in general, attention will focus on issues relating to achieving more vigorous progress in the process of limiting the arms race and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. The problem of banning chemical weapons is topical at the moment and it is important to exchange views on what can be done for a successful conclusion of the Vienna meeting. In short, a great deal of hard and constructive work lies ahead in Moscow.

[Agayants] Our party and state's course in world politics is consistently peace-loving. We have a realistic and flexible approach to international problems guided by the new political thinking. We shall steadfastly work toward seeing states shed their nuclear armor on the threshold of the third millenium, to keep weapons out of space and to reduce, and finally destroy, them on earth. But as long as international reaction spurs on the arms race and until it renounces the policy of social revenge and crusades against socialism, the CPSU and our state will do everything necessary to maintain at an appropriate level the defense capability of our country and of the whole socialist community. The Soviet people can be sure that we shall never under any circumstances permit the military superiority of imperialism.

And on that, we end the broadcast.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

SOVIET-CANADA TALKS--Ottawa March 11 TASS--Soviet-Canadian consultations on questions of arms limitation and disarmament were held at the Canadian Foreign Ministry on March 5 and 6. During the consultations views were exchanged on such problems as nuclear and space arms, prohibition of chemical weapons, reduction of troops and armaments in Europe, total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the interconnection between disarmament and development, questions of disarmament in the United Nations. Special attention was given to the new Soviet proposal to solve the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe set forth by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of February 28. From the Soviet side the consultations were conducted by Ambassador Viktor Karpov, head of the Directorate on Problems of Arms Limitation and Disarmament at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the Canadian side by David Peel, the director-general, international security and arms control, and Ambassador for Questions of Disarmament Douglas Roche. Viktor Karpov was received by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada C. Taylor and Deputy Minister A. Sullivan. There is understanding that consultations on this range of problems between the foreign ministries of the two countries will be continued. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1407 GMT 11 Mar 87 LD]

SOVIET-SPANISH TALKS--Moscow March 18 TASS--Consultations with Carlos Miranda, general director of the Department for International Security and Disarmament at Spain's Foreign Ministry have been held at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. During an exchange of views the sides came out in favour of an agreement on medium-range missiles in Europe, reduction of conventional arms and armed forces and prohibition of chemical weapons and elimination of their stockpiles. The Soviet side highly assessed Spain's decision to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, a decision corresponding to the efforts directed at ridding Europe of nuclear weapons and strengthening confidence, European and international security. Miranda was received by Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy foreign minister of the USSR. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 18 Mar 87 LD]

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